Beyond Liabilities: Survival Skills for the Young, Small, and Not-for-profit by Searing, Elizabeth A.M.
Georgia State University
ScholarWorks @ Georgia State University
Public Management and Policy Dissertations Department of Public Management and Policy
Summer 8-11-2015
Beyond Liabilities: Survival Skills for the Young,
Small, and Not-for-profit
Elizabeth A.M. Searing
Georgia State University
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.gsu.edu/pmap_diss
This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Department of Public Management and Policy at ScholarWorks @ Georgia State
University. It has been accepted for inclusion in Public Management and Policy Dissertations by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks @
Georgia State University. For more information, please contact scholarworks@gsu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Searing, Elizabeth A.M., "Beyond Liabilities: Survival Skills for the Young, Small, and Not-for-profit." Dissertation, Georgia State
University, 2015.
https://scholarworks.gsu.edu/pmap_diss/55
 
 
ABSTRACT 
BEYOND LIABILITIES: 
SURVIVAL SKILLS FOR THE YOUNG, SMALL, AND NOT-FOR-PROFIT 
By 
ELIZABETH ANNE MURDOCK SEARING 
MAY 19, 2015 
Committee Chair: Dr. Dennis Young 
Major Department: Public Management and Policy 
 This dissertation offers insight into the organizational lives of small and new not-
for-profits.  The first essay used three different estimation strategies to model the role of 
revenue type in the growth in young and small not-for-profits.  We find that increases in 
the percentage of a not-for-profit’s revenue portfolio going to dues, indirect support, or 
non-mission income will suppress growth and that there is no “optimal” model across 
subsectors.  The second essay uses over twenty years of panel data to predict which 
factors indicate the impending recovery of a financially vulnerable small and young 
nonprofit.  Support for hypotheses based in the literature is mixed, but the key insight is 
that nonprofits need to save if they want to get healthy: bringing in revenues is not 
enough.  Finally, the third essay uses a qualitative approach on young and new mental 
health not-for-profits in the state of New York.  Using comparative case studies, this 
study analyzes the internal and external factors surrounding the demise of small and 
young mental health nonprofits.  This study finds support for several of the potential 
causes of nonprofit demise in a newly proposed typology.   
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CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION 
 
“So never kick a dog, Because he's just a pup 
We'll fight like twenty armies, And we won't give up 
So you'd better run for cover When the pup grows up!” 
~ Gavroche, Les Miserables: The Musical 
 
 Life can be especially difficult for the small and the young, whether this pertains 
to individuals, businesses, or not-for-profit organizations.  In 1965, Stinchcombe argued 
that new organizations face an increased likelihood of failure due to their lack of internal 
structures and external ties to allies and resources; since then, scholars have explored the 
organizational and environmental factors that inhibit growth and increase the likelihood 
of demise for nonprofit organizations.  The intent of these studies has predominantly been 
empirical verification of the liabilities of smallness and newness; though this is valuable, 
very little explanation is made to further flesh out theory or to make practical 
recommendations for the not-for-profits themselves.  Especially given that almost all 
organizations spend time as both small and new, the lack of a dedicated branch of 
nonprofit scholarship to the small and new is surprising. 
 This study contains three essays exploring the difficulties faced by young and 
small nonprofits.  Each essay focuses on a separate and crucial question in the life of a 
small, new not-for-profit: how do I grow, how do I recover, and why did I die.  By using 
different methodological approaches and sources of data for each essay, this collection 
offers a comprehensive look at the organizational behavior and management of a small 
and new not-for-profit.   
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Theoretical Motivation: The Liabilities of Smallness and Newness 
 
 The determination of liabilities of smallness and newness reside primarily in the 
organizational ecology literature, which will be the umbrella used to frame the three 
essays in this study.  Beginning in 1965 with Stinchcombe’s work and continuing to 
flourish with the landmark contributions of Hannan, Freeman, and Carroll, the study of 
the complex web of relationships within and between organizations and their 
environment provides a comprehensive way to view a market niche.  Specifically, it 
provides a way to systematically analyze population dynamics without undermining the 
importance of individual organizations or any of the factors involved. 
  To what end is organizational ecology normally used?  Studies of organizational 
mortality are common: what about the internal and external characteristics of a situation 
affects the likelihood that an organization will cease to exist?  Initial research 
concentrated on verifying the popular “liabilities” of smallness and then newness, but 
later studies dug deeper into the causal mechanisms behind the phenomenon, such as the 
role of legitimacy in attracting resources.  Additionally, the use of the “niche” concept to 
describe the intricate market and landscape surrounding the organization is crucial to both 
organizational studies and fields such as industrial organization, where the ability to draw 
boundaries around a particular catchment area can be instrumental in decisions from 
marketing to mergers.  Niche width refers specifically to the organization type’s ability to 
survive: a wide niche means that the population (or organization, depending on your level 
of analysis) is able to be a flexible generalist about resources (John Freeman & Hannan, 
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1983).  On the opposite side, a resource specialist means that only one or a very few 
types of resources can be consumed.  This resource fascination is additionally peculiar 
given that demise is often determined through some kind of financial condition, though 
few organizational ecology studies explicitly consider financial metrics. 
Amburgey and Rao (1996) contend that the study of organizational ecology gave 
insufficient attention to the financial workings of organizations.  They argue that, as the 
lifeblood of an organization, the financials are an indicator for processes such as 
legitimation.  Further, even with the continuing debate over the objective functions of 
nonprofit managers and the ultimate measures of nonprofit success, the programs offered 
by the nonprofit still require a certain level of resources in order to be carried out.  In 
response, Chambré and Fatt (2002)  and Hager and Galaskiewicz (2001) produced studies 
which emphasized the role of finances in organizational studies.  This paralleled the 
development of the organizational vulnerability literature, which relies heavily on 
financial ratio analysis.  Though ratio analysis may not be organizational analysis per se, 
much of the empirical work verifying the liabilities of newness and smallness has been 
done using this approach; additionally, two of the three essays in this study adopt a 
similar view regarding the importance of financial mechanics, including one which 
highlights ratio analysis specifically. 
 
 The Liability of Newness 
 
Stinchcombe argues that older organizations are less likely to die for four reasons.  
Internally, new organizations do not have the routines and best practices of older firms, 
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and they also do not possess the resources to develop such skills in-house in a short 
period of time.  Externally, new organizations lack the time to have built up both allies 
and relationships with clients and other resources, all of which would decrease the search 
costs of finding revenues.
1
  Combined, these factors hinder young organizations more 
than others and increase the likelihood that they will close. 
 These results have held for a variety of industries: labor unions (J. Freeman, 
Carroll, & Hannan, 1983; Michael T Hannan & Freeman, 1988); newspaper 
organizations (G.R. Carroll & Delacroix, 1982; Glenn R Carroll & Huo, 1986); 
manufacturing organizations (Glenn R Carroll, 1983); start-ups commercializing 
university technologies (Scott & Stuart, 2002); independent pharmacies (Beliveau & 
Bernstein, 1997); and multinational corporations competing for foreign direct investment 
(FDI) (Peng, 2011).  Fichman and Levinthal (1991) extend the biological metaphor back 
into human behavior, stating that: 
 
“We  reinterpret  Stinchcombe's  arguments  as  a  special  case  of the  general  
problem  of  time  dependence  in  relationships  between  two  or  more social  
actors.  Indeed,  Stinchcombe's  arguments  for the  liability  of newness of  
organizations  describe  the  nature  of  the  dynamics  we  may  expect  for 
marriages,  jobs,  and  interorganizational  relationships.” (443) 
 
 The liability of newness has also been tested specifically in the nonprofit context.  
Singh et al. (1986) link the process for social service organizations of acquiring external 
legitimacy such as a community directory listing to higher survival rates; similar findings 
                                                          
1
 Further explanation and extension of the Stinchcombe typology occurs in the third essay. 
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have been made for social service organizations by Tucker et al. (1984).  Other literature 
also supports the liability of newness, though with a brief honeymoon period at the very 
beginning of life as the organization used its start-up funds and resources.
2
  This “liability 
of adolescence” is caused by the same underlying drivers as the liability of newness, but 
assumes an initial endowment of resources and enthusiasm that sustains the organization 
through infancy (Bruderl & Schussler, 1990; Chambré & Fatt, 2002; Fichman & 
Levinthal, 1991). 
 
The Liability of Smallness 
 
 Whereas the liability of newness stems from a lack of time to build necessary 
relationships between nonprofits and their environment, the liability of smallness can 
afflict an organization older than a century; further, newness is a title that has a necessary 
end after a finite amount of time, whether the organization passes into the next age status 
or ceases to operate entirely.  The liability of size, however, can afflict an organization 
indefinitely, which causes a heterogeneous mix that has been under-theorized in 
comparison to the liability of size (Mark A. Hager, 1999). 
Longstanding scholarship in the for-profit sector discusses the liability of 
smallness.  In 1945, Butters and Lintner describe the difficulties small firms face  in 
relying almost exclusively on retained earnings rather than external financing to grow or 
survive through shocks.  Star and Massel (1981) and the Small Business Administration 
(1983) find that firms with more sales have higher survival rates.  Bruderl and Schussler 
                                                          
2
 These and other authors have labelled this phenomenon the “liability of adolescence”; this concept is 
explained more fully in the third essay of this collection. 
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(1990) find a severe liability of smallness in their work on Bavarian small businesses, 
while Wholey at al. (1992) find that HMOs run by independent practitioners are more 
likely to fail because they are unable to achieve economies of scale.   
In the nonprofit sector, Frumkin (2002)  suggests that small nonprofits are 
disadvantaged in five ways.  First, the lack of access to equity capital makes scaling the 
enterprise difficult.  Second, small nonprofits are less likely to have a “honeymoon” 
period of working through the original endowment of resources that a for-profit often 
enjoys.  Small nonprofits also rarely have the political connections and clout that a larger 
nonprofit would, and they may not be able to attract or maintain the same level of human 
resources as larger organizations.  Finally, unlike their small counterparts in the for-profit 
sector, small nonprofits that cut corners or cream off the top clients would help their 
bottom line, but potentially violate sector norms.  Similarly, Wollebaek (2009) notes a 
liability of smallness in local voluntary associations in Norway, while Fernandez (2008) 
finds similar results with Spanish associations. 
Hager et al. (2004) is one of a few, but growing number of studies that includes 
both the liabilities of smallness and newness within the same test.  They find that funding 
source and volunteer participation contribute to the liabilities of age and newness, with 
several interaction effects.  Freeman, Carroll, and Hannan (1983) also find deleterious 
impacts of both age and size, even with both variables in the model.  Bruderl and 
Schussler (1990) address both, though they find a stronger argument for a liability of 
adolescence than of newness outright. 
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Empirical Motivation: The State of Young and Small Not-for-profits 
  
 Though the liabilities of size and youth are accepted in the literature, these 
findings have left large gaps in both the theory and practical applications.  All 
organizations were once new and almost all were small, and the possession of these traits 
is something that may be difficult to address from a strategic management perspective.  
The needs of managing the difficulties of the large and established are very different from 
those of the young and new, thus they deserve their own study and best practices (H. 
Aldrich & Auster, 1986).  Infant organizations, regardless of corporate form or tax 
exemption status, often look more similar to each other than they do more established 
organizations of their own kind.  Further, like small business, most of the nonprofit sector 
is made up of very small organizations (See Table 1).  
Further, revenues in the nonprofit sector have an extremely positive skew, with 
two percent of the population reporting no revenues at all (National Center for Charitable 
Statistics, 2012).
3
  Lecy (2010) found that the top 1% of the NP in INGOs attracted 60% 
of the sector’s resources in 2007; in terms of survival rates, between the 25th and 75th 
percentile in size there was practically no difference in hazard rate of mortality, but the 
organizations at the 95
th
 percentile had hazard rates so low that the median time could not 
be estimated with the available data..  This distribution complicates financial practice and 
theory, since prescribing advice to the “mean” nonprofit with $4.6 million in total 
revenues actually addresses a level of revenues higher than that of 92% of the 
organizations (National Center for Charitable Statistics, 2012).    
                                                          
3
 Given that only organizations that collect over $25,000 are required to file tax forms, we expect that 2% is 
underreporting the true amount of registered nonprofits with no revenues. 
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Table 1 
Size Distribution of Not-for-profits Filing Tax Returns, 2012 
 
Percentile 
Centile 
(in USD) 
[95% Conf. Interval] 
(in USD) 
0 0 -218,265,024    -218,265,024* 
10 11,678 11,459 11,886 
20 32,747 32,450 33,029 
30 55,129 54,813 55,487 
40 83,763 83,180 84,296 
50 130,074 129,117 131,022 
60 214,761 212,813 216,717 
70 394,,870 390,932 398,554 
80 855,783 845,582 865,785 
90 2,827,935 2,784,367 2,871,384 
100 40,148,557,824 40,148,557,824 40,148,557,824 
* Lower (upper) confidence limit held at minimum (maximum) of sample 
Size is operationalized through the use of total revenues.
4
 
N=373,291 
 
 
Table 2 
 
Age Distribution of Not-for-profits Filing Tax Returns, 2012 
Percentile Centile [95% Conf. Interval] 
0 -1 -1 -1* 
10 2 2 2 
20 5 5 5 
30 8 8 8 
40 11 11 11 
50 15 15 15 
60 19 19 19 
70 25 25 25 
80 32 32 32 
90 43 43 43 
100 113 113 113* 
* Lower (upper) confidence limit held at minimum (maximum) of sample 
Age is defined as the difference between the fiscal year and the date the IRS approved of 
that organization’s application.  N=373,291 
 
                                                          
4
 Variable used to operationalize size will vary according to study in this dissertation. 
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A similar distribution applies for age, though not as severe (see Table 2).  The 
mean age of a nonprofit since the date the IRS ruled on their nonprofit status is just under 
twenty years, though half of the sample is fifteen years old or less.
5
  With such a large 
part of the sector considered both small and new, the lack of a specialized literature 
similar to that in for-profit small-to-medium sized enterprise (SME) research is startling. 
 
 
 
Figure 1.  Percentage of Not-for-Profits which are Small and New, 2012 (Core Files) 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
5
 There is a healthy debate over whether age is best captured using the reported date of formation or the 
date on which the IRS ruled on the tax status of the nonprofit.  The rule date was chosen because it was 
generally more reliable in the NCCS data, can be verified through the IRS, and would likely signal a 
substantial change in revenue portfolio once the exemption was gained. 
34% 
13% 
25% 
28% 
Neither
New (Age ≤ 10) 
Both
Small                                   
(Total Revenues ≤ 
$150K) 
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Research Framework 
 
 Both theoretically and empirically, this collection of essays is designed to move 
beyond the categorizations of smallness and newness to provide additional insight into 
how to survive as a not-for-profit.  As mentioned by Hager (1999), the primary wave of 
organizational ecology research into the liability of newness occurred during the 1980’s; 
the majority of the work in the offshoot of financial ratio analysis occurred in the 2000’s.  
However, the continuation of the work by drilling down into and past these unique 
subsets of organizations has not occurred.  Even in 2004, Hager et al. (2004) bemoaned 
that:  
 
Perhaps as a consequence of the ubiquity of this ﬁnding [that young organizations 
close down more often than older organizations], the vanguard of research in the 
ecological tradition no longer focuses on age dependence and examines other 
determinants of organizational demise. The age variable, once the central interest 
in studies of organizational demise, became merely a control variable in new 
branches of the ﬁeld. (161) 
 
This study, therefore, is designed to be the next step in rejuvenating and expanding the 
conditions of being small and being new beyond the designation of a liability.   
This collection of essays poses three crucial and sequential questions in the life of 
a small, new not-for-profit: how do I grow, how do I recover, and why did I die (see 
Figure 2). 
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Figure 2.  Dissertation Research Framework 
 
 
All three questions are related.  First, all three processes – growth, recovery, and 
death – are strongly influenced by the liabilities of size and age.  Second, the answers to 
all three could hypothetically be the same factors, only employed in slightly different 
ways or having different impacts.  Finally, the questions regarding recovery and demise 
could be seen as asking the same question from two different points in time.  Though this 
has some validity, there are differences.  For example, revenue differentiation has a 
negative or insignificant role in nonprofit growth (D. A. Carroll & Stater, 2009; W. 
Foster & Fine, 2007), but has a positive impact on the likelihood of staying alive (Mark 
A. Hager, 2001).  Further, to navigate the series of unfortunate events that ends the 
hypothetical not-for-profit undergoing the process in Figure 2, these essays employ a 
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variety of methods and data sources, with the demise essay utilizing a unique and 
qualitative dataset. 
The first essay evaluates the impact that different types of revenues have on the 
growth of small and young nonprofits.  Using the extremely detailed financial 
information found in the National Center of Charitable Statistics’ (NCCS’s) digitized 
dataset, we use panel data estimation techniques to untangle the growth in program 
expenditures associated with different funding types.  Aside from being the first study to 
model the impact of revenue on nonprofit firm growth using this estimation method, the 
insight gained from knowing how a small and young nonprofit should dedicate its scant 
resources is invaluable to both managers facing such decisions and to the academics and 
other experts that provide advice on such scenarios. 
The second essay begins with the assumption that a nonprofit is already 
financially vulnerable. The standard use of financial ratio analysis in the nonprofit 
literature is to predict demise.  This essay, however, uses logistic regression to analyze 
the ratios and underlying financial behaviors that predict which nonprofits will recover 
from financial vulnerability.  This extends both the robust financial and demise literatures 
in nonprofits, in addition to providing useful information to nonprofit leaders in financial 
management. 
The final essay uses classical organizational ecology to compare cases of young 
and small child welfare organizations in Georgia and New York that have closed to those 
that remain open.  The theories described in the demise frameworks of Stinchcombe 
(1965) and Hager (1999)  inform the design of a typology of demise specifically for 
young and new not-for-profits.  Semi-structured interviews and structured reviews of the 
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child welfare nonprofits’ environments are used to validate the six different fundamental 
causes of nonprofit demise for the young and new described in the typology. 
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CHAPTER II: THE ROLE OF REVENUE TYPE IN THE GROWTH OF SMALL AND 
YOUNG NOT-FOR-PROFITS: A DYNAMIC ANALYSIS 
 
Introduction 
 
 From Flintstone’s™ chewable vitamins to Eukanuba puppy chow, the consumer 
market generally recognizes that the young and small have their own unique nutritional 
needs; even though some of the basic inputs are the same, portion size and the diversity 
of the diet are different for different sizes and stages of life.  The same lesson holds for 
organizations.  Enterprises often thrive on different types of revenue and support 
according to how large they are and the stage of life that they are in.  Enterprises founded 
by entrepreneurs, regardless of tax status, are often self-funded (Searing, 2014); however, 
this changes as the organization grows and the behavior of corporate types diverge.  For-
profit organizations are expected to become solely supported by commercial activities 
(with potentially some leverage), while not-for-profits (NFPs) face a more diverse and 
complex portfolio of funding options. 
 How small organizations grow is one of the central preoccupations of the field of 
economics, with formal study extending back at least a century  (Coase, 1937; Marshall, 
1920; Penrose, 2002).  This appeal is agnostic to sub-discipline of economics, with 
interest in the growth of developing countries, small municipalities, and small firms all 
attracting dedicated scholars. In fact, the vast majority of firm growth studies in the for-
profit sector concentrate on small-to-medium size enterprises (SMEs) (Davidsson, 
Achtenhagen, & Naldi, 2010).  This is in direct contrast to the not-for-profit sector, 
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however, where a subfield dedicated to the management needs of the small and young 
not-for-profit is conspicuously absent. In contrast, many of the empirical organizational 
growth studies in NFPs are done across a variety of sizes in particular subsectors (Corbin, 
1999; Huggett, 2012; Kimberlin, Schwartz, & Austin, 2011), in specific locations 
(Galaskiewicz, Bielefeld, & Dowell, 2006; Trzcinski & Sobeck, 2012), or on large 
organizations specifically, which are often weighted heavily in publicly available datasets 
(W. Foster & Fine, 2007). 
  As suggested by Stinchcombe (1965) in his description of organizational 
liabilities (please see Chapter 1 and 4 for additional elaboration), young and small not-
for-profits face high mortality rates, in part due to their limited resources; this includes 
both internal business processes and access to external capital.  Though there has been 
research on the impact of different types of revenue on various measures of growth 
(including potential benefits of revenue diversification), the role of revenue type in the 
growth of small not-for-profits has been understudied.  Given the importance of revenue 
source in consumer spending and marketing, this is a glaring omission.  Studies have 
shown that individual people spend gifts differently than they do earned income (Arkes et 
al., 1994; O'Curry & Strahilevitz, 2001; Raghubir & Srivastava, 2008; White, 2006).  
Therefore, I would expect the traits of different revenues to influence spending behavior 
and growth. 
This study expands the literature in three ways.  First, it uniquely synthesizes the 
broader and more robust literature on NFP revenues with organization-level growth 
modelling sensitive to income type.  Second, the emphasis on young and new not-for-
profits contributes to the understanding of a vulnerable, but under-studied part of the 
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sector.  Third, this study contributes to the sparse, but growing theory of financial 
management dedicated to NFPs. 
This essay uses three different estimation strategies to model the role of revenue 
type in the growth in young and small not-for-profits.  I begin by reviewing the current 
literature on growth factors for not-for-profit enterprises; I then discuss the uniqueness of 
small enterprise growth in the non-profit sector.  The next section describes the variables 
and corresponding hypotheses, where I detail the relationships we expect to find between 
different types of revenue and increasing levels of total expenses.  Following descriptions 
of the three modelling specifications and the data, the results are clustered and discussed 
by sector within each model.  Limitations and implications conclude, followed by 
extensive appendices. 
 
Theories of Not-for-Profit Growth 
 
When measuring success in traditional for-profit companies, metrics such as 
profit, asset growth rate, number of employees, or earnings per share often apply 
(Muurlink, Wilkinson, Peetz, & Townsend, 2011).  In not-for-profits, however, 
measuring success is more difficult because the definition of success is not as clear.  For 
example, is a “successful” NFP one that has grown its revenues, increased the number of 
clients served, or deployed the program with the most impact to a fixed audience size?  
As an additional complication, these metrics of success are not necessarily positively 
correlated.  For example, they can often be inversely related: larger amounts of retained 
earnings could potentially (but not necessarily) come from decreased amounts of 
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programming.  The seminal NFP growth work of James (1983) suggests that such metrics 
may hide the important relationships behind growth; she suggests that nonprofit firms 
will diversify their revenue portfolios by offering market items (which their managers 
may dislike) as a way of subsidizing and furthering their own missions, thereby making 
non-mission activities and mission activities a form of complementary goods. 
This discussion is part of a long and vigorous discussion on what the objective 
function for a nonprofit is and how it is operationalized from the viewpoint of leadership 
within the NFP (Hughes & Luksetich, 2010).  Hansmann (1981) suggests that price-
discrimination allows NFPs to achieve multiple different objectives (such as output-
maximization, quality-maximization, and budget-maximization), and also that one can 
observe the objective function by studying the allocation of particular revenue streams.  
Steinberg and Weisbrod (1998) employ price-discrimination in a similar fashion, 
designing a system of weights that allow certain consumers to have higher levels of 
importance in the utility-weighting schema than others.  These theoretical approaches 
assume that all those with a voice in determining the course of a NFP agree.  Rose-
Ackerman has several studies which address this mechanism, whether it is in the potential 
dissonance between donors and nonprofit managers (Rose-Ackerman, 1987) or the 
potential synergies between donors and idealistic NFP entrepreneurs (Rose-Ackerman, 
1996). 
By focusing on firm growth, this study makes assumptions regarding the objective 
function of the NFP (described in the variables sections). However, Steinberg (1986) 
emphasizes that such functions need to adapt to legal, competitive, and financial 
conditions, and that certain metrics exist (such as program expenditure growth) that can 
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reasonably approximate several different objective function specifications (Steinberg & 
Gray, 1993).  Beyond this flexibility, however, this study also heeds the call of Young 
(2003) that supply-side factors in the nonprofit sector have been under-studied.  By 
disentangling the role of revenue types in firm growth, this study will help refine the 
assumptions initially made regarding organization-level decisions and objectives. 
 
The Uniqueness of Small Enterprise Growth 
 
The lack of a subspecialty in small and young not-for-profits is especially 
surprising given that the particular needs of the small and young are consistent across the 
for-profit/not-for-profit border (Beck, Lengnick-Hall, & Lengnick-Hall, 2008).  
Schneider (2003) emphasizes the simple internal characteristics of small not-for-profits, 
which echoes the remarks of Stinchcombe’s internal characteristics of the liability of 
newness; this is further elaborated in Beck et al. (2008), who describe small not-for-
profits as having less job specialization and, therefore, less orientation on the specific 
operations of the position.  Though this results in a great deal of latitude for employees 
and volunteers to make decisions, this may not be in the best interest of the organization 
if those individuals do not possess the required skill sets.
6
  In particular, the staff, 
volunteers, and board of small not-for-profits often lack the specialized skill sets of 
financial management (Kennard Wing, Hager, Rooney, & Pollak, 2004) and information 
technology (Schneider, 2003). 
                                                          
6
 To further underscore this point, the emphasis of the Beck et al. (2008) article is on how for-profit 
practices are generally not adaptable to the not-for-profit sector; however, the authors believe that the 
similarities between the small organizations of both types warrant mention. 
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Beyond the potential lack of the human resources necessary to construct optimal growth 
structures, the limited size and experience of these not-for-profits are themselves an 
obstacle to many types of funding.  Calabrese (2011b) describes obstacles to certain types 
of capitalization  for small not-for-profits, such as the inability to conduct a capital 
campaign without established relationships with donors, cost analysis techniques and 
tools, and the capacity to manage the undertaking in-house.  Frumkin (2002) makes 
similar arguments, noting an extreme lack of capital for small not-for-profits, especially 
at the beginning; unlike for-profits, there is no equity to entice venture capital or, rarely, 
assets to guarantee commercial loans. 
However, for the small and young, even the prospect of financial success can be 
problematic: the sudden influx of funds will cause an immediate need for different types 
of assets, organizational complexity, and (hopefully) planning for further capitalization 
(Miller, 2007).  However, often it is the planning of the financial capacity that receives 
the shortest shrift, partially because the organization has been able to get by on sweat 
equity when it was very small.  As noted by the Not-for-profit Finance Fund: 
 
There is a belief in the not-for-profit sector that energy, will power, 
stamina and enthusiasm can overcome all obstacles, and that where it does 
not, this is rooted in some sort of personal failing. The idea that an 
inappropriate capital structure can somehow subvert an organization’s 
ability to meet its objectives can seem overly deterministic, fatalistic even. 
The temptation in the face of adversity is to say to oneself, "We must work 
harder," rather than to look at the balance sheet – where money is or is not 
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allocated – for systemic reasons for failure. However, what works for 
small organizations rarely works for larger, more complicated institutions, 
and vice versa. In other words, "sweat equity" and an organizational 
culture (and capacity) driven mainly by stamina or enthusiasm does not 
scale well. (Miller, 2007, pp. 228-229) 
 
 In one of the few studies of not-for-profit growth for small not-for-profits, 
Trzcinski and Sobeck (2012) surveyed 383 small- and medium-sized not-for-profits from 
their local area.  Their definition of growth was a self-reported description of change in 
staff size, clients served, number of programs, and budget size, which was distilled into a 
composite of change that could take negative, absent, or positive values of growth.  Using 
two cross-sectional estimation strategies, Trzcinski and Sobeck (2012) found that 
program development activities and positive attitude towards change were significantly 
related to growth in both models.  Of more note are the relationships that lacked 
statistical significance for Trzcinski and Sobeck (2012), such as age, staff size, and 
management capacity.  These curious results are one of the motivations behind the 
authors’ call for research specifically dedicated to small- and medium-sized not-for-
profits.  
 
The Role of Revenue Type 
 
 The not-for-profit sector has a long and rich fascination with revenue sources: 
what they are, what organization changes they cause, how they impact each other, and 
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what impacts they have on firm size or success (Froelich, 1999; Moore, 2000; D. R. 
Young, 2007a; D. R. Young, Wilsker, & Grinsfelder, 2010).  Froelich (1999)     
developed profiles of three broadly-defined revenue sources (private contributions, 
government funding, and commercial activity) according to their volatility, goal 
displacement effects, effects on internal processes, and effects on the NPF structure.  
Froelich (1999) notes that more commercial types of income may be less constraining 
than traditional sources of revenue such as private donations, but that there may be long 
term legitimacy questions for the sector if such sources are pursued.  Pratt (2002, 2005) 
developed a typology of NPF revenues based on their degrees of reliability and 
autonomy, then developed 8 different revenue archetypes to describe different 
organizations.  Bowman (2011a) discusses several theories of revenue management based 
on such characteristics and notes the differences between subsectors and activity types.  
Several authors call for and contribute toward a “normative theory” of nonprofit finance 
that would guide nonprofits through these complex revenue choices (Bowman, 2011a; 
Mitchell, 2015; D. R. Young, 2007b) 
 Even beyond their practical characteristics such as reliability, revenues can have 
impacts on the organization itself.  For example, higher revenues are often confounded 
with higher degrees of professionalization (Kim, 2012; McPeak, 2001; Sandberg, 2011; 
Suárez, 2011).  This makes intuitive sense from the view of Stinchcombe’s liabilities, 
where the low amounts of human capital resources that are associated with the liability of 
newness and youth begin to disappear; however, there are concerns in the field that 
increased professionalization may be bringing in unsavory aspects of the business sector 
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(Beck, et al., 2008; Lewis, 2002; Lindenberg, 2001; McPeak, 2001) or displacing the 
voice of volunteers (O'Reilly, 2011; Trolander, 1982).   
 Some areas of the literature focus purely on the role of revenues in the overall 
health and growth of the not-for-profit firm, though few with the same research focus as 
this study.  For example, in their study of the 144 not-for-profits that have grown larger 
than $150 million in total revenues, Foster and Fine (2007) determine that 40 percent of 
their funding came from the government, 33 percent from service fees, 19 percent from 
corporate giving, 6 percent from individual donations, and only 2 percent from 
foundations.  Unfortunately, this is a picture from the opposite end of the age and size 
distribution than where the vast majority of the sector operates (and where the current 
essay concentrates).  Similarly, in a near reversal of the current research question that 
asks about the impact of revenues on total expenses, Carroll and Stater (2009) find that 
changes in total expenses have the largest impact on revenue volatility, more so than 
changes in retained earnings or diversification.   
 There are, however, studies which have taken the first steps in exploring the 
impact of revenue type on firm growth more closely.  Using total expenses as a measure 
of financial health, Galaskiewicz, Bielefeld, and Dowell (2006) found that not-for-profits 
that relied more on donations performed better with larger numbers of social contacts in 
their network, while  not-for-profits which relied on more market revenue performed 
better when they had fewer contacts.  Pratt (2005) advocates that organizations may find 
themselves more suited to certain types of revenues, and thus should concentrate on 
accommodating and managing the available options.  To do so, he develops a typology of 
revenue sources according to degree of reliability and of autonomy, and then offers 
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recommendations for handling combinations of each type. As a general rule, however, 
the majority of literature in how to use revenues to spur growth is from the practitioner 
side, with some notable exceptions (Bowman, Tuckman, & Young, 2011; Froelich, 1999; 
Kearns, 2007; D. R. Young, 2007a, 2007b; D. R. Young, 1999). 
Though linkages between revenues and not-for-profit growth may not have been 
fully explored, research exists on several of the revenue types either singly or in 
opposition to each other.  Large sections of the not-for-profit revenue literature involve 
the relationships among revenue types; specifically, there is a great deal of analysis 
regarding whether the presence of government funding will “crowd out” other forms of 
revenue, especially private giving (Andreoni & Payne, 2003; Bergstrom, Blume, & 
Varian, 1986; Arthur C. Brooks, 2003; Hungerman, 2005; Owalla, 2007; Bruce A. 
Seaman, 1980; D. Tinkelman, 2010).  Another area of the literature addresses the role of 
revenue “diversification,” or whether not-for-profits should concentrate on having 
income from a variety of sources or specialize in just one or two (D. A. Carroll & Stater, 
2009; Chang & Tuckman, 1994; Grace L Chikoto & Neely, 2013; Froelich, 1999; 
Frumkin & Keating, 2011; Lin, 2010).  Finally, the emerging framework of benefits 
theory explores the relationship between the type of revenue and the nature of the 
services provided by the not-for-profit (Wilsker & Young, 2010; D. R. Young, et al., 
2010); though this generally does not look at the relationship between revenue growth 
and income type per se, it does lay the groundwork for a functional relationship between 
revenue types and operations. 
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Variables and Hypotheses 
 
Dependent variable 
 
 Unlike a for-profit organization, there are many ways to define and measure the 
success of a non-profit organization.  This paper selects the change in a NFP’s total 
annual expenses as the best measure of growth.
7
  This is for several reasons.  First, it is 
reasonable to assume that service provision maximization is the focus of the objective 
function for the not-for-profit executive director (Ansari, Siddarth, & Weinberg, 1996; 
Weinberg, 1978).  Though service provision maximization is not universally accepted, 
other objectives (such as modified profit maximization, quantity/quality trade-offs, mixed 
motives, etc.) can be feasibly modelled in this scenario by program expenditure growth 
(Steinberg, 1986).  Even budget maximization can potentially be justifiably modelled by 
invoking the potential for funding future program expenditures with reserved profits (H. 
B. Hansmann, 1980); Ramirez (2011) finds that not-for-profits that stockpile large 
amounts of cash are more likely than others to spend on land and capital assets in later 
periods.  
 Second, there is a logical objection that program expenditures alone, rather than 
total expenditures, should be used.  The election to use total expenditures stems from the 
choice of data available from the National Center of Charitable Statistics (NCCS) and the 
not-for-profits who fill them out notoriously understate overhead and fundraising 
expenses, whether accidentally or as a way of increasing their appeal to donors (J. D. 
                                                          
7
 Specifically, this is the growth rate of the natural logarithm of the NFP’s total expenditure, but this will be 
made more clear in the model specification. 
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Lecy & Searing, 2014; K. Wing & Hager, 2004).  In contrast, program expenses are often 
overstated (Ranjani Krishnan, Yetman, & Yetman, 2006; J. Trussel, 2003).  Therefore, it 
is more complete to simply use the total expense figure.  
 Third, the common metric of employment (whether full time, volunteer, or some 
kind of man-hour unit) is not as appropriate for the small and young not-for-profit 
analysis as for studies targeting the entire sector since many organizations will have 
extremely few or no employees.  Further, the information available on employment and 
volunteer levels is also very limited (Lampkin & Boris, 2002). 
 
Independent variables: Revenue Types 
 
 When attempting to capture the impact of price or income changes on spending 
behavior, two separate effects need to be evaluated.  These are the income effect, which 
is the change in behavior directly attributable to the increase in income or purchasing 
power, and the substitution effect, which is the change in behavior that occurs from 
substituting other goods or services for the original.  This approach has been used not 
only in traditional consumption studies involving demand elasticities for consumer 
goods, but also in public finance studies involving the responsiveness of taxable income 
to marginal tax rate (Feldstein, 1995; Gruber & Saez, 2002) and crowding out of private 
donations by government funding in NPFs (Abrams & Schitz, 1978; Bruce Robert 
Kingma, 1989; Schiff, 1985; Simmons & Emanuele, 2004).  In this study, we are not 
focused on the mechanisms by which the acquisition of a particular revenue type 
influences the acquisition of another; rather, we are interested in how the acquisition of a 
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revenue type influences the overall growth and spending of the organization.  This still 
requires the careful separation of income and substitution effects: what changes are due 
simply to an increase in that revenue, and what changes are attributable to the increase in 
the overall revenue portfolio belonging to that revenue.  Each revenue type in the study 
will be evaluated on both effects.
8
 
 Our first hypothesis is that the “income” effect9 for all revenue types will be 
positive.  It is intuitive that increases in money available will increase spending, though 
the degree may vary.
10
  Though certain theoretical arguments in the literature regarding 
legitimacy could be used to argue that total expense decreases may occur over time 
despite increases in individual revenues, they are insufficient to overcome the notion that 
increased income will increase spending levels.
11
 
 
H1:  An increase in any revenue will cause an increase in growth, holding revenue 
portfolio changes constant.  
 
The literature does not, however, provide such a straightforward prognosis on 
“substitution” effects; rather, the hypotheses vary depending on the revenue. 
 
 
                                                          
8
 The unique insights gained from the separation of these two effects plus the ability to employ elasticities 
during interpretation of some coefficients are some of the reasons that a level form of growth rather than a 
growth rate was estimated. 
9
 We will call this a “revenue level effect” in the study since there are technical differences in our 
estimation strategy from some definitions of “income effect.” 
10
 This may not seem particularly exciting, however the most important function of teasing apart the 
revenue effect is that it leaves the substation effect.  Additionally, this allows the interpretation of the 
logged revenue level results as elasticities.   
11
 This does make an assumption that the total expenses are essentially considered a “normal good,” but 
there is a fairly safe assumption. 
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Private Giving 
 
 First, donative support from private sources has been declining as a percentage of 
total revenues for almost twenty years (Froelich, 1999).  Despite its symbolism as the 
backbone of the donative sector and monetary proxy of civil society, scholarship noting 
the susceptibility of donors to market strategies such as solicitation, advertising, and 
signaling emerged early in both the US (Okten & Weisbrod, 2000; Weisbrod & 
Dominguez, 1986) and the UK (Posnett & Sandler, 1989).  Further, in terms of overall 
not-for-profit financial health, Chambré and Fatt (2002) found that the likelihood of not-
for-profit demise was very high for small not-for-profits that depended on private sources 
of funding for support: 39% of their not-for-profit sample that relied on private sources of 
funds survived, compared to the 82% survival rate of not-for-profits dependent on public 
funds. 
 What causes the high mortality rate among donative not-for-profits?  The primary 
drawback appears to be the instability.  In Gronbjerg (1992, 1993), some of the 
organizations interviewed reported having changes of over 50% in the total amount 
received from year to year, which made budgeting and program continuity extremely 
difficult for the staff.  Also, soliciting donations or writing foundation grant applications 
requires a large amount of staff time that is not put toward program activities (Froelich, 
1999).  This reorientation from service provision to courting individual donors can cause 
a disconnect with other stakeholders (Gronbjerg, 1992, 1993), subject the organization to 
chasing fads (Rossi, 1978), and contribute to goal displacement (Gronbjerg, 1993; 
Odendahl, 1990). 
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 Similar concerns exist for other types of private donative funding.  DiMaggio 
(1986) warns of similar volatility concerns regarding foundation funding, but notes that 
foundations may be involved in strategic planning with the organization or make multi-
year grants, which may decrease the severity.  However, the concerns regarding the staff 
requirements and goal displacement for attracting and fulfilling the requirements of funds 
for both foundation and corporate sponsors remain (Kelly, 1997).   This volatility, 
however, can be addressed to achieve other benefits of private donative funding.  For 
example, Carroll and Stater (2009) find that the negative impacts of relying purely on 
donations decrease for every additional 5% of revenue portfolio diversification, with the 
strongest benefits seen when the organization is just beginning to diversify. 
Other studies have investigated the elasticities associated with fundraising 
specifically, often interested in empirically verifying the existence of “excessive” 
fundraising introduced by Rose-Ackerman (1982).  Using a 2SLS model with fixed 
effects to control endogeneity and employ lagged variables as instruments, Okten and 
Weisbrod (2000) find that few nonprofits “optimally” fundraise and that crowd-out rarely 
occurs, though their results vary depending on industry..  Jacobs and Marudas (2006) 
estimate the fundraising elasticity of the Nonprofit Times 100 organizations and find a 
wide variety; they estimate their model using the Prais-Winsten method on a pooled cross 
section of their organizations.  After estimating the model, the authors provide a list of all 
organizations in their sample and their corresponding level of fundraising (“excessive,” 
“optimal,” or “insufficient.”).  Smith (2007) employs the Okten and Weisbrod model to 
study the effect of government money on donations to specific types of Arts 
organizations, finding that crowding-in is actually more prevalent in some types of 
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organizations than crowding out.  Though this study is not directly focused on the 
fundraising process, the degree to which organizations devote resources to pursue private 
giving emphasizes its desirable role as a central component in the revenue portfolio.  
Increased private giving appears to be a proxy for (or at least stepping stone of) 
organizational success as a NFP. 
 
H2a:  A larger percentage of total revenue coming from private giving will increase the 
total expenses of a not-for-profit, holding the revenue level constant..  
 
Despite the increasing difficulty in obtaining private donative dollars, an increased share 
of the revenue portfolio should signify both a popular endorsement of the not-for-profit 
and a signal of increasing donative revenues to come. 
 
Dues 
 
 Dues are revenues that members of a nonprofit organization pay to belong to the 
organization.  Though the majority of small organizations do not rely heavily on dues 
(please see Appendix 2A.3), but many have them to some degree; further, there are 
particular types of organizations which can be more dependent on dues.  First, as 
suggested by Knoke (1990), a few national organizations are sustained by extremely 
large memberships, especially in the case of large issue advocates such as environmental 
protection or particular types of illness. Second, as suggested by Smith (2000), grassroots 
organizations can also be heavily dependent on dues for revenues.  Bielefield (2000) uses 
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the percentage of income from dues as a proxy for grassroots support in his analysis of 
metropolitan NCCS data.  Therefore, we would expect a study which focuses on small 
and young organizations to have a larger proportion of not-for-profits that are heavily 
reliant on dues than a study which looks at the sector at large.  It is also therefore 
reasonable to consider that an increase in dues as a small nonprofit symbolizes increased 
grassroots support, which would indicate nonprofit growth. 
 
H2b:  A larger percentage of total revenue coming from dues will increase the total 
expenses of a not-for-profit, holding the revenue level constant. 
 
There is a note of caution, however.  According to the Internal Revenue Service 
(IRS), the portion of income that can be traced directly to a tangible benefit is, in fact, the 
only portion that can be counted as dues; the right to vote or the social benefit from 
simply being a member is not considered a membership benefit (Internal Revenue 
Service, 1999).  If there is not a tangible membership benefit, then the income should be 
classified as a donation.  For example, if you wrote the Loving Animals Forever Fund a 
check for $20 but received an umbrella worth $3, only that $3 can be counted as dues.  
The mechanics of small grassroots organizations subsisting largely on dues for which 
they are returning a tangible benefit does not seem logical; rather, such organizations 
would have many members who wished to support the activities of the organization 
through “membership” that according to the IRS should be considered donation.  To my 
knowledge, there has not yet been a study looking specifically at the fidelity of the dues 
revenue classification.  It is not unreasonable to assume that both very large organizations 
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with token membership gifts and small organizations with almost no membership perks 
aside from intangible ones may be misreporting their dues according to the IRS 
definition.  Since there is no way to predict how this may manifest, however, it does not 
influence the hypothesis. 
 
Indirect Support 
 
 Similar arguments can be made regarding indirect public support, which fewer 
organizations receive.  Indirect public support is funding that originates with private 
donors, but then arrives at the not-for-profit by way of an intermediary not-for-profit 
(Hughes & Luksetich, 2004).  An example is the United Way, where a unified or 
federated campaign for donated revenue as an inflow to the United Way is then granted 
out again to other NFPs.  Catholic Charities has a similar model, as do many community 
foundations.
12
  Indirect support also describes any donations or transfers between 
subsidiary, parent, or sibling organizations  This can be support from a dedicated 
supporting foundation, such as Heifer, International and the Heifer Foundation, or 
support between NFPs in a more complicated network of organizations such as chapters 
of a national membership organization.  Some NFPs also maintain ties through their 
original founder to both the parent and other sibling organizations, such as a church, or 
have developed a system of affiliated partnerships through common missions or 
geographical areas of focus.  
                                                          
12
 Foundations have been excluded from this particular study as organizations, but support received from 
such organizations by NFPs will emerge as indirect revenue within the sample. 
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 There are several advantages to funds received from indirect public sources.  
First, they could simply be monetary expressions of an organizational relationship that is 
already there.  This means that fundraising dollars spent cultivating this revenue source 
are minimal or nonexistent.  Second, even if the indirect funds are from a federated 
source, these organizations can take advantage of economies of scale in fundraising.  For 
example, rather than 20 nonprofits running their own campaigns soliciting donations, the 
paper and monetary resources that would have been spent are saved since only the 
federated nonprofit has to solicit the public funds.  Young (2001, p. 146) refers to this as 
“reduc[ing] the average cost of the charitable dollar.” However, as Young (2001) also 
points out, this causes a sizable concentration of power in the hands of the federated 
organization that could be problematic. 
 Indirect support, therefore, would be subject to many of the same concerns 
regarding the flow of private resources that direct donations would be; though this means 
that the income itself is subject to the same liabilities of direct support, but without the 
level of direct control such as fundraising that can be extended by an organization to 
prospective donors.  The decision regarding whether and how much revenue the not-for-
profit receives from indirect support often rests with the donating organization.  This loss 
of autonomy in the pursuit of funds is a serious consideration in the use of indirect 
support. 
 
H2c:  A larger percentage of total revenue coming from indirect support will decrease 
the total expenses of a not-for-profit, holding the revenue level constant. 
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Unlike private giving, where an increased percentage of the revenue portfolio signifies 
increased popular endorsement, an increase in the percentage of Indirect Giving signifies 
a shift away from direct donor engagement.  Depending on the source of funds, an 
increase in the percentage of total revenue stemming from indirect giving could mean 
either an increasing reliance on an affiliate or from a federated program.  Either one 
signifies a shift in a power relationship away from the not-for-profit as the funding body 
becomes more influential. 
 
Program Service Fees 
 
 Program service fees, which is income gained in exchange for providing a 
particular good or service related to the organizational mission, increased from 25% of 
total revenues in the not-for-profit sector in 1980 (Virginia Ann Hodgkinson & 
Weitzman, 1986) to 39% in 1996 (Boris, 1998) to over half in 2002 (Kerlin & Pollak, 
2011).  Though some scholars have suggested that such gains come at the cost of 
dwindling government support, Kerlin and Pollak (2011) found little evidence to support 
this.  According to Pratt (2005), earned income allows not-for-profits a great deal of 
autonomy in working with the revenue itself; further, the income has a moderate amount 
of reliability compared to unreliable options such as foundation grants or government 
funding.  Though there is a risk in allowing a not-for-profit manager to have discretion 
over unrestricted funds, since this may create opportunities for the mission to drift away 
from explicit restrictions, most managers are responsible stewards and respect the 
organizational culture of which they are a part. (Froelich, 1999). 
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The role of program service fees on the health of the overall organization is 
mixed.  Adams and Perlmutter (1991) surveyed roughly one hundred voluntary social 
agencies and found no evidence of goal displacement or harmful effects.  Gao (2006) 
found that commercial income contributes to the self-sufficiency of a not-for-profit, but 
has a dampening effect on receiving donations.   More than 60% of the not-for-profits 
that were predominantly financed with earned revenues either stayed the same or 
improved  in Crimmins and Kiel (1983); in Young  (1998), commercial revenues 
appeared to take up the slack when other types of revenue did not come through. 
 On the negative side, Bielefield (1992) found that not-for-profits that relied on 
commercial income suffered from severe financial uncertainty.  Gras and Mendoza-
Abarca (2014) find a U-shaped non-monotonic relationship between the health of the not-
for-profit and the quantity of support received from earned revenue, with very low and 
very high amounts of commercial income considered unhealthy.  However, Calabrese 
(2011b) found that the type of revenue had very little impact on the not-for-profit capital 
management plan. The primary drawback to program service fees, especially ones 
originating from private interests, are ones of governance and goal displacement; notably, 
the majority of concerns are not about whether commercial revenues boost growth, but 
whether the market activities will change governance or accountability structures (Adams 
& Perlmutter, 1991; Cherry, 2012; Goering, 2008; Gras & Mendoza-Abarca, 2014).  This 
is especially true for program service revenues originating with the government, which 
elicit concerns of both goal displacement and crowd-out. 
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H2d:  A larger percentage of total revenue coming from program service revenues paid 
by the government will increase the total expenses of a not-for-profit, holding the revenue 
level constant. 
 
H2e:  A larger percentage of total revenue coming from program service revenues paid 
by private individuals or organizations will increase the total expenses of a not-for-profit, 
holding the revenue level constant. 
 
The increasing amounts of not-for-profit activity in earned income plus the extremely 
popular concept of for-profit social enterprise lead to hypotheses that predict a positive 
relationship between program service fees and not-for-profit growth.  Though the 
predicted signs on the hypotheses for both payers are the same, separating the two will 
allow any impacts that can be traced to one party and not the other (such as government 
crowd-out of private contribution) to come through. 
 
Government Grants 
 
 Capturing the exact contribution of government is more complicated than for 
other types of revenue (Froelich, 1999).  The federal government could be directly 
funding a not-for-profit through contracting or grants, or the money could be routed 
through local governments (in addition to programs originating at the state or local level).  
There are also reimbursement programs and tax credits which are granted to private 
citizens, but are then potentially paid to not-for-profits for services such as schooling (B. 
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Smith, 2013).  Therefore, even though the percentage of not-for-profit revenue 
attributable to government at the turn of the century had recovered from its lows in the 
1980’s, studies are unable to show whether it is attributable to cost increases for items 
like health care (Virginia A Hodgkinson, Weitzman, Abrahams, Crutchfield, & 
Stevenson, 1996).  In this study, we divide the government contributions into the program 
service fees mentioned previously and government grants, discussed here. 
 One of the most common critiques of government grant funding is that it alters the 
internal processes of the organization in order to fit its own reporting requirements and 
objectives  (Gronbjerg, 1992, 1993). In the case of small and new organizations, though, 
this has the possibility of providing numerous outcomes.  On one hand, since 
Stinchcombe insisted that the liabilities stemmed from a lack of internal processes, 
building structures in the image of a particular funding source may be better than no 
structure at all.  On the other hand, the creation of not-for-profits that are mimetically 
government agencies may not be beneficial to the sector or the clients (Ferris, 1993; 
Salamon, 1987; Tucker, 1981). 
 Another critique of government revenues is the potential for revenue dependency.  
Salamon (1995) and Saidel (1991) both describe a mutually beneficial relationship 
between government and not-for-profits that shares not only resources, but power; to 
scholars such as Cho and Gillespie  (2006), this is a cause for concern for the clients and 
their interests.  Revenue dependency occurs when the alignment of the funder and not-
for-profit becomes so strong (and the proportion of funding so large) that the not-for-
profit becomes a surrogate arm of the state that would be unable to function if the state 
withdrew its support.  According to McMurty et al. (1991), in their sample of 200 human 
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services not-for-profits, government revenue only accounted for 34% of the total revenue 
of the group; however, for those organizations that had any government funding, 
government revenue comprised  more than 60% of the total revenues.  This suggests that 
a characteristic of government funding may be an increased chance of resource 
dependency.  
 
H2f:  A larger percentage of total revenue coming from government grants will decrease 
the total expenses of a not-for-profit, holding the revenue level constant. 
 
A large quantity of evidence suggests a negative relationship between government 
grants and not-for-profit growth, but more recent work is inclined to consider the case for 
crowd-out to be mixed (D. Tinkelman, 2010).  There is a base of empirical evidence to 
suggest that government funds signal legitimacy in the same way that private giving 
does; this phenomenon is called “crowding in” (Payne, 2001; Bruce A. Seaman, 1980).  
However, there are also studies which show mixed results of crowding-in and crowding-
out depending on the sector (T. M. Smith, 2007) or suggesting that the relationship is 
non-linear (Borgonovi, 2006; Arthur C Brooks, 2000). This variety of empirical work in 
government funding means that, though we expect a negative relationship, we also expect 
sensitivity to sector and specification. 
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Income from Non-Mission Activities 
 
 Non-mission activities include a basket of potential revenue sources that are 
sometimes common, but are unrelated to the central purpose of the organization.  Non-
mission income sources are investment activities, interest, sales from inventory, rent, and 
sales from assets that are not considered securities or inventory.  Though common, there 
can be large penalties if too much non-mission revenue is achieved; further, since most of 
them are not directly related to mission, the nonprofit should theoretically not want to 
spend much attention or resources in the pursuit of these revenues.  Further, a large 
amount of non-mission activity could serve as a signal to other revenue sources that the 
organization is not behaving as a not-for-profit organization is expected to.  However, as 
mentioned previously, such activities may be desirable as a way to cross-subsidize their 
charitable activities (James, 1983).  Additionally, the presence of large amounts of 
investment income may signal successful financial management practices that have 
resulted in large quantities of amassed assets; however, it also opens the potential to large 
capital losses such as those that struck university endowments during the most recent 
economic downturn.
13
   
 
H2g:  A larger percentage of total revenue coming from non-mission income will 
decrease the total expenses of a not-for-profit, holding the revenue level constant. 
  
 
                                                          
13
 Whether negative levels of income are zeroed out or kept may also have a large impact on the role of 
investments in the estimation.  Whichever is chosen for the final model, we will conduct a robustness 
regression with the other method. 
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Secondary Independent Variables 
 
Revenue Concentration 
 
Revenue concentration (or its inverse, revenue diversification) is a quantitative 
measure of how many revenue sources the total revenue portfolio contains, and the 
literature is divided on the potential role of revenue diversification in small not-for-
profits.  The largest difference centers on whether diversification is playing a role in 
protecting the NFP from financial vulnerability or in helping it grow. 
For the former, portfolio diversification theory implies that having several 
different types of revenue means that the NFP is more resistant to external shocks 
stemming from unsystematic risk (H.P. Tuckman & Chang, 1991; D. R. Young, 2004).  
For example, if an organization received a great deal of money from individual 
donations, then a wealth shock such as the property bubble might diminish individual 
giving and bring the nonprofit close to collapse.  However, if an organization received 
only part of its revenues from individuals and part from an unrelated source, such as 
government grants, then the second organization would be more resistant to the resource 
shock.  In addition to risk diversification, Young (2007a) also suggests that 
diversification helps match incomes to programs and encourages the efficient use of 
assets.  Though not universal, the nonprofit financial vulnerability literature has 
repeatedly found strong empirical evidence supporting the benefits of diversification 
(Greenlee & Trussel, 2000; Mark A. Hager, 2001; Keating, Fischer, Gordon, & Greenlee, 
2005; Searing, 2015; J.M. Trussel & Greenlee, 2004). 
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Revenue diversification can be a hindrance, however, in nonprofits attempting to 
grow; these studies often refer to the opposite of diversification – revenue concentration 
(William Foster & Bradach, 2005; William Foster, Dixon, & Hochstetler, 2003).  Foster 
and Fine (2007) attribute this to job specialization, where an organization becomes 
particularly skilled at gathering a type of revenue and thus has comparative advantage 
over organizations that have to maintain the knowledge and staff required to attract 
multiple sources.  Though Foster and Fine (2007) concentrate on very large 
organizations, the concern that spending a large portion of the very scarce resources of a 
small nonprofit maintaining a wide variety of income sources leads us to expect a 
positive relationship between revenue concentration and the growth of small and young 
nonprofits. 
 
H3:  Increased revenue concentration will increase the size of a small and young not-for-
profit. 
 
Unrelated Business Income 
 
Scholars assume that not-for-profit organizations generally dislike commercial 
activities unrelated to their core business, engaging in them only to cross-subsidize 
activities for the public interest (Weisbrod, 1999).  The rules regarding participation in 
such activities are stringent, and acquiring too much unrelated business income (UBI)
14
 
                                                          
14
 This is more commonly operationalized in the literature by using the Unrelated Business Income Tax 
(UBIT), which is the actual tax amount levied on the UBTI (Unrelated Business Taxable Income) that is a 
portion of the UBI.  However, the Form 990 question that will be used for operationalization asks about the  
level of the income, not any resulting tax, so I prefer to use the more technically correct term. 
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can result in the removal of the 501(c)(3) charitable designation (Kosaras, 2000).  
Because of this intricacy and constant monitoring, however, we might also expect the 
presence of UBI to signal a greater level of financial sophistication and capability than 
average.   
 
H4:  Larger amounts of Unrelated Business Income will increase the size of the not-for-
profit.  
 
 It is important to note that the revenue stream from Non-Mission Income sources 
and the presence of significant UBI are not necessarily correlated.  As stated in the 
instruction form to the Form 990 for 1999, there are several ways that revenues correctly 
classified as program service revenue would count toward UBI.  For example, an 
advocacy organization may produce a magazine that it distributes to members.  The 
magazine’s purpose is educational and coordinational, but the revenues from selling 
advertisements inside the magazine are considered both program service fees and UBI.
15
 
 
Fixed Costs 
 
 High fixed costs signal a chain of financial obligation that extends into the future; 
we therefore expect a large percentage of fixed costs compared to total expenses to have 
a positive impact on growth.  There are a few mechanisms through which this may 
happen.  First, the obligations themselves will cause an inflation in total expenses, which 
is how this study operationalizes growth; however, there is a possibility that commitment 
                                                          
15
 In the study sample, the correlation between Non-Mission Income and UBI is only .013. 
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of debt or similar payments into the future will likely suppress other spending rather than 
buoy the total expense amount.  This is the sign that Calabrese (2012) found between 
fixed cost ratio and not-for-profit health; however, Calabrese examined unrestricted net 
asset (UNA) accumulation. which could also be spurred to provide a war chest against 
fixed costs).  Second, investment in capital now or in immediately previous periods may 
enable future expansion and growth.  One of the central concerns with small nonprofits is 
in actually achieving the internal or external financing to make capital investments; once 
it has been acquired, then growth may soon follow. 
 
H5:  Higher levels of fixed costs in relation to total expenses will be positively related 
with not-for-profit growth in young and new not-for-profit organizations. 
 
Unrestricted Net Assets 
 
 Similar reasoning dictates our choice of sign on the accumulation of unrestricted 
net assets (UNA).
16
   Net assets roughly correlate to a for-profit company’s accumulated 
“profit”: they are the amount of assets left over once all the liabilities have been paid. 
These net assets are then categorized according to how they can be used: restricted 
(meaning that their use is legally stipulated by the donor or board), temporarily restricted 
(often because a requirement for use has been satisfied), and unrestricted.  Unrestricted 
net assets are the discretionary funds that can be used by the not-for-profit in any way it 
sees fit; however, a large accumulation of UNA can also be seen by donors as funds that 
                                                          
16
 Logged value will be used. 
43 
 
did not get spent on mission
17
.  Calabrese (2012) found that not-for-profit directors do try 
to build net assets to both serve as a hedge against risk and as a signal of financial health.  
Intuitively, we would expect a sign of greater health and potential slack to be associated 
with the ability to grow. 
 
H61:  Growth in unrestricted net assets (UNA) will be positively related with not-for-
profit growth in young and new not-for-profit organizations.  
 
Age 
 
 Though the age range is limited in this study, the inclusion of organizations up to 
ten years old still allows elements of age dependency: the internal processes and 
legitimation of a 1-year-old not-for-profit and a 6-year-old not-for-profit can be very 
different.  Therefore, we still expect to find evidence of age dependence in line with the 
literature on the liability of newness described more fully in chapters 1 and 4. 
 
H7:  Age will be positively associated with not-for-profit growth.  
 
 
 
 
                                                          
17
 UNA can exist in several different forms, such as cash, market investments, or capital investments.  The 
distinction is not in the liquidity, but in the discretionary element.  In times of financial duress, a not-for-
profit executive is just as able to dispose of unrestricted net assets in the form of a fully depreciated vehicle 
as a for-profit executive. 
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Table 3 
Summary of Growth Hypotheses 
 Revenue Source Expected Sign 
H1 Revenue Level (“Income”) 
Effect for all Revenues 
+ 
H2a Private Giving + 
H2b Dues + 
H2c Indirect public support and 
affiliates 
- 
H2d Program service revenue 
(Government) 
18
 
+ 
H2e Program service revenue 
(Private) 
+ 
H2f Government grants - 
H2g Non-Mission Income + 
H3 Revenue Concentration + 
H4 UBI + 
H5 Fixed Costs + 
H6 Unrestricted net assets  + 
H7 Age + 
 
 
Summary of Hypotheses 
 
Due to the large number of hypotheses, Table 3 contains their description and 
expected sign.   
 
 
 
 
                                                          
18
 The dataset contains warnings about the reliability of the Medicare data from the Income-Producing 
activities statement (Part VII of the 990).  NCCS analysts claim that the figures are almost never properly 
recorded.  We make the assumption that it is the disentanglement of Medicare fees from the other fees and 
contracts from government that is the issue, thereby accepting the total of the figures in this section to 
represent the whole of program service revenues from the government.    
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Control Variables 
 
 The subsector in which a not-for-profit operates has a great deal of influence on 
the organization’s fixed costs and revenue structure; accordingly, most studies which 
utilize comparative financials or demise figures will differentiate between subsectors.  
This study uses three different specifications to address the research question, all of 
which follow the logic of Calabrese (2012) and run separate regressions for each 
subsector to allow unique dynamics within those fields to come forth.  Additionally, as 
will be discussed in the next section, growth is highly state-dependent, so we utilize lags 
of the dependent variable.  The models also include time dummies to help address 
correlation, as is often recommended for panel and dynamic panel models using 
difference- or system-GMM (Bluedorn, 2009). 
 
Data and Methodology 
 
Data 
 
The data is the publicly available data set from the National Center of Charitable 
Statistics called “The National Center on Charitable Statistics (NCCS) – GuideStar 
National Not-for-profit Research Database” or the “digitized data” (National Center for 
Charitable Statistics, 1998-2003).  This data set contains the financial federal filings for 
all public charities between 1998 and 2003 who earned more than $25,000 in total 
46 
 
revenues.
19
  In addition to containing much more detailed financial information than 
similar NPF financial form data sets, the information in the “digitized data” has been 
verified by the NCCS, which makes it a more reliable source than traditional tax data.  
The sample for this study utilizes only a subset of young and new not-for-profits, which 
are public charities as those that are less than 10 years old and have, during at least one 
fiscal year in the five years of the sample, made less than $150,000 in total revenues.  The 
cleaning process is explained in Table 4 in detail; Tinkelman and Neely (2010) 
emphasize the importance of cleaning and sensitivity of results with respect to cleaning 
decisions when working with the Digitized dataset.  The percentages of the “clean” data 
that can then be considered young, small, and both are displayed in Figure 3.  The final 
number of observations in the sample is 87,340, which reflects 25,299 not-for-profit 
organizations. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
19
 Organizations earning more than $25,000 were required to file.  The data set also contains the tax filings 
from many organizations that did not earn over $25,000 in total revenues and filed anyway. 
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Table 4 
Summary of Data Cleaning and Sample Creation 
Beginning sample size 
less not-for-profits observations with missing rule dates 
less not-for-profits observations with incorrectly formatted rule dates 
less not-for-profits observations with ages less than -1
20
 
less observations from private foundations 
less observations from the 990 EZ form
21
 
less observations that do not use accrual accounting
22
 
less observations where the program service revenue components 
summed to more than the total 
1,388,480 
-33,827 
-16,399 
-4,979 
-13,422 
-267,846 
-415,451 
-1,208 
Potential sample size after cleaning 635,348 
less observations from not-for-profits older than 10 years 
less observations from not-for-profits who never made less than 
     $150K during the study time frame 
-374,781 
-173,227 
 
Final number of observations 
Final number of young and small not-for-profits providing 
     observations 
87,340 
25,299 
 
 
 
                                                          
20
 NPFs with an age of -1 are included because it is still possible for an organization to be granted tax 
exempt status and have it apply retroactively, such as being awarded in March of 2013 and applying it to a 
fiscal calendar year of 2012. 
21
 This eliminates a large quantity of small not-for-profits, a subgroup which is the focus of the study.  
However, the level of detail required by the financial measurements is only available on the full form.   
22
 This also probably biases the sample away from small and new not-for-profits which may lack the 
financial training required to maintain an accrual system.  However, especially in a model based on growth 
of expenses, the uniformity of the term “expense” afforded with accrual is a necessity. 
48 
 
 
Figure 3.  Percentage of Not-for-Profit Observations which are Small and New, 
1998-2003 (N=635,348) 
 
 
Further, as described in the previous section, sector plays an important role in both 
revenue composition and expenses.   The composition of the sector across eight 
subsectors used in this study’s final sample is shown in Figure 4.23   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
23
 This distribution of NFP observations across subsectors is roughly equivalent to the distribution in the 
entirety of the Digitized Database. 
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Figure 4.  Subsector Composition of the Young and Small Sample (N = 87,340) 
 
 
Model specifications 
 
Modeling the growth process in a not-for-profit organization requires careful 
attention to potential causes of bias and misspecification, such as autocorrelation, 
endogeneity, and simultaneity (Coad, 2007; Lööf, 2008; Oliveira & Fortunato, 2006); 
disputes regarding which estimation strategy is appropriate for dynamic financial models 
are especially contentious (Flannery & Hankins, 2013).  This econometric debate has 
generally not emerged in the empirical nonprofit literature, however there are exceptions.  
Both Wedig (1994) and Calabrese (2012) utilize dynamic modeling to study endogenous 
processes over time.  Simultaneous equations are used by several scholars, many with 
backgrounds in economics (Aaronson, Zinn, & Rosko, 1994; Adamache & Sloan, 1983; 
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Jenkins & Austen-Smith, 1987; W. Luksetich, 2008; W. A. Luksetich & Lange, 1995; 
Bruce A. Seaman, 1980); Steinberg (1986) uses simultaneous equations in an exploratory 
fashion, but chooses a single equation model as the best fit.  The notion that econometric 
complexity is not always required for optimal fit is echoed in Seaman (2005), and the 
assumptions and interpretations of certain models and estimation approaches can tell 
slightly different versions of the same causal story.  Accordingly, this study tests 
hypotheses using three different estimation methods in order to address a complex set of 
specification issues. 
Since the data contains several observations of the same NPO over time, a panel 
estimation with fixed effects helps control the unobserved heterogeneity by only using 
the within-variance (Plümper & Troeger, 2007; Wooldridge, 2009).  However, this 
estimation has severe endogeneity issues, specifically with simultaneity:  the decision to 
spend may be conflated with the receipt of income.  This holds especially true in a 
managerial sense, where the direction and level of funds that a NFP will pursue and its 
targeted expenses stem from the same budgeting documents and process.  Therefore, we 
use lags for the independent variables as instruments for the contemporaneous values, 
such as been done in other studies (Okten & Weisbrod, 2000; Wooldridge, 2009).   
Thus far, however, we have not addressed the potential for autocorrelation, which is a 
common trait of firm growth models in the for-profit literature.
24
  Accordingly, we 
introduce a lagged dependent variable.  This estimation addresses the autocorrelation and 
simultaneity, while permitting coefficients that are interpretable as elasticities of total 
spending with respect to different revenue types.  As is traditional with papers containing 
comparative models, we begin with the more simple method and increase the complexity 
                                                          
24
 The presence of AR(1) is confirmed in almost all estimations; please see the Appendices. 
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of the technique as the paper continues (Flannery & Hankins, 2013; Heid, Langer, & 
Larch, 2012; Semykina & Wooldridge, 2013). 
 
Model 1: Fixed Effects by Revenue Type and Sector 
 
First, the independent variables are instrumented only by a single lag rather than a 
dynamic estimator, with the lagged dependent variable included as is customary for 
single-firm growth models.
25
  Since tests determined there is no presence of AR(2) 
(please see Appendices), the lagging should address concerns of simultaneity.  However, 
an assumption regarding the lack of correlation between the lagged dependent variable 
and the error term needs to be made in order to assume that that the estimates are 
unbiased (Calabrese, 2012; Nickell, 1981). 
 
𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽1𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒𝑇𝑦𝑝𝑒𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒𝑇𝑦𝑝𝑒𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽3𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡−1
+ 𝛽4𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽5𝑈𝐵𝐼𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽6𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡−1
+ 𝛽7𝑈𝑁𝐴𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽8𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝜂𝑖 + 𝛿𝑡 + 𝜇𝑖𝑡 
 
 Each subsector is estimated separately since the financial structure can vary 
widely.  Within each subsector, each revenue type is also estimated separately.  Thus, 
there are 56 regressions as a part of the main results in the second model (8 sectors and 7 
revenue types).  Second, we include both a measure of the amount of the revenue type 
and the percent it has of the overall revenue portfolio in the same estimation.  This allows 
                                                          
25
 Growth is operationalized through size levels rather than through growth rates. 
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us to separate revenue and portfolio effects
26
, in addition to correcting for earlier design 
issues.
27
 
However, as Okten and Weisbrod (2000) note in their analysis of the donation 
level-fundraising expense relationship, the fixed effects model may not address all of the 
endogeneity.  Even with a lag, it is not unreasonable to assert that the previous year’s 
income was at least partially determined by expected expenses for the following year.  
This would call for a more complex instrument than simply a lag, even with the de-
meaned process in the fixed effects estimation.  In addition, introducing a lagged 
dependent variable in a fixed-effects regression amplifies the potential for “Nickell bias,” 
especially in “large N, short t” data (Arellano, 1993; Nickell, 1981). 
 
Model 2: Dynamic Model by Revenue Type and Sector 
 
 Since the available data panel has many observations over a short period of time, 
the second two models utilize the instrumental variables (IV) estimator of Arellano and 
Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998), also known as the system generalized 
method of moments (GMM) estimator (Bluedorn, 2009).
28
  This requires assumptions 
guaranteeing that not only are the past levels (where t>=2) of total expenditures 
acceptable instruments for the current first difference, but also that the lagged differences 
are valid instruments for the lagged level (Bluedorn, 2009): 
                                                          
26
 Revenue and portfolio effects can be viewed as correlatives of income and substitution effects.  I hesitate 
to call them such explicitly due to differences in the nuance of meaning between classical economic 
understanding of these terms and the way they are used here. 
27
 Earlier drafts of this paper included only the level increases, and results were biased by the size of the 
overall revenue portfolio that the revenue type possessed.   
28
 The Stata package used is xtabond2, which is described in (Roodman, 2009) and (Roodman, 2014) 
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𝐸(𝑦𝑖,𝑡−𝑠 ∆𝜀𝑖,𝑡) = 0 ∀ 𝑖, 𝑡 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑠 = 2 . . . 𝑛 
and 
𝐸(∆𝑦𝑖,𝑡−𝑟 [𝛼𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡]) = 0 ∀ 𝑖, 𝑡 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑟 = 1 . . . 𝑛 
 
In addition to being considered more precise than differences GMM of the original 
Arellano-Bond (Hayakawa, 2009), time-invariant regressors can be included since the 
model uses the level values in addition to lags; this is especially important since previous 
literature has shown the importance of such traits as sector or year to financial structure.   
In the second model, we duplicate the fixed effects model using the dynamic 
estimator.  All revenues variables, UBI, and revenue concentration are all treated as 
endogenous.  The lagged values of the fixed cost ratio and UNA are treated as 
predetermined, which means that they are uncorrelated with the current error term, but 
may be correlated with past values of the error term (Roodman, 2009).
29
  The year in 
which the NFP gained tax exemption status and all dummies for year are all considered 
exogenous with the current year’s spending. 
The second model, therefore, is specified as: 
 
𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽1𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒𝑇𝑦𝑝𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒𝑇𝑦𝑝𝑒𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡−1
+ 𝛽4𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑈𝐵𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡−1
+ 𝛽7𝑈𝑁𝐴𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽8𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝜂𝑖 + 𝛿𝑡 + 𝜇𝑖𝑡 
                                                          
29
 There is some evidence to suggest that the fixed cost ratio and UNA should also be treated as 
endogenous.  However, this assumes that we have theoretical reasons for  instrumenting the 
contemporaneous values, whereas it is actually the function of the UNA and the fixed cost ratio as lag that 
we are interested in. 
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Where 𝜂𝑖 are the organizational fixed effects, 𝛿𝑡 are the year effects, and 𝜇𝑖𝑡 is the error 
term.  Time-invariant characteristics such as founding year can be included since they are 
used in the “levels” equation of the system estimator.  This model, however, also has 
shortcomings.  In the new configuration, 4 of the 8 sectors have problems with 
instrumentation validity.  Second, though the Wald tests are universally significant, there 
are concerns with the interpretation of coefficients in dynamic models.  Though the 
dynamic estimation of the variables serves as instrumentation and should not impact the 
interpretation of the coefficients, there is a certain amount of faith that a scholar has to 
use when straying from literal interpretation.  This especially applies when dealing with 
already transformed coefficients such as elasticities.  In an attempt to improve on these 
issues, we collapse the nest of separate revenue regressions into one based on the revenue 
portfolio percentages only. 
 
Model 3:  Dynamic Full Portfolio by Sector 
 
The final model estimates the impact of revenue types on growth for the small and 
young not-for-profits in each subsector using a single dynamic model and the percentages 
of total revenues for each revenue type.   
 
𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽1..6𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒𝑇𝑦𝑝𝑒𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽8𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽9𝑈𝐵𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽10𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽11𝑈𝑁𝐴𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽12𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝜂𝑖 + 𝛿𝑡
+ 𝜇𝑖𝑡 
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Though this estimation handles many of the technical issues which arise, there are 
shortcomings.  First, the inclusion of the revenue ratios means that all revenue 
coefficients are interpretable in relation to the base category, which here is private giving.  
Though useful, this limits the interpretation without running additional specifications and 
shifting the base groups.
30
  An even greater limitation is that we do not have the ability to 
tease apart whether the impact from an increase in a particular revenue type are due to the 
level increase in the amount or because of its proportional gain against other revenues.  
(this can be thought of as substitution versus income effects).  Finally, the Hansen J 
statistics on the estimation indicate a poor instrument fit for 3 of the 8 sectors, so some of 
the subsectors contain instruments that are not acceptably exogenous. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
30
 The constant could be used to assist interpretation, but it is of dubious merit both theoretically and 
econometrically in this situation. 
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Table 5 
Growth Variable Operationalization 
Name Formula 
NCCS Digitized Data 
Fields 
SIZE
31
 
 
Total expenses 
 
ln (p1totexp + p1speve + 
p1rente + p1securc + 
p1othc + p1invntc +1) 
 
PRIVATE 
GIVING 
 
Direct Support + Special Events 
 
ln (p1dirsup + p1spevg + 
1) 
 
DUES 
 
Dues 
 
ln(p1dues + 1) 
 
IN-
DIRECT 
 
Indirect Support 
 
ln (p1indsup + 1) 
 
PSR 
GOVT 
 
Program Service Revenues 
 
ln (p7govamt + p7govxat 
+ p7govrin + p7medamt 
+ p7medxat + p7medrin 
+ 1) 
 
PSR 
PRIVATE 
 
Program Service Revenues not from 
Government and Medicaid 
 
ln (p1pSrev - p7govamt - 
p7govxat - p7govrin - 
p7medamt - p7medxat - 
p7medrin + 1) 
 
GOVT 
GRANT 
 
Government Grants 
 
ln (p1govgt + 1) 
 
NON-
MISSION 
INC 
 
Interest + Dividends + Other Investment 
Income  + Securities Sales +Non-Security 
Asset Sales + Rent + Inventory Sales 
 
ln (p1int + p1div + 
p1oinv + p1securg + 
p1othg + p1rentg + 
p1invntg + 1) 
 
REV. 
TYPE 
PERCENT 
 
(
𝑈𝑛𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑔𝑒𝑑 𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒 𝑇𝑦𝑝𝑒 𝐴𝑚𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡
𝑈𝑛𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑔𝑒𝑑 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒𝑠
) 
 
Varies 
 
HHI
32
 
 
∑ (
𝑈𝑛𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑔𝑒𝑑 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒 𝑇𝑦𝑝𝑒
𝑈𝑛𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑔𝑒𝑑 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒𝑠
)
2
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 The total expenses have been adjusted for inflation prior to taking the natural log.  Further, due to the 
feasibility that expenses may have been reported as negative amounts on the 990, the absolute value of the 
recorded figure representing total expenses has been used.  This resulted in changes in 19 observations. 
32
 There were 619 observations that had a zero in the denominator and, thus, could not be used to compute 
the HHI.  The HHI for these organizations was set to zero. 
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UBI 
 
Unrelated Business Income 
 
p6unrelb 
 
UNA 
 
Unrestricted Net Assets 
 
ln (p4e_unre + 1) 
 
FIXED 
COST 
 
(Occupancy + Interest+ Depreciation) / 
 Total Expenses 
 
(p2tOccup + p2tint + 
p2tDepr) / 
(p1totexp + p1speve + 
p1rente + p1securc + 
p1othc + p1invntc ) 
 
AGE 
 
Years since receipt of tax-exempt status 
 
fisyr – ruledate 
 
RULE 
DATE 
The year tax exempt status was granted ruledate 
 
 
Variable Operationalization and Description 
 
 The NCCS Digitized data contains a great amount of financial detail that allows 
very accurate construction of the dependent, independent, and control variables.  Despite 
the panel being short, all monetary figures not included in a ratio reflect an adjustment for 
inflation with a base year of 2003; additionally, all monetary figures not included in a 
ratio have been logged.
33
  Full operationalization is shown in Table 5. 
 Of particular note is the way that I constructed the revenue and expense figures. 
which is a general departure from the empirical literature.  As previously discussed, the 
financial information from the Form 990 is the basis for much of the large scale empirical 
work in the sector; therefore, the construction of the form has an influence on research 
practices.  The 990 will remove the costs associated with production of the revenue 
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 Specifically, the negative values have been set to zero.   Then, the natural log of the monetary figure plus 
one was taken, resulting in a lower bound of zero. 
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stream from only a portion of the different revenue types; on the form used from 1998-
2003, these revenue types are rent, assets sales, inventory sales, and special events.  
However, expenses associated with other revenue streams, such as fundraising campaigns 
designed expressly for direct public support, are not included.  I therefore consider the 
comparison of revenue streams prior to the removal of any type of associated expense to 
be the most directly comparable across revenue types, which requires augmentation of 
the more traditional fields used in research relying on the Form 990.
34
 Following this 
augmentation, the financial information more closely resembles the format and amounts 
presented in traditional audited financial statements. 
The summary statistics for each sector are presented in Appendix A
35
, while 
correlation tables between the income and substitution measures and amongst the revenue 
ratios are presented in Appendix B.  Average revenue portfolios for each subsector are in 
Appendix C. 
 
Findings 
 
Model 1: Fixed Effects by Revenue Type and Sector 
 
 For the sake of clarity, the result from each model will be discussed by subsector 
after general notes; I will interpret significant coefficients singly or across groups within 
                                                          
34
 The potential implications of this practice of using gross revenues versus the traditional Form 990 
presentation is the subject of a working paper by Searing and Calabrese. 
35
 As a methodological note, the digitized data files provided by NCCS in the Stata format are classified as 
data type “float,” which only renders 9 degrees of precision.  If an analyst or researcher were to build new 
variables also in type “float,” the details for those organizations whose monetary values exceed nine digits 
will be lost to scientific notation due to the limits of the data type.  This results in a subtle bias which was 
discovered in earlier versions of this work, and all variables were then set to type “double.” Possible 
implications of this limitation in the literature are the subject of a working paper by Searing and Calabrese.  
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the same sector.  No single variable is universally significant across all sectors and 
revenues.  The models are a generally good fit for the data as shown by highly significant 
F statistics across all 56 regressions except for the Hospitals subsector, where 
significance levels occur that are still significant, only at p<.1 levels (please see 
Appendix D).  Autocorrelation of the first degree is confirmed in almost all regressions, 
with exceptions noted in the tables; this confirms the logic behind including the lagged 
dependent variable as a regressor.  All regressions used Hausman tests to confirm fixed 
effects were a superior estimation method to random effects.
36
 
 I will also use a hypothetical NFP throughout the interpretation as a means of 
demonstrating the impact of the variables.  Our NFP’s total expenses will be $100,000, 
and we will assume when interpreting each revenue’s impact that it represents 25% of the 
revenue portfolio.  We will also assume that the NFP is running a balanced budget for the 
current year so that revenues equal expenses.
37
   
 In the Arts subsector, despite the AR(1), we do not see a significant impact from 
the previous year’s size.  We do see some impact from our revenues variables, and they 
are from relatively important revenue sources to the sector.  Assuming that the percentage 
of the portfolio that the revenue represents remains constant, an increase of 1% in private 
program service revenue will increase total spending the next year by .02%. In our 
hypothetical NFP, this means that if our revenues from private program service revenue 
increased by $2,500, the revenue type alone would spur increased spending of $200 
                                                          
36
 Due to concern over the low R-squared values, I also estimated the role of private giving in each sector 
using piecewise absorption regressions.  These are presented in Appendix E.  The R-squared on these 
incorporate the explanatory power that is attributable to the fixed individual effects.  As we can see from 
the very high R-squared in the absorption regressions, the primary reason that the R-squared in the fixed 
effects estimation is low is due to a very high level of explanatory power being attributed to the fixed 
effect. 
37
 Hopefully in practice this is not the case since it will not permit the putting aside of reserves, but this is 
simply to aid in explanation. 
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holding all else constant.  We find similar impacts for a $2500 increase in government 
grants (a spending increase of $70) and in non-mission income (a spending increase of 
$300).  Interestingly, however, we also see a negative impact from increased non-mission 
income on a percentage basis, with a 1 percentage point increase in the revenue portfolio 
being attributed to NMI causing an expected drop in total expenses of .5 percent.
38
  For 
our hypothetical nonprofit, this means that $510 dollars less will be spent due to an 
increase in the reliance on non-mission income; total expenses will fall by $520 due to an 
increase in the percentage of total revenue coming from government program service 
revenue.  A percentage point increase in the fixed cost ratio have a significant impact 
across revenue types, varying between a total expense increase of between .65% and 
.69% holding all else constant (between $650 and $690 for our hypothetical NFP).  UNA 
also has a universally significant but slight impact in the Arts subsector, with a 1% 
increase in UNA resulting in an expected increase of between .0162% and .0175% 
increase in total spending.  If we assume that our hypothetical NFP has a similar 
proportion of UNA to total expenses as the Arts subsector medians ($19,400 to 
$129,111), then this would mean an additional $1500 in UNA would spur an additional 
$162 to $175 dollars in expenses.  Fiscal year 2001 was the only year which was 
significantly different from 2000, but this may be attributable more to a lack of growth in 
2002 and 2003 as the mild recession continued.
39
 
                                                          
38
 Since the ratio variables range from 0 to 1, we divide the coefficient by 100 to make the results 
interpretable on a percentage point basis.  This was confirmed through the creation of a variable in the 
dataset with the same properties and matching results.  Then the coefficient is exponentiated to find the 
impact, then one is subtracted to better illustrate the effect of the negative..  So, for this example, the 
arithmetic is: [exp(-.005146)] - 1 = -.00514.  
39
 The constant will also not be interpreted as it is nonsensical in value, estimating the total expenses for 
NFPs that, for example, are newly born and have a zero HHI, which is a mathematical impossibility that 
only shows in the range of the study due to rounding. 
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 We do see the lagged size of the NFP become significant in the Health subsector, 
with a 1% increase in size previous year’s spending causing roughly an expected .2% 
increase in the current year’s spending compared to similar organizations. “ Income” or 
revenue level effects differ across revenue types, with our hypothetical NFP’s total 
expenses increasing by either $327 (private giving), $164 (dues), $131 (private program 
service revenues), or $230 (government grants) in response to a $2500 increase in 
revenue type, holding their percentage of revenue portfolio constant.  Similar to the Arts 
subsector, we see a negative impact to an increased share of income from NMI, with an 
increase of 1 percentage point in NMI resulting in an expected drop in total expenses of 
.6% ($600).  Private program service revenue has a similar effect, depressing total 
expenses by .2%.  Revenue concentration is also important in boosting total expenses for 
the private giving and government grant regressions, potentially because those are two 
revenue types which traditionally can dominate a portfolio; UBI is significant, but only in 
the indirect support regression, where an NFP with UBI is expected to have total 
expenses nearly $36,000 higher than those without .  Also similar to the Arts subsector, 
both the fixed cost ratio and UNA have significant effects.  A percentage point increase 
in fixed costs results in an expected increase in total spending of between $650 and $706, 
while a $2900 increase in UNA causes an expected increase in total expenses for the next 
year of between $290 and $310, assuming that our hypothetical NFP has a similar 
proportion of UNA to total expenses as the Health subsector medians. 
 In the Human Services subsector, the lagged size still has a significant impact, 
though of almost half the magnitude of the Health subsector.  The revenue level effects 
are almost universally significant, though with varying magnitudes and signs.  An 
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increase in $2500 of the revenue type will lead to an expected increase in total expenses 
the next year by $75 (private giving), $95 (indirect support), $87 (private programs 
service revenue), or $153 (non-mission income).  We do see a surprising decrease of $91 
in total spending due to an increase in government program service revenue, though I 
suspect it is the function of holding the portfolio percentage constant that is causing this 
result since government PSR only contributes 2.8% of revenue to the portfolio, on 
average, for Human Services.  There are also portfolio effects, with an increase of a 
percentage point in revenue share (holding absolute value constant) causing a decrease in 
total spending of $162 for private giving, $190 for indirect support, and $185 for non-
mission income.  Portfolio gains have a positive impact holding revenue level constant, 
however, for government program service revenues, where an additional percentage point 
results in an expected increase of $304 in total expenses.  Human services is one of two 
subsectors where UBI is universally significant, with those NFPs having UBI spending 
an additional $15,270 to $16,670 compared to similar organizations that did not declare 
UBI.  An additional percentage point increase in the fixed cost ratio results in an 
additional $403-$438 in total expenses, while a $1719 increase in UNA results in an 
expected increase in total spending the next year by between $118 and $125. 
 An increase in 1% in the previous year’s size causes an increase in expected total 
expenses in the Public subsector of between $66.20 and $68.20, though the results in the 
non-mission income estimation are not significant.  There are significant positive 
responses to increases in revenue type levels for all types except the two affiliated with 
the government.  Both revenues associated with private markets show negative portfolio 
effects, with an increase in a percentage point of private program service revenue and 
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non-mission income resulting in expected spending decreases of $266 and $346, 
respectively.  An increase of $3068 in UNA causes an expected increase of between $320 
and $334 in total spending the next year.  Interestingly, age is significant only for the 
non-mission income regression, which I presume is due to a possible interaction of the 
lagged size and age variables in organizations with significant quantities of NMI.  Here, 
an additional year of age increases expected total spending by 5.47% among 
organizations with otherwise identical characteristics. 
 In the Education subsector (which excludes higher education such as universities), 
the lagged size of the NFP also plays a significant role in determining current expenses, 
with an increase in $2500 in the previous year’s expenses causing between an estimated 
$759 and $810 in current total expenses.  An increase of $2500 in the revenue type leads 
to an expected increase in total expenses the next year of either $100 (dues), $157 
(private program service revenues), $131 (government grants), or $159 (non-mission 
income).  Only dues show a portfolio effect, with an additional percentage point of 
revenue coming from dues curtailing the next year’s spending by $310.  UNA also has 
significant impact, with an additional $1696 in UNA for our hypothetical NPF leading to 
an estimated boost in total expenses between $265 and $274. 
Meanwhile, for the Universities subsector, very little is significant, potentially 
stemming from the small sample (N=196 observations from 65 NFPs).  There is a barely 
significant revenue level effect for indirect support, showing that an increase of $2500 
increases the expected spending the next year by $1808; this might be attributable to the 
active role of supporting foundations that some universities may enjoy.  UNA is 
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significant for all estimations except government program service revenue
40
; an 
additional $3488 in UNA leads to between an additional $367 and $502 in total 
spending.
41
  Age is significant for dues, government program service revenue, and non-
mission income, with an additional year leading to an increase of 50% to 58%.  Year 
dummies are universally negative, but not universally significant; it is reasonable to 
conclude that 2000 was the top year, all else consistent.  This would the mean that the 
highest spending year was at the beginning of the recession, which for small colleges 
seems logical since they would not have the professional programs that draw applicants 
during a recession. 
 Small hospitals only show revenue type level effects in private giving and 
government program service revenue, where an additional $2500 in revenue will lead to 
an expected $1260 and $1234 in total expenses, respectively.  Non-mission income has a 
particularly strong portfolio effect, with an additional percentage point resulting in a 
penalty of $2163 less in total expenses.  The presence of UBI is significant, with NFPs 
reporting UBI spending between two and five times as much as those who do not declare 
UBI.  Though this may sound unreasonable, non-mission income is the largest 
component of the mean revenue portfolio at 32.7%.  This large of a contribution means 
that such operations are a core component and, as such, UBI would signify high levels of 
success in gathering this revenue.  UNA is only significant for the non-mission income 
regression, with an additional $5275 in UNA leading to an additional $897 in total 
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 Government program service revenue accounts for only .6% of the mean revenue portfolio in the Higher 
Education subsector. 
41
 It is interesting to note that the median UNA to total expenses ratio of Education without universities 
(.1696) is almost half that of Universities (.3488). 
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expenses the next year
42
.  For all estimations other than NMI, age was found to decrease 
expected total expenses by between 32.6% and 36.1% with all other variables held 
constant. 
 In the Other category of miscellaneous NFPs, lagged size is again a factor, with 
an additional $2500 of lagged total expenses in our hypothetical NFP causing an increase 
of between $1192 and $1273 in total expenses for the current year.  Both government 
revenues have revenue level effects, with a $2500 increase resulting in an increase in 
expected total expenses of $221 (government program service revenue) or $163 
(government grants).  Government program service revenue also has a portfolio effect, 
with a decrease of $374 in total expenses stemming from an increase in a percentage 
point of the revenue; a percentage point increase in non-mission income decreases 
expected total expenses the next year by $361.3.  The fixed cost ratio is universally 
significant again, with a percentage point increase causing an increase in total expenses 
the following year by between $856 and $880.
43
  There is a similar boost from UNA, 
with an additional $1913 in UNA leading to an increase of between $367 and $502 in 
expected total expenses for the next year. 
 
Model 2: System GMM by Revenue Type and Sector 
 
 We see in the dynamic model several strong variations from the fixed effects 
estimations, which reflect the inconsistency of different methodological attempts to 
instrument the variables.  The results include a Wald test of fit for the model in each 
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 The median UNA to total expenses ratio for the Hospital sector is .5275 – over half. 
43
 Note that the regressions do not show significant results for the fixed cost ratio in the four subsectors 
where the median ratio is under .02. 
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revenue and subsector, each of which is highly significant.  An Arellano-Bond test for 
autocorrelation was conducted for each model, with each having significant 
autocorrelation of degree one, which is expected of dynamic estimations (C. F. Baum, 
2006); however,  no subsectors show signs of second degree autocorrelation and the test 
statistic for AR(2) is included in Appendix F.  Potential heteroskedasticity  is addressed 
using the Windmeijer (2005) finite sample correction for standard errors.  However, it is 
crucial to note that only half of the sectors have estimations whose instrumental variables 
are considered exogenous as a group; this can be seen in Appendix F by locating the 
results from the Hansen J test (the degrees of freedom and p-value are also reported).  
The Hansen J tests the null hypothesis that there is no correlation between the instruments 
and the error term, and a rejection of the null means that the validity of the estimates are 
suspect (C. F. Baum, Schaffer, & Stillman, 2007).  This means that all conclusions drawn 
from the Human Services, Health, Education (without Higher Education), and Other 
subsectors should be interpreted with caution despite their reported levels of fitness 
through other measures
44
.  Accordingly, I only interpret those models with exogenous 
instruments in the text, though insights from the findings in the other sectors can be 
gleaned from the Appendix where they are reported in full. 
 In the Arts sector, we see relatively uniform impacts of the lagged dependent 
variable.
45
  In a dynamic model, the coefficient on the lagged dependent variable is 
interpreted as a rate of adjustment toward a goal.  Therefore, we estimate that NPFs in the 
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 Calabrese (2012) also had the null of exogenous instruments rejected for the Human Services subsector 
in his study. 
45
 When interpreting the fixed effects regression, time-demeaned values of the variables were lagged and 
interpreted as the impact of the lagged value on the following year’s total expenses.  In dynamic estimation, 
previous levels and lags instrument for the current value of the variable, therefore the interpretation is on 
contemporaneous impact unless the variable is lagged for theoretical reasons in the model, such as Fixed 
Cost Ratio and UNA.  Sensitivity to these lags is shown in Appendix G, with greater comparability to the 
fixed effects estimation using a constant term in Appendix H. 
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Arts subsector are able to close between 70.6% and 74% of the gap in total expenses 
annually, on average.  Though respectable and demonstrating an intent to grow, this is 
not extremely large and may mean that Arts organizations are setting targets too 
optimistically.  There are revenue level effects in two of the three revenues types we saw 
effects for in the fixed effects estimation; here, we expect that a $2500 increase in a 
revenue type will lead to a decrease of $469 (private program service revenue) or $423 
(non-mission income).  We also have portfolio effects in two revenue types, one of which 
is shared with the fixed effects regression.  An increase in a percentage point of the 
revenue portfolio for dues and non-mission income causes an increase in expected total 
expenses of $1242 and $1095, respectively.  UNA has a slight impact in the private 
program revenue services regression, with an additional $1500 in UNA resulting in an 
expected increase of $136 in total expenses.  The year in which tax exemption was 
granted is universally significant as well, with an additional $391 to $440 in expected 
total expenses per additional year of age.
46
 
 There are likewise significant coefficients for the lagged dependent variable in the 
Public subsector estimation, with Public NPFs closing between 68.6% and 74.2% of the 
annual targeted gap.  This is roughly approximate to the adjustment rate of Arts NPFs, 
even though Arts NPFs are roughly 5% smaller when comparing median sizes.  Four of 
the five revenue types which show revenue level effects are the same, though the 
coefficients differ: an increase in $2500 in a revenue type causes an increase in total 
expenses of $736 (private giving), $427 (dues), $629 (private program service revenue), 
$651 (government grants), and $500 (non-mission income)
47
.  The same two revenue 
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 Since the constant has no real empirical meaning, it has been suppressed in the system GMM analysis. 
47
 In fixed effects, there were significant level results for indirect support rather than government grants. 
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types as in fixed effects have portfolio effects as well: an increase in a percentage point of 
the revenue portfolio going to private program service revenue or non-mission income 
decreases expected total expenses by $650 and $932, respectively.  Revenue 
concentration has an inhibiting effect on total expenses, while those NFPs that have UBI 
spend almost double what those without spend.
48
  An increase of $3,068 in UNA results 
in additional total expenses of between $223 and $284, while an additional year of age 
causes an increase in expected total expenses of between $391 and $451. 
 Lagged size is not universally significant in the Higher Education subsector, with 
rates of adjustment between 65.9% and 73.3% based on estimates from three revenue 
types (though these estimates are in line with results from other subsectors)
49
.  Private 
giving and private program service revenues have both revenue level and portfolio 
substitution effects.  A $2500 increase in a particular revenue increases expected total 
expenses by $935 and $1771, respectively, while a gain in a percentage point for either 
revenue results in losses of $1635 or $1660, respectively.  There is a very strong return to 
revenue concentration in two estimations, especially in private giving, and the indirect 
support regression estimates that those organizations which report UBI having total 
expenses roughly five times higher than those without.  Age is universally significant and 
relatively consistent, with an additional year of age increasing the expected total expenses 
for the year to increase by between $351 and $401. 
 Finally, the Hospitals subsector assigns universally significant impact to the 
lagged dependent variable.  The adjustment rate for hospitals is estimated at between 
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 According to the government grant and non-mission income estimates. 
49
 The p-values on the Hansen J-statistic are high enough to be what Roodman (2009) considers to 
potentially indicate that the test itself has been weakened by the number of instruments.  Though this is not 
a rejection of the exogeneity of the instruments, is does cast more doubt on the accuracy of the Hansen J 
test than a test with a more plausible (but still insignificant) statistic. 
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49.2% and 64.1%; since the 64.1% is an outlier by approximately 5 percentage points, I 
expect that the actual estimate is closer to 50% and that the lagged dependent variable 
and non-mission income may be correlated.  This low level of adjustment rate means that 
hospitals are only closing half of the distance to their expected size, reflecting slow 
growth, optimistic projections, or both.  Four different revenue types show both revenue 
level and portfolio substitution effects.  With an additional $2500 in the revenue type and 
holding the portfolio percentages level, expected total expenses increase by $2408 
(indirect support), $2702 (government program service revenue), $1752 (government 
grants), or $2084 (non-mission income). These revenue level gains are offset by portfolio 
substitution losses if the levels are held constant, with an increase in 1 percentage point of 
a particular revenue type resulting in a decrease in total expenses by $8733 (indirect 
support), $9641 (government program service revenue), $3898 (government grants), or 
$2789 (non-mission income).  An additional year of age raises the expected total 
expenses by between $301 and $381, though the estimation for government grants does 
not find the coefficient on the date of exemption to be significant. 
 
Model 3: System GMM and Revenue Portfolios by Sector 
 
 In the third model, we lose the ability to differentiate between the revenue level 
(or “income”) and portfolio (or “substitution”) effects and restrict ourselves to 
interpretation regarding comparison with a base group.  However, by including all 
revenue percentages in the same dynamic regression, we also gain increased specificity 
and lower our chances of omitted variable bias.  There is danger in taking this path in a 
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dynamic regression since the number of instruments increases very rapidly, but it will be 
insightful to both determine the results and compare them with the individual revenue 
regressions.  Full results are shown in Appendix I. 
 Three of the four subsectors which had instrument exogeneity rejected during the 
individual revenue type regressions remain the same for this model; therefore, the Health, 
Human Services, and Other subsectors will not be interpreted in the written text.  This 
estimation did, however, regain Education without Higher Education.  The p-value on the 
Hansen J statistic for the Higher Education subsector remains at or close to 1, so we 
should continue to suspect weakness in the Hansen J test for that subsector. 
 The findings for the Arts subsector map well to the individual revenue dynamic 
findings.  The coefficient on the lagged dependent variable is significant, with an 
estimated adjustment rate of 68%.  An increase in a percentage point of revenue share for 
both dues and non-mission income cause a drop in expected total expenses of $1062 (for 
dues ) and $1350 (for NMI) more than the impact from private giving.  The exemption 
date is likewise significant, with an increase in a year of age increasing expected total 
expenses by $420. 
In the Public subsector, NFPs are closing 72.13% of the gap annually for levels of 
total spending.  Only non-mission income has a significant impact, with an additional 
percentage point gain resulting in an expected decrease of $492 when compared to the 
effect of a similar increase in private giving.  Both UNA and the exemption date are 
significant, just as they were in the individual GMM revenue regressions.  An increase of 
$3068 in UNA leads to an increase of $229 in total expenses, which is within the range 
set by the individual regressions.  The impact of the exemption date (an additional year of 
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age leading to an increase of $421 in total expenses) is similarly within Model 2’s 
estimate range. 
The Education (without Higher Education) subsector did not have sufficiently 
exogenous instruments for Model 2, but does for the configuration of variables in Model 
3.  The total expense adjustment rate is 72.16% annually, almost identical to the Public 
subsector.  Three different revenue types have portfolio effects relative to private giving 
in our hypothetical NFP: government program service revenue (an increase of $1451 in 
total expenses), private program service revenue (an increase of $564 in total expenses), 
and government grants (an increase of $1075 in total expenses in response to a $2500 
increase in revenue type).  A percentage point increase in the fixed cost ratio from a year 
prior increases expected total expenses by $812, while an increase of $1696 in UNA the 
previous year leads to an estimated increase in total expenses of $256.  An increase in a 
year for the exemption grant date increases total expenses by an estimated $391. 
The Higher Education subsector only contains two significant variables.
50
  First, a 
percentage point increase in private program service revenue increases expected total 
expenses by $1051.4 compared to an increase in private giving; this is partly intuitive 
since universities are funded in large part by tuition.  These are also both the two revenue 
types that displayed portfolio effects in the individual regression.  The exemption date is 
also significant, with an additional year of age increasing the expected total expenses by 
$441. 
Hospitals close only 53.68% of the gap annually toward their target total 
expenses, which is both the lowest in the model and within the range of the individual 
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 Similar to Model 2, the p-value on the Hansen J statistic is 1, which means that the number of 
instruments has made the Hansen test weak.  Though not dismissive, interpretation should include a degree 
of skepticism. 
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dynamic regressions.  Total expenses are expected to increase by $1333 compared to 
private giving for a percentage point increase in revenue share for private program 
revenue.  Interestingly, this was not one of the four revenue types that had significant 
portfolio effects in Model 2; this is probably due to the current model testing for 
significant differences between revenue types rather than overall impact on the model.  
The exemption date is also significant, with an additional year of age for the hospital 
increasing expected total expenses by $381. 
 
Discussion 
 
Comments on Comparing the Fixed Effects and System GMM Models 
 
The results across the fixed effect and dynamic models bear some resemblance, 
but are not identical.  Therefore, the model differences across models 1 and 2 bear some 
explanation.  The samples between the dynamic model and the fixed effects model vary 
slightly, with the fixed effects model containing slightly less due to the differencing 
needs.  The differences in included NFPs in the two samples are contained in Table 6. 
Additionally, the age variable differs between models.  Therefore, we re-estimate 
the models using a consistent sample and eliminating the age variables in order to 
enhance comparability.  The fixed effects model still does not utilize as many year 
dummies; however, the number of observations and NFPs included in the regressions 
remains the same.  Results using these comparable estimations are found in Appendix J.   
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We notice in comparing the two models that, as we noted earlier, there is 
consistency within the same model; for example, size from the year before is not 
impactful in either fixed effects regression, but is very large and significant in the 
dynamic regressions for both revenue types.   But what is causing the consistent 
differences between the two models?  Though not conclusive, the most insight stems 
from the rho value in the fixed effects: approximately 68% of the total variance is due to 
the fixed effect.   
 
 
Table 6 
Comparison of Samples between Growth Models 
Dynamic  Fixed Effects 
5,228 Arts 5,182 
6,666 Health 6,616 
23,727 Human Services 23,602 
9,228 Public 9,197 
6,558 Education (w/o Higher) 6,530 
196 Higher Education 196 
538 Hospitals 536 
5,286 Other 5,261 
57,427 Total Observations 57,120 
 
 
74 
 
 This means that we are looking at very strong levels of unobserved characteristics 
across time tied to the NPF that we are assuming our fixed effects estimator is addressing.  
However, given the differences in results, I contend that there is persistent omitted 
variable bias due to these effects that are only adequately addressed through the more 
comprehensive instrumentation of the dynamic estimator.  Also supporting this theory is 
that the largest differences occur either in the lagged dependent and independent 
variables.  The dependent variable, which is at risk of Nickell bias if the fixed effect and 
lagged dependent variable are correlated, becomes highly significant in the dynamic 
regression.  Further, the fixed cost ratio and UNA (which are lagged and therefore 
somewhat more impervious to simultaneity and endogeneity than other variables in the 
fixed effects) happen to be the ones which are significant.  Though not conclusive, I 
consider these strong indications that the dynamic estimator is the best fit model, though 
useful insights can be drawn from the fixed effects model, especially for the subsectors 
whose instruments are not properly identified. 
 
Discussion of Hypotheses 
 
First, before the discussion of hypotheses begins, there are several generic 
conclusions that should be drawn from this study.  First, this essay has provided 
additional confirmation that the different subsectors of NPFs are very distinct from each 
other (Calabrese, 2012).  This means that the common practice of simply adding dummy 
variables to large-N regressions is inadequate since not only the activities, but also the 
financial structures and mechanisms will vary.  Studies hoping for explanatory power 
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should either concentrate on a single sector or divide along subsectors into separate 
regressions.  The need for this is shown not only by the differences in significance and 
magnitude across sector regressions, but also in the difficulties in fitting exogenous 
groups of instruments.  If the instrument set fits half of the sector well and half not, then 
underlying mechanisms are substantially different and should be further explored. 
Also, though no formal hypothesis was dedicated to it, the coefficient on the 
lagged dependent variable was insightful not only on describing the behavior of the 
different sectors as they tried to chase their set growth path, but also because it likely 
demonstrates the downward bias predicted by Nickell (1981) that corrects itself once the 
system GMM is employed.  Due to the lack of universal exogeneity by Models 2 and 3, 
however, the inclusion of the fixed effects estimates is certainly warranted.  Due to the 
different models used in this study, however, there are nuances involved in the 
confirmation or lack of confirmation for the hypotheses.   
With a single exception in 89 valid regressions
51
, Hypothesis 1 is confirmed.  
Almost all increases in any type of revenue, when holding substitution effects constant, 
will increase total expenses.  The one exception was for government program service 
revenues in the Human Services subsector fixed effects analysis, though as noted in the 
Findings this may be an isolated incident since only 2.8% of revenues are attributable to 
that revenue source.  Which results were significant between models differed slightly, 
with the dynamic model generally both containing more revenues with significant impact 
and having coefficients roughly 4 times the magnitude of the fixed effects regression. 
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 56 valid fixed effects regressions plus 28 valid dynamic revenue-specific regressions plus 5 dynamic 
portfolio regressions 
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The portfolio or “substitution” hypotheses are more complicated, as anticipated.  
First, the signs were almost universally negative in the results which are significant; this 
may be due to the occasionally significant level of correlation between the two revenue 
variables, so the opposing signs are not unexpected if one is being “held constant” when 
measuring the other’s impact in the regression.  Second, we see general consistency in 
significance and sign across Models 1 and 2 on the portfolio variable.  Finally, these 
results again emphasize the difficulties in fitting models across sectors.  In retrospect, it 
might have been more surprising to see universal treatment of the revenue portfolio 
hypotheses across sectors, especially since the meaning of the revenues percentages 
which “popped” is that they are significantly different from  their unseen dummy “other 
revenue” in the individual revenue regressions.  For example, when looking at the 
individual revenue type regressions, an increase in 1 percentage point of the revenue at 
hand will necessitate a 1 percentage point loss in any other revenue of which the overall 
portfolio is comprised.  As seen in Appendix C, the “other” revenues which are losing to 
said revenue will vary greatly between sectors.  The negative coefficients are flags for 
losses of total expenses given this trade-off, holding the overall total income steady.  To 
some degree, this is addressed in Model 3, where all revenues are visible in the same 
estimation; however, this model both forces the comparison between two revenues (one, 
both, or neither may have any real presence in a particular subsector) and omits the 
income effect, so that the impact of simply increasing the budget may be influencing the 
coefficients. 
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Given these limitations, I am still confident in rejecting or failing to reject some 
of the hypotheses based on the results; the relevant summaries and signs of significant 
findings can be found in Table 7.
52
 
 
 
Table 7 
Summary of Significant Revenue Portfolio Effects 
Hypoth. 
 
(#) 
Private 
Giving 
(2a) 
Dues 
 
(2b) 
In-
direct 
(2c) 
Govt 
PSR 
(2d) 
Private 
PSR 
(2e) 
Govt 
Grant 
(2f) 
NMI 
 
(2g) 
Expected 
Sign 
+ + - + + - + 
Model 1 - - - - + - - - 
 
- - - - - 
- 
Model 2 - - - - - - - - - - 
Model 3 N/A - 
 
+ + + + + - - 
Conclude
?  
Reject 
Hypoth. 
Support 
Hypoth.    
Reject 
Hypoth 
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 Due to the use of private giving as a base group in the final model and the lack of significant results in 
Models 1 and 2, I consider the test of Hypothesis 2a inconclusive. 
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First, a lack of supporting evidence across models leads me to reject Hypothesis 
2b.  I had proposed that an increase in the percentage of dues would indicate a 
strengthening of membership in the grassroots advocacy tradition; however, significant 
negative impacts were found, even in Model 3 where the signs are more reliable.  This 
may simply be because organizations that are heavily dependent on or are growing their 
reliance on dues intend to restrict their size and, therefore, are associated with smaller 
rates of growth. 
Second, I fail to reject Hypothesis 2c, which proposed a negative impact of 
increasing reliance on indirect funding on growth in total expenses.  Though the lack of a 
significant result in Model 3 gives me pause, we do not have conflicting signs; 
additionally, the results we do have conform to theory.  Increasing reliance on a 
supporting group indicates a general detachment from mission service recipients, even if 
the institution donating is a dedicated foundation (unlikely in this size bracket).  There is 
also the possibility that the indirect funds come from an organization such as the United 
Way or other federated giving plan, which have been struggling with their own 
difficulties in recent years. 
 Finally, I reject Hypothesis 2g, which states that non-mission income will have a 
beneficial effect on NFP spending; it appears that the NFP may be apprehensive about its 
drift from mission activities.  Even if we were to grant the James (1983) cross-
subsidization theory that such activities must occur in order to subsidize mission, the 
presence of 6 significant negative impacts of a potential 8 in fixed effects estimation (the 
highest number of significant impacts for revenue percentages in Model 1); 3 significant 
negative impacts of a potential 4 in the individual revenue dynamic regressions (also the 
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highest number of significant impacts for the revenue percentages in Model 2);and 2 of a 
potential 5 significant negative impacts in the dynamic portfolio model all provide 
evidence that increasing reliance on non-mission income in an NFP revenue portfolio 
suppresses growth.  This may have been able to emerge due to the instrumentation: since 
we are using either demeaned data or instruments from past values in the models, we may 
see the potential negative impact on legitimacy over time from over-commercialization. 
The impacts of both Revenue Concentration and UBI are sector dependent and 
negligible.  Across all valid estimations, Revenue Concentration has only 5 significant 
coefficients; I therefore consider this insufficient information to render judgement of any 
kind on the hypothesis.  For UBI, though it is generally insignificant, it had an extremely 
positive impact on growth in Model 1 for the Human Services and Hospital estimations.  
In these sectors, there is enough evidence to warrant a failure to reject of the hypothesis 
which predicts a positive impact of UBI on growth. 
The lagged Fixed Cost Ratio is another variable which had very strong results in 
Model 1, but almost no significant impact in the valid estimates of Models 2 and 3.  Since 
all signs are positive and in accordance with theory, I fail to reject the hypothesis that 
increases in the fixed cost ratio will increase total expenses, but on a sector-dependent 
basis.  In the fixed effects regressions and as noted in the Findings, the significant results 
occurred in sectors where the median ratio was over .02.  Therefore, this confirmation of 
a positive impact would extend generally to these sectors. 
UNA is another variable where, despite a universal positive sign when it is 
significant, the degree of support for a confirmed hypothesis varies by sector.  The 
strongest support for UNA having a positive impact on growth is in the Public subsector, 
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where all three models contain significant and positive coefficients.  Slightly less support 
is given to the conclusion in the Education sector (without higher education), where 
support is found in two of the models.  All other sectors except for Hospitals have 
universal signs and significance in the fixed effects estimation, but not in the others; there 
is no support for UNA playing a role in the Hospital subsector in any model.  Therefore, I 
would feel comfortable discussing the failure to reject Hypothesis 6 in all sectors save 
Hospitals, where I do not feel there is sufficient evidence to make the call. 
Age (as measured by the actual exemption date or by the number of years 
between the fiscal year and the exemption date) has mixed results.  There is a general 
lack of support for any conclusion in Model 1with the exception of the Hospital 
subsector, where we see a liability of age.  In Model 2, almost every valid estimation 
finds a significant positive impact, though the Hospitals subsector does not have 
significantly consistent findings.  Finally, in Model 3, all subsectors report a positive 
impact for age.  Therefore, for all subsectors except for Hospitals, we fail to reject the 
hypothesis that total expense growth increases with age; for Hospitals, the conflicting 
signs and significance levels keep me from a formal opinion. 
 
Practical Implications and Conclusions 
 
Lessons for Practice and Policy 
 
There are several insights from this study that can inform practice and policy.  
The first is that advice, whether sought or given, should be sector-specific.  The revenue 
81 
 
portfolios and financial mechanisms vary widely between or even within nonprofit 
sectors, so sector-wide studies should be carefully approached to look for certain caveats 
or assumptions.  On the policy side, this should caution policy-makers against seeking 
sector-wide panaceas, especially when trying to encourage growth in the small NFPs. 
This study provides further evidence that accumulation of UNA is beneficial to 
the health of not-for-profits, and further research should be dedicated to fine-tuning the 
“optimal” level.  How such UNA is acquired, however, appears to make a difference.  
This study also shows that increasing reliance on indirect support or dues are not 
beneficial to growth if they come at the cost of a different revenue, though increasing 
amounts in the levels of revenue spurs growth in total expenses. 
Finally, this study deepens the concern regarding the role of non-mission income 
in the nonprofit sector.  With sectors showing as much as one third of their average 
revenue portfolio stemming from non-mission income, this should concern all those 
interested in defining clearly what the distinctions between non- and for-profit 
organizations should be.  Further, if it is a hindrance to growth, this provides yet another 
concern for its prevalence in the sector.  This study does not differentiate between 
degrees of mission-relatedness, however, and this should be an important component of 
future research. 
 
Limitations and Future Research 
 
There are significant limitations to this study beyond the discussion over the 
optimal estimation strategy.  First, there are concerns regarding the representativeness of 
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the sample.  The Form 990 databases do not comprehensively cover those organizations 
whose revenues may fall below the mandatory filing line.  Further, dropping EZ filers 
means that the smallest of the mandatory filers have also been removed from the study.  
The same criticism applies to the exclusion of those who were not using accrual 
accounting: though necessary to ensure that expenses are measured the same way, accrual 
is a more sophisticated method that may select away from very small or young 
organizations.  These concerns can be addressed by either relaxing the standards of data 
quality, changing the model to include less granular information, or the assembly of a 
unique dataset, preferably one that began with a specific sector focus.
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There are also limitations to the models.  Further exploration is needed to find 
instruments of universally appropriate fit, though I anticipate there will always be a 
tradeoff between the best fit for a specific sector and the universalizability of that model 
for all sectors.  As to the models, even simple interpretation of variables that are not the 
lagged dependent variable in a dynamic model is not straightforward, and further work 
regarding the appropriateness of different modelling techniques for different data 
characteristics and research questions is definitely warranted. More than almost anything, 
this study is a call for more focused work in revenues, especially those involving non-
mission income.  The normative implication that non-mission income is bad news for 
governance is now coupled with the empirical findings that non-mission income achieved 
at the expense of other income will hurt growth.  These are two strong and potentially 
reinforcing reasons why, in an era where nonprofits are being threatened with loss of 
exemption and social enterprise is making inroads through the charitable sector, the role 
and impacts of non-mission income need further attention. 
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 Please see Chapter 4 for a similar approach. 
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Conclusions 
 
This study proposed and tested several models of NFP firm growth.  The focus of 
these models was the relationship between the revenue level or “income” effect and the 
portfolio or “substitution” effect of different types of revenue. Three different models 
were used and, when the analyses were combined, produced interesting findings.  The 
strongest takeaways are that individual subsectors need to be modeled independently; that 
increases in the percentage of a NFP’s revenue portfolio going to dues, indirect support, 
or non-mission income will suppress growth; and that when there is no “optimal” model, 
a nest of models to compare will offer additional insights due to their own strengths and 
weaknesses (such as the empirical discovery of probable Nickell bias). 
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CHAPTER III: PREDICTING FINANCIAL RECOVERY IN VULNERABLE 
SMALL AND NEW NOT-FOR-PROFIT ORGANIZATIONS 
 
Introduction 
 
 Over the last twenty years, the nonprofit sector has become an increasingly 
crowded place; during the period between 1989 and 2000, the gross entry rate for new 
nonprofits was 5.6 percent while the exit rate was half of that amount (Harrison & 
Laincz, 2008).  Competition for resources increased, as did theories on how to most 
effectively leverage an individual nonprofit’s cost structure and financial portfolio to 
attract further funds (S. Ashley & Faulk, 2010; Bowman, et al., 2011; Calabrese, 2011a, 
2011b; Kearns, 2007; B.R. Kingma, 1993; Mayer, Wang, Egginton, & Flint, 2014; D. R. 
Young, et al., 2010).  Not only did nonprofit managers want to extend the life and serving 
capabilities of their particular nonprofit, but donors wanted the ability to gauge which of 
the many projects available was the most financially fit and would thereby have the 
greatest chance of a long life and lasting impact (Abraham, 2006; Anthony, 1991; S. 
Ashley & Faulk, 2010; Hodge & Piccolo, 2005; F.A. Jacobs & Marudas, 2009; J. Lecy & 
Searing, 2012; Mosley, Maronick, & Katz, 2012; Twu, 2007).  Further, a gap opened in 
the theoretical literature on the how the differences in the for-profit and not-for-profit 
forms manifested themselves in financial management (Bardach & Lesser, 1996; 
Barman, 2002; Chapelle, 2010; Finkler, Purtell, Calabrese, & Smith, 2013; Gertler & 
Kuan, 2009; Kalleberg, Marsden, Reynolds, & Knoke, 2006; Michalski, 2012; Ruvio, 
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Rosenblatt, & Hertz-Lazarowitz, 2010; Wolff & Schlesinger, 1998).  How can you tell if 
your nonprofit is healthy, efficient, and effective? 
 From this need sprang an effort, with roots in both the for-profit sector and in the 
native theories of nonprofits, to define what financially unhealthy or “vulnerable” means 
(Chang & Tuckman, 1991; Carolyn J Cordery, Sim, & Baskerville, 2013; Dayson, 2013; 
Greenlee & Trussel, 2000; Mark A. Hager, 2001; Hodge & Piccolo, 2005; Keating, et al., 
2005; J. Lecy & D. Van Slyke, 2012; Matthiesen, 2009; E. A. M. Searing, 2012; Tevel, 
Katz, & Brock, 2014; John M. Trussel, 2002; H.P. Tuckman & Chang, 1991).  Over the 
last 20 years, a significant and informative body of literature has grown around the use of 
financial ratios to predict whether nonprofits will become financially vulnerable; these 
studies use a broad variety of data sources and definitions of vulnerable, piecing together 
an evolving definition of what an unhealthy nonprofit looks like (Abraham, 2006; S. R. 
Ashley & Van Slyke, 2012; Chabotar, 1989; Frumkin & Kim, 2001; Mark A. Hager, 
2001; J. D. Lecy & Searing, 2014; Ritchie & Kolodinsky, 2003; Tinkelman & 
Donabedian, 2007; D. Tinkelman, 2009).  The prior literature, though comprehensive, 
focused primarily on improving the diagnostic accuracy of the models that predict 
financial vulnerability.  However, similar to receiving an unfortunate prognosis at your 
doctor’s office, the question that follows such a verdict is often: now what do I do? 
Especially since a confluence of financial warning signs often occurs, the task of 
maximizing a firm’s chances of survival is both monumental and unclear.  This is 
especially the case for young and small nonprofits, which may not have the human 
resources, institutional memory, or network of allies necessary to provide advice in 
financially stressful times. 
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 Rather than expanding the current literature on organizational mortality in 
nonprofits, this essay explores the process of healing from financial vulnerability.  I 
utilize a modified version of the Hager (2001) and Trussel (2002) models and twenty 
years of nonprofit tax filings from the National Center for Charitable Statistics (NCCS) to 
identify young and small nonprofits who have successfully recovered from financial 
vulnerability. Using the same organizational and financial characteristics found in the 
models used for diagnosis of distress, this study uses logistic regression to compare 
organizations that emerge from vulnerability to organizations that remain vulnerable. I 
suspect that many of the same trends that influence the onset of nonprofit vulnerability 
and demise, such as higher overhead costs and revenue diversification, will also affect 
which areas of their financial health will show improvement.    
 
Predicting Vulnerability with Financial Ratios 
 
 Financial ratio analysis was pioneered by the for-profit sector decades before the 
practice entered the nonprofit mainstream.  Beaver (1966) discovered that certain 
characteristics could be used to predict firm bankruptcy up to five years prior to failure; 
shortly thereafter, Altman (1968) and Deakin (1972) expanded on this theme by 
broadening the number of indicators and controls.   Altman (2000) began with a weighted 
five-ratio model developed through multiple discriminant analysis, then tailored the ratios 
and re-specified the model to reflect different ownership and production options.  Ohlson 
(1980) was able to expand the sample size thirtyfold by employing logit estimation and 
turning to financial statements as a source of information rather than relying on published 
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resources from ratings agencies.  Ohlson (1980) used nine indicators, but found only four 
of them consistently significant across both one- and two-year thresholds.  All of the 
private sector models from this period used declared bankruptcy as their definition of 
financial distress, since this is easily measurable and verifiable in the corporate sector. 
 Several difficulties exist in applying predictive methods and measures designed 
for commercial for-profit companies to the nonprofit sector (Beck, et al., 2008).  First, 
Ohlson (1980) noted that model improvement was linked to data improvement, and for 
the for-profit world this means combining accounting-based valuations with market-
based valuations.  Aside from market pricing for assets and liabilities, nonprofits are not 
readily able to estimate the market capitalization of their business.  Concepts of earnings 
per share are nonsensical, while estimates for EBIT (earnings before interest and taxes) 
and retained earnings are possible to calculate, but do not provide the same nuance of 
meaning that they would in the corporate sector (Calabrese, 2012).  Second, though 
adequate corollaries or alternate measures could be found in the nonprofit sector for these 
missing estimators, the nonprofit sector has unique financial concerns such as fundraising 
expenses and revenue type diversification, which also need to be accounted for in a 
measure of nonprofit health. 
 Finally, unlike the formal declaration of bankruptcy that signals the demise of a 
for-profit entity, the nonprofit sector in the United States does not have a commensurate 
signal for nonprofit failure.  The for-profit pioneers were able to build predictive models 
based on declared failures, while the definition of what would constitute a failure or, as 
became popular, financial vulnerability for non-profits became a matter of inquiry.  
Nonprofits can be involuntarily stripped of 501(c)3 status if they have it, in addition to 
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having their organization disbanded due to failure to file mandated regulatory documents, 
failure to pay taxes or fines, failure to notify the state regarding changes in registered 
agents, board or staff mismanagement, judicial action, and, depending on the state, 
inactivity or excessive liabilities (Greenlee & Trussel, 2000; Moody, 1988).  Voluntary 
dissolutions can occur for numerous governance concerns, such as board dissonance or 
impropriety, in addition to financial concerns, such as impending bankruptcy (Greenlee 
& Trussel, 2000; Norris-Tirrell, 1997).  However, the constrained distribution of assets in 
the case of the dissolution of a 501(c)3 complicates the behavior of any financial 
indicator that would assume a degree of liquidity in asset valuation; in other words, 
whether everything can be sold at the closure of the firm and the money distributed 
versus donated to another 501(c)(3) makes a difference.  If you are a creditor, you may 
lose access to such assets in case of organizational closure; if you are a manager, you 
need to compensate potential creditors for this additional assumed risk. 
 
Financial Ratio Analysis in Nonprofits 
 
 One of the first objectives of nonprofit financial ratio analysis was defining how 
to measure nonprofit duress using financial metrics.  Since ratio analysis began in the for-
profit sector, the initial studies in the nonprofit sector simply transplanted the commercial 
ratios and underlying analysis to the nonprofit sector.  Cleverley and Nilsen (1980) used 
29 different indicators to evaluate the financial health of New York State hospitals prior 
to closure; this was followed by Kennedy and Dumas (1983), who found strong evidence 
of a liability of smallness across hospitals with different types of ownership.  Chabotar 
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(1989) used 12 measures of health to develop an “early warning system” in a case study 
of a non-profit university.  Unlike the for-profit literature at that time, these studies did 
not attempt to develop a predictive model; instead, each began to describe the public or 
nonprofit organizations using tools of the for-profit sector. A major contribution of this 
period was whether the messages communicated by financial ratio analysis in a non-
profit environment are comparable to similar conclusions drawn in a for-profit 
environment. 
 In 1991, Tuckman and Chang proposed that what a nonprofit needed was not 
necessarily a prediction of bankruptcy, but a way to gauge the probability of an 
interruption in the provision of services.  Tuckman and Chang (1991) analyzed four 
financial ratios that were potentially the most able to forecast whether a financial shock 
would decrease nonprofit service provision: equity balances, revenue concentration, 
administrative costs, and operating margins.  The authors then sort the nonprofits that 
filed 990 financial information forms in 1983 (4,730 firms in their sample) with at least 
one of the ratios in the bottom quintile as “at-risk,” and with all ratios in the bottom 
quintile as “severely-at-risk.”  Their descriptive cross-sectional analysis is considered the 
seminal work in the field of nonprofit financial indicator analysis. 
 Since 1991, there have been a wide variety of goals, definitions, and statistical 
methods applied to the use of financial ratios in the nonprofit sector.  Building on the 
foundation of his demise work in 1999, Hager (2001) shifted the focus from predicting 
vulnerability to predicting actual organizational demise.  Using a nonprofit’s failure to 
file mandatory 990 forms for four years as a proxy for firm death, Hager found that all 
four of the Tuckman-Chang measures predicted firm demise for arts organizations 
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(though results vary between subgroups).   Greenlee and Trussel (2000) conducted an 
empirical test of Tuckman and Chang’s measures against a different definition of 
financial distress; they operationalized vulnerability (defined as the likelihood of  
program disruption) as a decrease in the program expenditure to revenue ratio for three 
consecutive years.  Using logistic regression, they constructed a predictive model and 
found that three of the four original ratios being significantly explanatory.  Trussel (2002) 
expanded the sample size and number of sectors in his test of the Tuckman and Chang 
measures, but lost the ability to gauge overhead ratios due to the change from the NCCS 
SOI database to the NCCS 990 core files database.   In 2004, Trussel and Greenlee 
returned to the SOI data to estimate a logit model on the four Tuckman-Chang indicators, 
plus size and subsector as controls.  They defined as “vulnerable” any organization that 
had a substantial decrease in assets between 1992 and 1995.  They found the equity ratio, 
surplus margin, and firm size significant, then used the results to create a financial rating 
system for the nonprofit sector.  In a change from the logistic regression, Ritchie and 
Kolodinsky used a two-phase factor analysis method on 122 university foundations to 
determine which of 15 indicators were important in evaluating nonprofit financial 
performance (2003).   
 Keating et al. (2005) tested on the models of  Ohlson, Altman, and Tuckman and 
Chang using discrete hazard-rate functions.  Using data from the NCCS digitized files in 
1999 and 2000, the authors estimated the models using four different definitions of 
financial vulnerability that are constructed based on a one-year decrease in solvency 
level, net assets, total revenues, or program expenses.  The Ohlson (1980) model had the 
most predictive power in their study, which they then augmented with ratios capturing 
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commercial revenues and endowment performance to build their own model.  Their final 
custom model had the most predictive power for the sample.  Almost a decade later, 
Tevel et al. (2014) take a similar approach and test many of the same models, but also 
include models built on practioner organizations such as UK New Philanthropy Capital 
and the Israeli Midot.  Despite the new models, however, Tevel et al. (2014) find that the 
original Tuckman and Chang (1991) ratios have the most predictive power. 
 More recently, studies have begun to focus on the roles of particular indicators 
and their correlations with firm types and performance.  Hodge and Piccolo (2005) use 
the Trussel  (2002) model to evaluate the impact of revenue source in social service 
nonprofits, holding board structure and organizational characteristics constant; Abraham 
(2006) takes this one step further by highlighting the role played by mission in the 
construction and use of financial ratio analysis.  Cordery and Baskerville (2010) and 
Cordery et al.(2013) apply both the Greenlee and Trussel (2000) and the Trussel (2002) 
models to New Zealand sports clubs, finding that the results were very sport-specific, 
owing primarily to organization size and asset structure (such as owning a golf course 
versus owning a squash court).  Bowman (2011b) identifies two financial goals for 
nonprofit firms: short term surpluses and long term asset growth.  His study explores the 
potential trade-offs between the two goals using a case study.  Bowman (2011a) then uses 
these dual goals to guide his textbook on financial management.  Overhead costs 
(Bowman, 2006; J. D. Lecy & Searing, 2014; K. Wing & Hager, 2004) and revenue 
concentration (Grace L Chikoto & Neely, 2013; Frumkin & Keating, 2011) have each 
developed a robust literature dedicated specifically to the definition and role of particular 
indicators in the health of a nonprofit.  Additionally, there has been work in 
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understanding demise in contexts other than the United States nonprofit sector, such as 
Dayson’s (2013) description of the issues facing nonprofit vulnerability research in the 
United Kingdom and Fernandez’s exploration of nonprofit demise in Spain (2008) 
 
Hypotheses 
 
 This study joins the literature in the utilization of the Tuckman and Chang (1991) 
indicators as a foundation.  In a departure from previous work, however, this essay uses 
these indicators to explore financial recovery in nonprofits rather than demise.  Since we 
are interested in how existing vulnerability tools perform as instruments of recovery, the 
set of  hypotheses tested here  are the same ones used in the Trussel (2002): the Tuckman 
and Chang measures in addition to sector and size.
54
   
The equity ratio is a measure of the total net assets of the organization compared 
to its revenues.  A significant proportion of total net assets reflects uncommitted assets, 
which can be liquidated rather than enter another period of vulnerability.  Trussel (2002) 
predicted and found a negative relationship between equity and financial vulnerability; 
accordingly, we expect to find a positive relationship between large proportions of equity 
and the ability to pull an organization out of financial distress.
55
  If this were so, it would 
suggest that organizations who recovered did not do so by taking on debt, which would 
depress the equity ratio. 
 
                                                          
54
 Further, Trussel (2002) faced the same data constraints in using the Core files, necessitating the removal 
of the administrative cost ratio due to a lack of data. 
55
 There are differences in formula between the Trussel (2002) and the equity ratio in this study, which is 
why the “predicted sign” contained in his paper is positive, despite denoting a positive relationship between 
low levels of equity and vulnerability. 
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H1:  Higher levels of equity will positively influence financial recovery in young 
and new not-for-profit organizations. 
 
  The surplus margin is a measure of both success and of liquidity.  Organizations 
with large surpluses compared to their expenses are flush in the cash needed to buffer 
financial difficulties and potentially grow.  Though the literature is currently divided over 
whether surpluses are a positive or negative attribute in a nonprofit (Bowman, 2011b; 
Calabrese, 2011a; Core, Guay, & Verdi, 2006), I expect a positive relationship between 
surplus and nonprofit recovery. 
 
H2:  Organizations with a high surplus rate will positively influence financial 
recovery. 
 
Unlike most for-profits, nonprofit organizations need a measure of revenue 
concentration: how many different types of revenue (such as earned income, grants, etc.) 
that the nonprofit receives.  If the nonprofit endured an interruption of one of these 
funding types, such as the expiration of a contract, then existing alternative revenue 
options should facilitate recovery.  Trussel (2002) therefore expected to see a positive 
relationship between the revenue concentration variable and vulnerability, whereas we 
expect to see a negative relationship: the higher the revenue concentration measure is, the 
less diverse is the portfolio.  If an organization is able to rely on numerous types of 
funding, then it is more likely to adapt to the resources available in their environment and 
pull themselves into financial recovery. 
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H3:  A more diverse revenue mix will promote financial recovery. 
 
Even though the sample is limited to nonprofits that had total revenues of 
$150,000 or less during the year of vulnerability, I still expect to find a liability of 
smallness.  In other words, larger organizations will be less likely to be vulnerable and 
will have a corresponding advantage in reversing their fortunes toward financial 
recovery. 
 
H4:  Larger nonprofits will be more likely to recover financially than similar 
smaller nonprofits. 
 
 I also expect that older organizations will have an advantage in recovering 
financially, even in a sample limited to organizations less than or equal to ten years old.  
The networks and internal systems which Stinchcombe (1965) described as lacking and 
contributing to the liability of newness will have an increasing number of years to 
develop.  This means that the human resource expertise and allies have had an additional, 
if small, amount of time to develop and offer a further buffer against vulnerability. 
 
H5:  Older nonprofits will be more likely to recover financially than similar 
younger nonprofits, even among an age-limited sample. 
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Data  
 
Data source 
 
Though the United States does not have an accurate way to track nonprofit 
demise, it does have a way to collect and disseminate information about nonprofits.  The 
National Center for Charitable Statistics (NCCS) assembles and maintains numerous 
databases based on the 990 and related tax forms that are required for U.S. nonprofits by 
the Internal Revenue Service (IRS).  This paper uses the Core data files, which contain 
select fields from every 990 filed between the years of 1990 and 2012 for those public 
charities registered as 501(c)3’s making more than $25,000 per year.   The files are 
provided by fiscal year, which I combined into a single panel dataset.  The extensive 
cleaning of the data prior to the construction of the two vulnerable samples is described 
in Table 8. 
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Table 8 
Summary of Data Cleaning 
Beginning sample of nonprofit observations 
 
less nonprofit observations with fiscal years prior to 
     1987 
less nonprofit observations with missing rule dates 
less nonprofit observations with incorrectly formatted 
     rule dates 
less nonprofit observations with ages less than -1
56
 
less nonprofit observations that were exact duplicates 
     on employer identification number (EIN), fiscal 
    year, and total revenues 
less nonprofit observations that were exact duplicates 
    on EIN and fiscal year
57
 
less organizations with negative values for 
    contributions, program revenues, or dues 
less nonprofits which did not report a sector 
5,500,342 
 
-5 
 
-39,867 
-62,333 
 
-26,575 
-767,966 
 
 
-21,109 
 
-3,170 
 
-2 
(% of 
original) 
~ 
 
.72% 
1.13% 
 
.48% 
13.96% 
 
 
.38% 
 
.06% 
 
~ 
 
Potential sample size after cleaning 
 
4,579,315 
 
 
83.26% 
 
Nonprofits from final potential sample with two years 
     of insolvency followed by two years of filing a 990 
     form 
Nonprofits from final potential sample with two years 
     of 25% decrease in total net assets followed by two 
     years of filing a 990 form 
 
91,226 
 
 
146,446 
 
1.66%
58
 
 
 
2.66% 
 
 
                                                          
56
 Since nonprofits can retroactively apply tax-exempt status for a year while their status ruling is pending, 
an operating age of -1 is possible since age is defined by the difference between the fiscal year and the date 
exemption was granted. 
57
 Observations matching on only EIN and fiscal year are less likely to be duplicate filings than those 
matching on EIN, fiscal year, and total revenues; however, it is still likely enough to be removed from the 
data set.  The steps are kept separate to tranche the likelihood of duplication. 
58
 There are two sources of restriction here.  First is the requirement that four consecutive years of data 
exists, which was problematic even before almost 14% of the data set was marked as missing.  The second 
is the restriction of meeting the sample conditions needed for insolvency and financial disruption. 
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Such accessibility and detail, however, do not come without drawbacks.   Only 
organizations making more than $25,000 per year in total revenue are required to file, 
though many smaller ones do; further, churches are not required to file.  Also, many 
inaccuracies and discrepancies exist in the forms: entries regarding financial activities 
that nonprofits consider unimportant or that they are uncomfortable with, such as 
commercial revenue sources and fundraising expenses, are particularly suspect (Froelich, 
Knoepfle, & Pollak, 2000).  However, as noted in Froelich and Knoepfle (1996) and 
Froelich, Knoepfle, and Pollak (2000), the Form 990 financial filings are adequate for 
research purposes, with high degrees of consistency between audited financial statements 
and the information in the 990 financial forms for balance sheet items.  
 
 
Data Caveats for the Young and New 
 
 Accounting information for young enterprises is often discounted; even in the for-
profit literature, such information can be volatile and unreliable (Wiklund, Baker, & 
Shepherd, 2010).  In addition, entrepreneurs in both sectors may have motives other than 
profit-maximization, such as personal fulfillment (Wiklund, Davidsson, & Delmar, 
2003).  Though the espousal of motives aside from profit-maximization causes no qualms 
in the nonprofit sector, similar concerns exist in both sectors regarding accounting quality 
and financial management for young enterprises.
59
  This reputation, whether accurate or 
not, is expected as a part of the liability of newness introduced by Stinchcombe (1965): 
organizations in their beginning phases lack internal processes, human resources, and 
                                                          
59
 Some studies dispute the contention that small organizations have poor financial records, however, such 
as Froelich, Knoepfle, and Pollak (2000). 
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legitimacy (Wiklund, et al., 2010).  Therefore, even if financial reporting systems are 
underdeveloped for the very young or very small, an effective way to combat the liability 
directly is to improve both the creation and usage of information.  Conducting financial 
ratio analysis on young nonprofits not only yields insight into the financial mechanics, 
but also helps legitimize the nonprofit using the process; the only way to develop higher 
quality financial records is to demonstrate that such information is useful to both 
nonprofit managers and funders. 
 
Sample Selection 
 
There are two different potential samples, each one comprised of the nonprofit 
firms that meet one of two different definitions of vulnerable.  The “solvency” sample 
consists of nonprofits who have been insolvent for at least two years, then filed 990 tax 
forms for an additional two years after that.  Likewise, the “financial disruption” sample 
contains 31,589 nonprofits that experienced a 25% annual loss in total net assets for two 
years as reported by the difference of beginning and end of year total net assets, then filed 
990 tax forms for an additional two years
60
.  These are the numbers seen in Table 8, and 
were the basis for Searing (2012), which did not look specifically at young and small 
organizations. 
This dissertation, however, specifically investigates the impact of nonprofit 
characteristics on recovery for nonprofits that are young and small, thereby filling a gap 
                                                          
60
 Though this provides the information required for our analysis, it also excludes those organizations that 
were in poor enough financial health that they did not report.  Unfortunately, these organizations are not 
separable from the normal response inconsistency in filing Form 990s.  Therefore, it is important to 
remember that this is not a determination of how nonprofits should avoid demise, but rather how they 
differentiate themselves from organizations that remain vulnerable. 
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in the nonprofit literature.  We consider “young” to be organizations that, in the time 
period where their recovery is determined, are not older than ten years.  This means that, 
on their first year of vulnerability, they must not be older than seven years.
61
  This study 
considers “small” to be nonprofits that had inflation-adjusted62 total revenues smaller 
than $150,000 during any of the four consecutive years of vulnerability and potential 
recovery.  Inclusion in this study required the nonprofit to be both young and new. 
 
 
Table 9 
Sample Selection for the Solvency Sample 
Nonprofits from final potential sample with two years of insolvency 
     followed by two years of filing a 990 form 
Less observations from nonprofits older than 10 in their diagnosis year 
Less observations from nonprofits whose total revenues were 
     consistently >$150,000 during the observation period 
91,226 
 
59.495 
21.519 
Final sample for Solvency  
     Total Observations 
     Number of Unique Nonprofits 
 
10,212 
5,386 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
 
 
62
 Inflation adjustments occur with a base year of 2012. 
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Table 10 
Sample Selection for the Financial Stability Sample 
Nonprofits from final potential sample with two years of 
     insolvency followed by two years of filing a 990 form 
Less observations from nonprofits older than 10 in their diagnosis 
     year 
Less observations from nonprofits whose total revenues were 
     consistently >$150,000 during the observation period 
146,446 
 
87,241 
 
30,459 
Final sample for Financial Stability 
     Total Observations 
     Number of Unique Nonprofits 
 
28,746 
21,175 
 
 
Tables 9 and 10 show the steps from the completion of data cleaning to the two 
final samples for this essay. The final samples corresponding to each definition of 
vulnerable can be seen in Figures 5 and 6, broken down into the percentages that are 
young, new, both, and neither.  These show the composition of the sample data in this 
work compared to the original study in Searing (2012).   
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Figure 5.  Small and Young Components of the Solvency Sample 
 
 
 
Figure 6.  Small and Young Components of the Financial Stability Sample 
 
 
 
52% 
24% 
11% 
13% 
Neither
Only Young (Age ≤ 10) 
Both
Only Small (Total Revenues ≤ 
$150K) 
40% 
21% 
20% 
19% 
Neither
Only Young (Age ≤ 10) 
Both
Only Small (Total Revenues ≤ 
$150K) 
Initial N=91,226 
Final Sample N=10,212 
Initial N=146,446 
Final Sample N=28,746 
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Variable Definition 
 
 The nonprofit literature defines financial vulnerability and demise in a variety of 
ways.  Actual closure of a nonprofit is difficult to verify using the popular forms of 
research data; unlike Canada, which maintains a list of deregistered nonprofits, nonprofit 
scholars in the United States have two general choices.  First, they can create their own 
dataset by personally verifying the operational status of a group of nonprofits.  Second, 
they can attempt to proxy closure or the likelihood of closure using widely available 
metrics.   
 The vast majority of vulnerability studies have been conducted using these latter 
proxies (though with notable exceptions such as Hager (1999) and Hager et al. (1996)).  
Tuckman and Chang (1991) predict service disruption risk by sorting their sample into 
vulnerability quintiles and labelling them according to vulnerability.  Greenlee and 
Trussel (2000) define vulnerability as a three-year decline in the ratio of program 
expenses to total revenues.  Trussel and Greenlee (2004) use two models: a 20% 
reduction or a 50% reduction in net assets over a three-year period; since using multiple 
definitions in the same study yields additional insight into the complications of financial 
distress, this practice is becoming more popular (Bowman, 2011b; Keating, et al., 2005). 
 This study similarly uses two definitions of financial vulnerability in its statistical 
analysis.  The first is the condition of “balance sheet” insolvency, where total liabilities 
are greater than total assets.  This is a classic measure of the net worth of an organization.  
The second type of vulnerability is probable financial disruption, which was 
approximated in the Trussel and Greenlee (2004) and Keating et al. (2005) papers; 
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similar to the latter paper, we operationalize this as a 25% decrease in annual total net 
assets over 2 years.  We only use one year of insolvency to classify a nonprofit as 
vulnerable since our study begins with a sample of vulnerable organizations trying to 
recover.
63
   
 
Dependent Variables 
 
 The use of two definitions of vulnerability permits us two dependent variables in 
order to gauge financial recovery.  For the first sample, solvency will be determined by a 
nonprofit having two consecutive years of total assets being equal to or higher than total 
liabilities following a two-year period of insolvency.  For example, an organization that 
was insolvent in both 2004 and 2005 will need to be solvent in 2006 and 2007 to be 
considered recovered in the solvency sample.  Similarly, in the financial stability sample, 
an organization will need to, following two consecutive years of at a least 25% annual 
decrease in total net assets, have two consecutive years of either net asset growth or 
losses less than 25% in order to be considered financially recovered. 
 
Independent Variables 
 
As mentioned previously, the independent variables closely approximate the ones 
used in Tuckman and Chang (1991) that are standard for the field.  These firm 
characteristics are selected based on their inclusion in the Hager (2001) or Trussel (2002) 
                                                          
63
 Requiring multiple years to prove vulnerability for inclusion in the sample would be similar to asking 
Trussel and Greenlee to prove three years of health for a nonprofit before including it in their predictive 
vulnerability model. 
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models, the latter of which contains the four original Tuckman-Chang measures plus a 
size measure and sector dummies, but without the administrative cost ratio.  Details on 
the formula and NCCS Core Data fields used to construct each measure are displayed in 
Table 11.  As a note, when used in the denominator or in taking the natural log, any total 
revenue less than $1 is edited to equal $1 to avoid mathematical complications. 
This study operationalizes the equity ratio as the difference between total end-of-
year assets and total end-of-year liabilities (total net assets), normalized by total revenues.  
We estimate financial surplus by normalizing net income by total revenues; as described 
earlier, evidence suggests that nonprofits accumulate surpluses, though the implications 
of such are under dispute (Calabrese, 2012; Howard P. Tuckman & Chang, 1992).  
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Table 11 
Variable Operationalization 
Name Formula NCCS Core Data Fields 
EQUITY
64
 
 
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒𝑠
 
 
𝐹𝑈𝑁𝐷𝐵𝐴𝐿
𝑇𝑂𝑇𝑅𝐸𝑉
 
 
SURPLUS 
 
(𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒𝑠 − 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑠)
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒𝑠
 
 
(𝑇𝑂𝑇𝑅𝐸𝑉 − 𝐸𝑋𝑃𝑆)
𝑇𝑂𝑇𝑅𝐸𝑉
 
 
HHI
65
 
 ∑ (
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒 𝑇𝑦𝑝𝑒
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒𝑠
)
2
 
 
∑ (
𝑅𝐸𝑉𝐸𝑁𝑈𝐸 𝑇𝑌𝑃𝐸
𝑇𝑂𝑇𝑅𝐸𝑉
)
2
 
 
SIZE
66
 
 
Natural log of total revenues 
 
log (TOTREV) 
 
AGE
67
 Years since receipt of tax-exempt 
status 
𝐹𝐼𝑆𝑌𝑅 − 𝑅𝑈𝐿𝐸𝐷𝐴𝑇𝐸 
 
 
As is common practice in determining revenue concentration, we use a 
Hirschman-Herfindahl concentration index, which is the sum of the squares of each 
revenue source’s proportion of total revenue (HHI).  Due to the detailed nature of the 
data, we are able to include 10 possible sources of revenue, which are divided by the sum 
of these ten sources.
68
  The more potential revenue streams that are included in the 
calculation of HHI, the more detail is picked up in the model and the greater the sizes and 
                                                          
64
 Both the equity and surplus ratios have been winsorized. 
65
 The revenue types used are CONT (direct public support + indirect public support + government 
contributions and grants), PROGREV (program service revenues), DUES (dues), INVINC (investment 
income + savings income + securities income), NETRENT (net rental income), SALESECN  (net sale of 
securities), SALEOTHN (net sale of other assets), FUNDINC (net special event proceeds), GRPROF (net 
inventory sales) and OTHINC (other revenues). 
66
 The total revenue has been adjusted for inflation prior to taking the natural log. 
67
 Some organizations appear to have lost and regained their exemption status during the sample, which 
causes nonlinear age.  To correct for this, the age for three years prior was calculated as a base year, then 
ages for years since then have been the base year plus the time elapsed since that year.  For example, the 
nonprofit’s current age will the fiscal date three years ago minus the date of exemption reported three years 
ago, plus three years.  Importantly, this catches older and more established organizations that have regained 
their exemption and kept their information out of the sample. 
68
 This sum is not the total revenue figure provided by the 990.  Rather, it is the sum of the revenues used in 
the study to account for errors or potential mismatches in the data due to cleaning. 
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significance of the impact on the dependent variable (Grace Lyness Chikoto, 2014).  The 
size factor is a logged form of total revenues.  Sector dummies are included, though we 
have expanded the number of sectors from the ten in Trussel (2002) to sixteen.  Since we 
use panel data during a period of twenty years, we also include year dummies to capture 
time-related variance.  Summary statistics for the solvency and financial stability 
estimations are show in Tables 12 and 13, respectively. 
 
 
Table 12 
Summary Statistics for the Small and Young Solvency Estimation 
  Year 1 Year 2 
 Variable Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
Achieved 
Solvency
69 
(N=1,659) 
 
Equity -.326 (.946) -.247 (1.129) 
Surplus -.249 (.660) -.048 (.470) 
HHI .806 (.210) .800 (.214) 
Size 11.355 (1.479) 11.603 (1.239) 
Age 2.700 (2.319) 3.700 (2.319) 
Did Not 
Achieve 
Solvency
 
(N=8,553) 
 
Equity -.628 (.573) -.681 (.577) 
Surplus -.317 (.794) -.210 (.671) 
HHI .823 (.203) .819 (.204) 
Size 10.992 (2.497) 11.128 (2.464) 
Age 3.528 (2.342) 4.528 (2.342) 
 
 
                                                          
69
 “Achieved Solvency” means that the nonprofit, following two consecutive years of total liabilities 
exceeding total assets, had two consecutive years where total assets either equaled or exceeded total 
liabilities. “Did Not Achieve Solvency” means that the nonprofit, following two consecutive years of total 
liabilities exceeding total assets, did not have two consecutive years where total assets either equaled or 
exceeded total liabilities. 
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Table 13 
Summary Statistics for the Small and Young Stability Estimation 
  Year 1 Year 2 
 Variable Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
Achieved 
Stability
70 
(N=11,929) 
 
Equity .772 (3.578) .753 (4.609) 
Surplus -.020 (.606) -.301 (.652) 
HHI .800 (.214) .794 (.216) 
Size 11.291 (1.182) 11.171 (1.481) 
Age 2.554 (2.410) 3.554 (2.406) 
Did Not 
Achieve 
Stability
 
(N=16,817) 
 
Equity .306 (3.535) .099 (3.489) 
Surplus -.163 (.728) -.315 (.693) 
HHI .823 (.205) .819 (.205) 
Size 11.192 (1.982) 11.172 (2.055) 
Age 3.006 (2.422) 4.006 (2.422) 
 
 
 Pearson correlation coefficients and their significance are shown in Table 14 and 
Table 15, with significance marked at the .05 level.  As is common in financial research 
across all sectors, many of the variables are significantly correlated (Flannery & Hankins, 
2013). 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
70
 “Achieved Stability” means that a nonprofit, following two consecutive years of at a least 25% annual 
decrease in total net assets, had two consecutive years of either net asset growth or losses less than 25%.  
“Did Not Achieve Stability” means that a nonprofit, following two years of at a least 25% annual decrease 
in total net assets, did not have either net asset growth or losses less than 25% for two consecutive years. 
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Table 14 
Pearson Correlations for the Small and Young Solvency Estimation 
 Variable Equity Surplus HHI Size Age 
 Solvency .169* .033* -.030* .057* -.130* 
Solvency
 
Year 1 
 
Equity 1     
Surplus .310* 1    
HHI -.039* -.027* 1   
Size .318* .066* -.056* 1  
Age -.099* .091* -.028* -.011 1 
Solvency
 
Year 2 
 
Solvency .224* .093* -.033* .076* -.130* 
Equity 1     
Surplus .262* 1    
HHI -.031* -.013 1   
Size .251* .017 -.037* 1  
 Age -.140* -.003 -.017 -.079* 1 
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Table 15 
Pearson Correlations for the Small and Young Stability Estimation 
 Variable Equity Surplus HHI Size Age 
 Stability .064* .103* -.054* .029* .092* 
Stability
 
Year 1 
 
Equity 1     
Surplus -.225* 1    
HHI -.007 .031* 1   
Size -.362* .186* -.002 1  
Age -.002 -.129* -.047* -.039* 1 
Stability
 
Year 2 
 
Stability .080* .010 -.59* -.001 
-
.092* 
Equity 1     
Surplus -.395* 1    
HHI .000 .024* 1   
Size -.450* .247* -.003 1  
 Age -.024* .012 -.014* -.060* 1 
 
 
   Nonetheless, there are concerns for which there are answers.  The first is whether 
the collinearity is due to the standardization of three variables by total revenues.  This 
does not appear to be the case since there is sizable correlation between the Equity and 
Surplus Ratios and between the Equity Ratio and Size, however there is not between the 
Surplus Ratio and Size.  Second, there is the concern that the Size variable of total 
revenues is causing problems; however, one of the sensitivity tests conducted later shows 
that using total assets yields similar problems.  Finally, aside from general comments on 
the section at large, these correlations fall within the realm of those found by landmark 
studies in the vulnerability field using this literature.  Trussel (2002) finds that all of his 
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covariates have significant Pearson correlations, with the Debt Ratio to Surplus Margin 
correlation at -.252 and the Debt Ratio to Revenue Concentration at .207.  Hager (2001) 
finds even higher coefficients in some subgroups of Arts organizations, with correlation 
coefficients between Operating Margin and the Equity Balance reaching as large as -.78.  
Accordingly, though we should be mindful of the correlations here, they should be taken 
with no more grains of salt than similar literature from the field.
71
 
 
Model Specification 
 
Since the Core data is available over such a long period of time, this grants an 
opportunity to use panel data structures that offer the best chance of inferring causality.  
Though studies such as Trussel (2002) and Hager (2001) have used the Core data before, 
both studies chose a single year or small group of years on which to base their 
measurements.  By utilizing the panel nature of this data, we are able to greatly expand 
and enhance the analysis.  This involves a model that contains information for a single 
instance of potential recovery taking place over a period of four years (see Figure 7). 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
71
 A possible avenue of future research is the inclusion of such variables in a dynamic model where, for 
example, we assume that the equity ratio is susceptible to the same issues as a lagged dependent variable.  
This is because, by the use of the general accounting equation, the solvency variable can also be the equity 
ratio standardized by total revenues, then lagged by two or three years depending on the model.  Though 
not conclusive, this could potentially cause bias in the same way that a lagged dependent variable does and 
could be estimated accordingly.  This study does not use fixed effects, but it does use year dummies and 
clusters on the EINs. 
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Figure 7.   Recovery Model Variable Construction 
 
 
The financial ratio analysis literature contains a wide variety of different 
estimation methods; I believe that two separate logistical (logit) analyses, one for the 
impact of the independent variables in each year, are the appropriate methods in this case.   
For the logistic analysis, let P(i,t) represent the probability that nonprofit firm i will have 
recovered from their diagnosis of financial vulnerability at time t.  The vector of firm 
characteristics is x(i,t) and the vector of parameters which form coefficients on those 
characteristics is β (Palepu, 1986; J.M. Trussel & Greenlee, 2004): 
 
𝑃(𝑖, 𝑡) =
1
1 + 𝑒−𝛽𝑥(𝑖,𝑡)
. 
 
where the vector of independent variables are related to the dependent variable using 
specific time values for characteristics in the first year of vulnerability (a) and those in 
the second year of vulnerability (b) as shown 
 
Year 1  
• Vulnerability, 
Year 1 
• Independent 
Variable 
Measurements 
Year 2 
• Vulnerability, 
Year 2 
• Independent 
Variable 
Measurements 
Year 3 
• Potential 
Recovery, 
Year 1 
Year 4 
• Potential 
Recovery, 
Year 2 
• Diagnosis of 
Recovered or 
Not Recovered 
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Findings 
 
 I discuss the empirical findings by variable.  Each variable in this section begins 
with a description of the medians over time.  Medians are used rather than means because 
they are more resistant to outliers; despite the ratios being winsorized at the 99
th
 and 1
st
 
percentile, there are still occasionally outliers that will skew means in a positive 
direction
72
.  It is also convenient and illustrative to construct the 25
th
 and 75
th
 percentile 
margins graphically around the median.  For assistance in interpreting the graphs, 
detailed summary statistics for all variables of interest are included in Appendix K 
(Solvency model) and Appendix L (Stability model).   I then discuss the marginal effects 
of the logistic regressions and the predicted probabilities, with the marginal effects 
calculated as the average partial effect (APE) rather than the partial effect at the average 
                                                          
72
 The ratios were winsorized as a part of the cleaning process and occurred before the isolation of the 
young and new organizations. 
(𝑎)   𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑦𝑖,𝑡+3
= 𝐸𝑄𝑈𝐼𝑇𝑌𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑆𝑈𝑅𝑃𝐿𝑈𝑆𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐻𝐻𝐼𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝑆𝐸𝐶𝑇𝑂𝑅𝑖 + 𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅𝑡 
(𝑏)   𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑦𝑖,𝑡+3
= 𝐸𝑄𝑈𝐼𝑇𝑌𝑖,𝑡+1 + 𝑆𝑈𝑅𝑃𝐿𝑈𝑆𝑖,𝑡+1 + 𝐻𝐻𝐼𝑖,𝑡+1 + 𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡+1
+ 𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑖,𝑡+1 + 𝑆𝐸𝐶𝑇𝑂𝑅𝑖 + 𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅𝑡 
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(PEA).
73
  The APE finds the marginal effect for each observation in the sample, then 
averages that effect.  The graphs of the predictive margins for each variable show the 
sample average of the predicted probability of recovery using that variable’s average 
marginal effect.  Full logit results are available in Appendix M, while the marginal effects 
are presented in Table 16. 
 
 
Table 16 
Predictors of Nonprofit Financial Recovery for Young and Small Nonprofits, Average 
Marginal Effects for Primary Independent Variables
74
 
 
VARIABLES 
Insolvency 
Recovery 
Year 1 
Insolvency 
Recovery 
Year 2 
Disruption 
Recovery 
Year 1 
Disruption 
Recovery 
Year 2 
     
Equity Ratio 0.138*** 0.202*** 0.014*** 0.014*** 
 (0.015) (0.019) (0.001) (0.001) 
Surplus Ratio -0.018** 0.004 0.087*** 0.045*** 
 (0.007) (0.013) (0.006) (0.006) 
Revenue Concentration -0.037** -0.045** -0.136*** -0.139*** 
 (0.018) (0.018) (0.015) (0.015) 
Size -0.003 -0.005 0.012*** 0.007*** 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) 
Age -0.015*** -0.012*** -0.014*** -0.016*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) 
     
Observations 10,212 10,212 28,746 28,746 
Log Pseudolikelihood -4195 -4008 -18849 -18962 
McFadden’s R-squared 0.074 0.115 0.034 0.028 
Adj. Count R-squared 0.001 0.001 0.037 0.031 
     
Sensitivity 0.60% 1.51% 25.64% 22.50% 
Specificity 99.89% 99.72% 84.41% 86.25% 
% Correctly Classified 83.76% 83.76% 60.02% 59.79% 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
                                                          
73
 The marginal analysis was conducted using the Stata packages “margins” and “marginsplot.” 
74
 Base Sector: Other Supporting Public Benefit; Base Year: 1991; Robust Errors are Clustered on EIN 
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Equity Ratio 
 
 Solvency 
 As seen in Figure 8, the equity ratio is low and relatively stable for most of the 
time period for both those who became solvent (green line) and those that did not (red 
line).
75
   
 
 
 
Figure 8.  Median Equity Ratio over Time for the Solvency Model 
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 As a reminder, the time periods are pooled, so Year 1 reflects the first year of the organization’s 
insolvency, whether that is 1991 or 2001. 
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There is much more variance in the group which remains insolvent with the 
second quartile larger than the third.  In addition, almost all of the interquartile range 
(IQR) of the solvent group is contained within the upper reach of the group which 
remains insolvent for the first year, which means that there is are similar chances of 
recovery at the initial condition.  There also does not appear to be a very strong recovery 
even for those who do survive, with the IQR just barely into positive territory and 
compression occurring in the second quartile.   
 
 
 
Figure 9.   First Year Equity Ratio Predictive Margin for Solvency with 95% CIs 
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Figure 10.   Second Year Equity Ratio Predictive Margin for Solvency with 95% CIs 
 
 
Once we begin to hold other factors constant, however, we notice that the equity 
ratio becomes much clearer.  According to Table 16, a 10% rise in the equity ratio in 
Year 1 raises the probability of recovery by 1.4 percentage points; in Year 2, it is even 
higher at 2 percentage points.  Looking at Figure 9, the effect size is precise across the 
range of values, especially around -.5 (which is lower than the mean for either group).  
Notably, even those with the lowest equity ratios (necessitating a large amount of 
liabilities compared to assets, standardized by total revenues) have a positive chance at 
recovery.  In Figure 10, which is the second year, the curvilinear trend hinted at in the 
first year becomes even more pronounced and the variance around the upper tail becomes 
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wider.  The range of predicted probabilities also increases despite the magnitude and 
significance of the marginal effects being the same.
76
 
To illustrate practical significance, let us assume there is a nonprofit that has the 
first-year median values of assets ($48,341), liabilities ($130,353), and total revenues 
($66,641).  This would give our not-for-profit total net assets of -$82,012 and an equity 
ratio of -1.234.  Ten percent of this is -.1234, which when combined to the original equity 
ratio gives a total of -1.1106.  The total net assets need to increase by $8,200.47 to 
-$73,811.  Therefore, a nonprofit similar to the first in all ways except for having 
-$73,811 in net assets compared to -$82,012 has a 1.4 percentage point higher chance of 
becoming solvent than the original nonprofit.
77
 
 
Stability 
 We see a similar, though muted predictive effect of the equity ratio on the 
likelihood of becoming financially stable.  As seen in Figure 11, it appears that the 
second year of vulnerability is an even leaner year for equity than the first for both those 
that recover and those that do not.  This is especially striking since the data is pooled and, 
thus, Year 2 could in fact be any given year in the dataset.  After that second year, those 
that gain stability have a strong rebound compared to those who do not.  This is 
interesting given the relatively small marginal effect of the equity ratio, which predicts 
only a .14 percentage point increase in the probability of stabilization for a 10% higher 
equity ratio the first year (shown in Table 68). 
                                                          
76
 Due to the higher level of multicollinearity between variables and the desire to test the Tuckman-Chang 
variables, I was not comfortable introducing a quadratic to this model.  However, it is definitely something 
that warrants further research at a later time. 
77
 This can be verified using predicted probabilities for the point values at an equity ratio of -1.234 
(Pr=.0805) and an equity ratio of -1.111 (Pr=.0907). 
118 
 
 
Figure 11.  Median Equity Ratio over Time for the Stability Model 
 
 
Figure 12.   First Year Equity Ratio Predictive Margin for Stability with 95% CIs 
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Figure 13.   Second Year Equity Ratio Predictive Margin for Stability with 95% CIs 
 
 
In Figures 12 and 13, we see that there is a wider range for the equity ratio in the 
stability sample than in solvency for the first year.  There is a high degree of precision 
that is similar to the solvency model (excepting the upper tail), though the upward trend 
is more constant than the slightly curvilinear solvency model.  The predictive probability 
for the lower tail of the first and second years is almost identical, as is the slope – this 
makes sense as the reported marginal effects for the two years is the same. 
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Surplus Ratio 
 
Solvency 
 Unlike the equity ratio, there is a definite and steady climb until the third year for 
those organizations that become solvent.  During the fourth year, however, the surplus 
ratios drop to almost second-year levels and the mean of the group that became solvent is 
in the IQR of those that did not.  Notably, the 25
th
 percentile of the group that became 
solvent remains negative, while the 75
th
 percentile of the group that remains insolvent is 
higher than the median of the solvent group.  Also, the 75
th
 percentile for both groups in 
the first year is practically the same. 
 
 
 
Figure 14.   Median Surplus Ratio over Time for the Solvency Model 
-0.5
-0.4
-0.3
-0.2
-0.1
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4
25p (Solvent) Solvent 75p (Solvent)
25p (Insolvent) Still Insolvent 75p (Insolvent)
121 
 
 
 
Figure 15.   First Year Surplus Ratio Predictive Margin for Solvency with 95% CIs 
 
 
 When we look at the marginal effects reported in Table 16, we find an unexpected 
negative relationship between increasing net income per dollar of revenues and eventual 
solvency, though this becomes insignificant during the second year of vulnerability.  A 
10% rise in the surplus ratio during the first year decreases the probability of becoming 
solvent by .2 percentage points; this does not seem especially large, except that the 
predicted probabilities of recovering are lower for solvency than for stability.  The 
confidence interval for the predictive margin is quite large in the lower range of values, 
owing primarily to outliers.  If we look at the measure of the IQR on Figure 14, the wide 
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confidence interval for the predicted probabilities shown across Figure 15 can be 
attributed more to positive outliers than negative.
78
 
 
 Stability 
 When looking at the medians for the stability sample, we notice the same second-
year dip that we saw in the second year of the equity ratio.  There are two potential 
explanations: there is a either a year of gathering resources in which to make the recovery 
or the organizations required a worse year than the previous in order to truly spur them to 
action.  Though not as pronounced as the equity ratio, we also see in Figure 16 the values 
drop from Year 3 to Year 4, though not as much.  In addition, there appears to be a lot of 
overlap between the IQRs throughout the timeline, unlike the equity ratio where the 
values began roughly similar, but diverged. 
  
                                                          
78
 The predictive margins for the second year of the equity ratio are not discussed since they are 
insignificant, but they are available upon request. 
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Figure 16.  Median Surplus Ratio over Time for the Stability Model 
 
 The marginal effects from Table 16 show a decided positive predictive 
relationship between the surplus ratio and the probability of achieving stability, though 
one that is half the magnitude during Year 2 as it is during Year 1.  In the first year, a 
10% rise in the surplus ratio increases the probability of becoming financially stable by 
.87 percentage points, which decreases to .45 percentage points for a similar rise in the 
equity ratio for Year 2.  Looking at the two graphs of the predictive margins for the 
surplus ratio in Figures 17 and 18, we can definitely see similarities, though the impact of 
a high surplus ratio in the first year is evident through the steeper slope on Figure 18. 
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Figure 17.   First Year Surplus Ratio Predictive Margin for Stability with 95% CIs 
 
 
Figure 18.  Second Year Surplus Ratio Predictive Margin for Stability with 95% CIs 
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Revenue Concentration 
 
 Solvency 
 Revenue concentration here is measured by the Hirschman-Hirfindahl Index 
(HHI), a number that trends to one if only one type of resource is used but approaches 
zero as the number of resource types increases.  Since the not-for-profits in this study 
were very small and young, it should not be surprising that the low amounts of revenue 
coming in are not from a wide variety of sources.  We can see in Figure 19 that the upper 
end of the IQR for both groups is nearly one, indicating pervasive use of a single revenue 
source throughout this sample; however, the wide breadth of the second quartile means 
that there are exceptions with very diverse portfolios.  We can also see that the revenue 
portfolio is relatively stable over the 4-year time period during which we watch the not-
for-profit. There is, however, a noticeable decrease in the median and 25
th
 percentile 
between years 2 and 3 in the group that becomes solvent. 
 We also have statistical evidence that this revenue diversification is a good thing 
in this particular situation.   As seen in Table 16, there are significant negative 
coefficients on both years in solvency; this indicates that increasing levels of 
concentration in a revenue portfolio decrease the probability that a not-for-profit will 
become solvent.  A 10% increase in revenue concentration the first year decreases the 
probability of recovering by .4 percentage points.  Using the median value for the first 
year of solvency (.90), this would mean that a 10% increase would bring the value to .99, 
which is essentially a single source.  This would decrease the probability of becoming 
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solvent from 13.62% to 13.32%, which is somewhat negligible even if statistically 
significant. 
 
 
 
Figure 19.  Median Revenue Concentrations over Time for the Solvency Model 
 
 
 We see a similar slope for the marginal effects between years one and two, though 
Table 16 has evidence of a slightly larger impact for Year 2.  What is visually notable in 
Figures 20 and 21 is that the intercept for the estimated margin has shifted upward by 
approximately half a percentage point, indicating an overall increase in the probability of 
recovery due to other variables.  There is also a very large confidence interval on left due 
to a negative skew in the distribution. 
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Figure 20.   First Year Revenue Concentration Predictive Margin for Solvency with 95% 
CIs 
 
 
Figure 21.  Second Year Revenue Concentration Predictive Margin for Solvency with 
95% CIs 
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 Stability 
 There is a similar lack of variation in the median value of revenue concentration 
over time in the Stability model as there is in the Solvency model.  We do not see the 
pronounced dip in the median in the recovery group between the second and third year 
that we did in the Solvency model, however (see Figure 22). 
 
 
Figure 22.  Median Revenue Concentrations over Time for the Stability Model 
 
 
Despite this lack in variation, the impact of revenue concentration in the stability model 
is three times the magnitude of the impact in the solvency model.  When an organization 
tries to achieve financial stability from financial distress, the impact of another 10% in  
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Figure 23.  First Year Revenue Concentration Predictive Margin for Stability with 95% 
CIs 
 
 
Figure 24.   Second Year Revenue Concentration Predictive Margin for Stability with 
95% CIs 
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their measure of the HHI predicts a 1.36 percentage point drop in the possibility of 
recovery.  Looking at Figures 23 and 24, there is a very steep and negative slope on the 
estimated margin.  This means that, despite there being fewer organizations with 
diversified portfolios, the diversification is very helpful in stabilizing their revenue 
stream, which is in accordance with the literature.   
 
Size 
 
 Solvency 
Since there is already a severe size restriction on the sample in order to focus on 
the small, I did not expect a large amount of heterogeneity in size.  Figure 25 shows the 
distribution of revenues per year in their log form, since that is the form of the model.  
For interpretation’s sake, however, the median total revenue in the first year is $95,225 
for those who would become solvent and $94,183 for those who will remain insolvent.
79
  
Though those who remain insolvent have stable revenues over time, though there does 
appear to be a slight upward trend.  Those that recover have a spike at Year 3, followed 
by a drop off.  Though this may seem intuitive, we know from the results on the surplus 
ratio that the relationship between revenues and solvency is more complicated than 
originally expected.  As evidence of this, size is not significant for either of the years in 
the solvency model. 
 
 
                                                          
79
 exp(11.464 )= 95,225; exp(11.453) = 94,183 
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Figure 25.  Median Size over Time for the Solvency Model 
 
 
 Stability 
 The medians and IQR for both groups in the stability model show signs of mild 
curvilinearity with the exception of the 25
th
 percentile of the group which does not 
stabilize (please see Figure 26).  The upward curve is more gradual for the group which 
remains unstable, while the median The most striking fact, however, is that the medias 
and IQR benchmarks are all lower for the group which stabilizes compared to the one 
that doesn’t.  There is also a drop for those who stabilize, but this turns into a rally where 
all benchmarks exceed those of the unstable group by Year 4.  
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Figure 26.  Median Size over Time for the Stability Model 
 
 
Figures 27 and 28 show that, unlike the solvency model, size has a positive and 
significant role in predicting financial stabilization with all other factors held constant; 
this is contrary to what one would expect by looking at the descriptives statistics and 
emphasizes the importance of regression analysis.  This impact is bigger the first year, 
with otherwise identical organizations that are 10% larger having an additional .12 
percentage points toward the probability of stabilizing (compared to .07 percentage points 
for the second year).  Since the mean size in the first year for those that stabilize is 
$82,290, this would mean that an increase of 1% in logged total revenues (about $9,845 
here) would only boost stabilization chances by .12 percentage points. 
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Figure 27.  First Year Size Predictive Margin for Stability with 95% CIs 
 
 
Figure 28.  Second Year Size Predictive Margin for Stability with 95% CIs 
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Age 
 
 Solvency 
 Unlike the other variables, displaying a figure of ages by year would be 
nonsensical since there is no attrition; instead, I present the distribution of age for the first 
year in both models.  As seen in Figure 29, the range of ages for both those who become 
solvent and those that remain insolvent are both the same.  The IQR (shown by the 
boxes) for those that do not become solvent is both wider and older, though both 
distributions are weighted away from the very young.  
 
 
 
Figure 29.  Distribution of Age for Year 1 of the Solvency Model 
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Figure 30.  First Year Age Predictive Margin for Solvency with 95% Cis 
 
 
Figure 31.  Second Year Age Predictive Margin for Solvency with 95% CIs 
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It is therefore not surprising that there is a small, but significant and negative 
impact to being older.  Figures 30 and 31 graphically show what Table 68 suggests: a 
negative marginal impact on the probability of recovery by .02 percentage points for each 
additional year of age in the first year.
80
  The impact is slightly less for the second year, 
with a marginal effect of -.012; this is visually perceptible by comparing the intercept at 
seven years old for both years. 
 
 Stability 
 For the stability model, we see a similar situation that we did in the solvency 
model: the group that did not recover is, on average, older than those that did.  Here, 
however, we see greater inclusion of very young nonprofits; the 25
th
 percentile fell a year 
for both groups, as did the median for those that did not stabilize.  The range for both 
groups is the same across all groups and models, as shown in Figure 32. 
 The marginal effect of age for stability is almost identical to the marginal effect 
for solvency: -.014 for the first year and -.016 for the second.  This can be seen in Figures 
33 and 34.  Though statistically significant, this is practically not especially useful.  First, 
the predictive impact is relatively small compared to other financial indicators; second, 
age is not something that is controllable by management, so even if it were extremely 
impactful there would be little on an organizational basis that could be done.  
Theoretically, however, the existence of a penalty to age in a dissertation dedicated to 
exploring such a phenomenon is very interesting. 
                                                          
80
 I suspect this interpretation of the marginal effect may be understating the effect compared to other 
variables, which are all continuous.  However, a 1% change in age does not make sense. 
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Figure 32.  Distribution of Age for Year 1 of the Stability Model 
 
 
 
Figure 33.  First Year Age Predictive Margin for Stability with 95% CIs 
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Figure 34.  Second Year Age Predictive Margin for Stability with 95% CIs 
 
 
Control Variables 
 
 In terms of controls, which can be reviewed in Appendix M, the year dummies are 
almost universally insignificant from the comparison base year of 1991.  The single 
exception is a minor positive impact of 1992 as compared to the previous year in 
recovery based on the first year of disruption.  The subsector results are generally 
insignificant when compared to the base group of “Other Supporting Public Benefit” 
organizations.  In the Solvency sample, only the Human Services subsector had 
significantly less likelihood of recovering compared to the base group. In the Financial 
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Stability sample, the Arts, Health, Human Services, International, Public Benefit, and 
Religious subsectors were all less likely to recover than the base group. 
 
Discussion 
 
 Most of the hypothesized results were confirmed with the empirical testing; 
however, this was not universal.  The determination of marginal effects also allowed us to 
attribute magnitudes to the effects, which had not been attempted in the hypotheses.  The 
expected and actual signs on the coefficients appear in Table 17. 
 
 
Table 17 
Summary of Hypotheses Results for Predicting Solvency 
 
VARIABLES 
Expected 
Sign 
Insolvency 
Recovery 
Year 1 
Insolvency 
Recovery 
Year 2 
Disruption 
Recovery 
Year 1 
Disruption 
Recovery 
Year 2 
      
Equity Ratio + + + + + 
      
Surplus Ratio + -  + + 
      
Revenue 
Concentration - - - - - 
      
Size +   + + 
      
Age + - - - - 
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Equity Ratio 
 
 My expectations regarding the desirability of a larger equity ratio when trying to 
overcome financial distress were confirmed.  Nonprofits with strong net asset gains with 
respect to revenues are more likely than nonprofits with weaker equity ratios to regain 
solvency, with an even stronger impact for gains in the second year of insolvency.  This 
is intuitive since the solvency measure is based on either total asset gains or total liability 
suppression, either of which could boost the net asset gain in the equity ratio.  The 
important lesson is that the growth in total net assets is outpacing the growth in revenue, 
which means that increasing amounts of money are being left at the end of the year as a 
nest egg.  The impact of a stronger equity ratio is still a positive force in achieving 
financial stability, but the magnitude is far less.  This difference could be attributable to a 
sizable gap between the means of the equity ratio between the two samples: the mean and 
standard deviation for the financial stability sample is much larger.  It does highlight the 
impact of savings, however, though it is interesting that a nest egg to fall back on appears 
to mean relatively little to financial stability. 
 
Surplus Ratio 
 
  The study had unexpected results on the predictive role of the surplus ratio in 
becoming solvent, with a negative relationship in Year One followed by an insignificant 
one in Year 2. Therefore, our second hypothesis is refuted for the purposes of becoming 
solvent, but confirmed for the purposes of stabilizing your financial resources.  This 
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could indicate that the total revenues for recovering nonprofits remains relatively flat, 
thus allowing an increase in total net assets to stand out against both a flat denominator 
and a lackluster surplus ratio.  It could also mean that a healthy increase in total revenues 
may be allocated more to total net assets than to total expenses.  For the stability 
estimation, however, we see the expected strong impact of a strong surplus ratio on 
recovery.  Here, we see the potential gains of increases in efficiency and profitability. 
 
Revenue Concentration 
 
As predicted, nonprofits with more diverse revenue portfolios are more likely to 
recover in both estimations, though the magnitude is stronger in the financial stability 
model.  This helps to settle the question of whether the role of diversification in recovery 
is more similar to its role in demise or in growth.  In the demise literature, such as those 
testing the Tuckman and Chang (1991) indicators against various definitions of financial 
vulnerability, diversification has been shown to be beneficial.   On the other hand, 
however, revenue diversification has been shown to hinder growth.  Not-for-profits can 
develop specializations and efficiencies in gathering particular revenues, and most do not 
have the capacity to specialize in many.  Thus, diversification would prevent 
organizations from specializing in a particular type of income.  In this study, even though 
a form of growth is occurring in recovery, the beneficial risk diversification that helps to 
prevent financial calamity is similarly helpful in overcoming it. 
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Size 
 
This study finds mixed empirical support regarding the role of size in financial 
recovery within a sample that is already young and new.  Size is not a factor (other 
elements held constant) in whether an organization can become solvent.  However, larger 
organizations appear to have an advantage in recovering from the potential of program 
disruption.  Therefore, we do see evidence of a liability of smallness within a young and 
small sample.  This is an interesting comparison to Searing (2012), where smaller 
organizations showed an increased likelihood of recovery.  These results point to a 
potential nonlinear role of size in the larger population of nonprofits that will be explored 
in later comparative work between the group of not-for-profits that are the subjects of this 
dissertation and the nonprofit sector at large. 
 
 
Age  
 
The liability of newness does not have support in a sample that is already young 
and new, with a universal disadvantage for older organizations in both samples.  In 
addition to suggesting that a threshold of age exists that separates the beneficial from the 
adverse impacts, this also lends credence to the advocates of young organizations having 
an advantage in lacking strong organizational infrastructures.  This absence, which was 
construed by Stinchcombe (1965) as a potential source of liability, may also signal an 
ability to adapt to the environment in a way that helps the organization survive. 
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Robustness Tests 
 
 In order to test the robustness of the models, I test the specifications in two ways.  
For the first, we begin an exploration of what appears to be a nonlinear relationship with 
age by including an age quadratic.  Second, we address concerns of multicollinearity by 
shifting the choice of the size variable away from total revenues, which also serves as a 
standardization variable, to total assets. 
 
Robustness 1: Age Quadratic 
 
This study does not show a liability of newness in recovering from financial 
vulnerability in small and young nonprofits.  This stands in contrast to the general finding 
of a liability of newness that served as an inspiration and parameter for this dissertation.  
Since there has also been suggestions of a liability of adolescence (where organizations 
have a honeymoon period after founding as they spend their original endowment, but 
then face potential calamity), I wanted to make sure that a nonlinear relationship was not 
hiding in the data.   Accordingly, both of the samples had all full models re-estimated 
including a quadratic age term in order to capture nonlinear effects.   
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Table 18 
Predictors of Nonprofit Financial Recovery, Logistical Regression Results for Primary 
Independent Variables Including Age Quadratic
81
 
 
VARIABLES 
Insolvency 
Recovery 
Year 1 
Insolvency 
Recovery 
Year 2 
Disruption 
Recovery 
Year 1 
Disruption 
Recovery 
Year 2 
     
Equity Ratio 1.084*** 1.644*** 0.062*** 0.059*** 
 (0.122) (0.158) (0.006) (0.006) 
Surplus Ratio -0.142** 0.029 0.374*** 0.191*** 
 (0.056) (0.106) (0.027) (0.026) 
Revenue Concentration -0.293** -0.366** -0.588*** -0.595*** 
 (0.142) (0.143) (0.063) (0.064) 
Size -0.022 -0.037 0.052*** 0.029*** 
 (0.018) (0.023) (0.010) (0.009) 
Age -0.142*** -0.116** -0.079*** -0.115*** 
 (0.036) (0.047) (0.015) (0.019) 
Age
2 
0.004 0.002 0.003 0.006** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.002) (0.002) 
Constant 0.057 0.970 -0.187 0.398 
 (1.054) (1.048) (0.410) (0.412) 
     
Observations 10,212 10,212 28,746 28,746 
log likelihood -4194 -4008 -18848 -18959 
McFadden’s R-squared 0.0743 0.115 0.0338 0.0281 
Adj. Count R-squared -0.001 0.000 0.038 0.030 
     
Sensitivity 0.60% 1.57% 25.79% 22.58% 
Specificity 99.87% 99.70% 84.37% 86.13% 
% Correctly Classified 83.74% 83.75% 60.06% 59.75% 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
As seen in Table 18, there was very little evidence to support a nonlinear effect of 
age within an already young and small model.  The exception is the importance of age in 
the second year of recovering from financial disruption, where there is a slight U-shape to 
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the curve.  This means that the likelihood of recovering decreases as the nonprofit ages 
until they are about 9.6 years old, then begins to increase.
82
  This would support the 
liability of adolescence argument.
83
  All quadratic models were considered inferior to the 
models without quadratics (see Table 19).  Full regression results are available in 
Appendix N. 
 
 
Table 19 
Goodness of Fit for Original and Quadratic Models 
 
 
Insolvency 
Recovery 
Year 1 
Insolvency 
Recovery 
Year 2 
Disruption 
Recovery 
Year 1 
Disruption 
Recovery 
Year 2 
     
Difference in BIC’ 8.780 9.085 8.318 4.363 
     
Best Fit Model Original Original Original Original 
 
 
Robustness Test 2: Standardization by Total Assets 
 
 Despite a large degree of multicollinearity being endogenous to finance ratio 
research, I had concerns that the use of total revenues as a standardization variable in 
addition to using a transformed version of it as the operationalization of size was 
introducing unnecessary difficulties to the specification when there were other variables 
used in the literature.  To test whether some of the high correlation was attributable to the 
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 The minimum is found by using the 2b/a formula.  
83
 This is also a reason why further exploration of a potential nonlinear relationship with age is best left for 
future research – the inflection point is on the upper bound of this dissertation’s sample. 
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use of logged total revenues, I substitute logged total assets as the size measure.  The 
findings are reported in Table 20. 
 There does not appear to be a significant difference in the coefficients with the 
exception of the size variable.  The fit variables provide conflicting results, probably due 
to the lack of a uniform sample between the two models.  Using log pseudolikelihood, 
total assets is the appropriate choice; using the percentage correctly classified, the fit 
depends on the type of R-squared, the model, and the year (Cameron & Trivedi, 2009, p. 
359).  Additionally, the appearance of a negative adjusted count R-squared in the total 
assets model is concerning.  The Pearson correlation coefficients are still very high (see 
Appendix O), with some being higher; in the solvency sample, the correlation between 
logged assets and the equity ratio is -.491 in the second year.  With values of this 
magnitude, the initial cause for concern and investigation into an alternate variable is not 
addressed.  Therefore, this study retains total revenues as both a standardization variable 
and size variable; full results for this analysis are available in Appendix P. 
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Table 20 
Predictors of Nonprofit Financial Recovery for Young and Small Nonprofits, Assets as 
the Standardization Variable
84
 
 
VARIABLES 
Insolvency 
Recovery 
Year 1 
Insolvency 
Recovery 
Year 2 
Disruption 
Recovery 
Year 1 
Disruption 
Recovery 
Year 2 
     
Equity Ratio 0.820*** 1.463*** 0.067*** 0.053*** 
 (0.115) (0.158) (0.007) (0.005) 
Surplus Ratio -0.166*** 0.095 0.359*** 0.032 
 (0.060) (0.122) (0.029) (0.025) 
Revenue Concentration -0.332** -0.313** -0.582*** -0.621*** 
 (0.145) (0.146) (0.064) (0.065) 
Size -0.156*** -0.073*** -0.191*** -0.216*** 
 (0.014) (0.016) (0.008) (0.007) 
Age -0.102*** -0.101*** -0.043*** -0.050*** 
 (0.013) (0.013) (0.006) (0.006) 
     
Observations 9,847 9,850 28,122 27,543 
log likelihood -3937 -3795 -18068 -17558 
McFadden’s R-squared 0.092 0.123 0.054 0.061 
Adj. Count R-squared 0.001 -0.001 0.025 0.041 
     
Sensitivity 1.08% 1.65% 32.76% 33.85% 
Specificity 99.82% 99.66% 78.30% 78.91% 
% Correctly Classified 83.97% 83.99% 59.30% 60.20% 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Policy Implications and Conclusions 
 
Though small and young nonprofits comprise a significant portion of the sector, 
the scholarly literature dedicated specifically to their financial management is hardly 
present.  This essay uses financial ratios traditionally used to analyze and predict 
nonprofit demise to explore the predictors of nonprofit financial recovery.  Doing so 
yields not only empirical and practical advice for practitioners, but also extends the 
academic literature in several ways and offers several implications for public policy. 
The contribution of this study to nonprofit financial management is 
straightforward, providing large-scale statistical support to financial practices that 
increase the likelihood of organizational survival.  First, the retention of net assets is 
more important than the simple increase in revenues; however, an increase in revenues is 
beneficial beyond providing additional resources for expense.  This is especially true 
when recovering from financial disruption since there appears to be a liability of size 
throughout the age range considered by this study.  Revenue portfolios should be 
diversified in order to maximize the likelihood the recovery.  Finally, the only indicator 
that is truly out of managerial control, which is age, does not appear to be relevant when 
other factors are held constant.  These insights benefit not only the staff and board 
members responsible for steering the organization, but also potential institution and 
individual funders that would like to direct their dollars in ways that would most benefit 
the nonprofit. 
 There are also contributions to the academic literature.  First, this contributes a 
novel approach to the financial ratio analysis research since most analysis in the nonprofit 
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sector focuses on institutional demise rather than the process of recovery.  Second, it 
continues the exploration of the liabilities of smallness and newness in the nonprofit 
sector, providing mixed support for the former and no support for the latter.  The revenue 
diversification literature gains a unique insight from an area that could be considered the 
crossroads of two conflicting streams of empirical findings: that diversification prevents 
demise, but hurts growth.  This study shows that the process of recovery, though growth 
is occurring, more strongly resembles the positive relationship found in the demise 
literature.  Finally, this continues to build the scholarly literature for nonprofit financial 
management, which still relies heavily on the theory of other sectors and is 
underdeveloped compared to nonprofit studies in philanthropy or volunteer motivation. 
There are also several implications for policy.  First, the norms (whether political, 
institutional, industry, or cultural) regarding net asset accumulation by nonprofits need to 
be revisited.  Though research has shown that most nonprofits do attempt to accumulate 
net assets, the perception that such accumulation should be discouraged is still present.  
The existence of outliers with significant endowments such as hospitals and institutions 
of higher education help foster this notion.  More attention should be paid to the larger 
portion of the nonprofit sector that do not have these cushions; smaller nonprofits would 
benefit by not needing to rely on regular use of a line of credit to even cash flow, a 
practice which both incurs interest and enables a slide into debt problems similar to those 
in personal finance.  Discussion of appropriate levels of nonprofit net asset retention 
should occur in national fora, both political and in the nonprofit sector, to preempt the 
current domination of the issue by egregious examples highlighted in mainstream media. 
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 Similarly, efforts should be made across governmental and private granting 
institutions to harmonize the proposal and tracking requirements of their potential grant 
recipients.  One of the major obstacles to accessing such revenues are the necessity of 
dedicated staff to apply for and monitor the grants; this is doubly unfortunate since the 
grant rarely contains any or enough funding to cover the overhead required to administer 
the grant.  Streamlining this process will enable organizations that are unable to dedicate 
a staff member or contractor to grant administration to compete.  Further, this would 
encourage the diversification of revenue portfolios by lowering the barrier to entry to the 
grant market. 
 As with most empirical studies, there are limitations and precautions regarding the 
results contained here.  First, as mentioned previously, the data on the Form 990 can be 
inaccurate, though the figures used in this study are among the more reliable (Froelich, et 
al., 2000).  This is accentuated by the focus on small and young nonprofits.   During the 
time period covered by this study, nonprofits which made less than $25,000 per year were 
not required to file the form; further, this threshold shifts during the time period.  Though 
many in this group do file, it means that the very small may not be adequately 
represented in the sample.   Second, since four complete years were needed to be a part of 
the sample, any organization that was vulnerable for two years and then ceased operating 
or filing would not be included.  Thus, the resulting sample may contain the healthier of 
the vulnerable population.  Since it is unlikely, however, that the organizations that died 
during the sample had higher levels of revenue or net asset accumulation than those that 
survived, the data would suggest that the impact of the financial indicators might be 
understated rather than overstated.  Third, due to the construction of the 4-year periods of 
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analysis, some nonprofits had years that were included in multiple periods.  For example, 
if there was a 5-year length of time where the first three were vulnerable and the final two 
not, then this nonprofit would have two observations, one of which would have a 
dependent variable denoting a failure to recover (reflecting years 1, 2, 3, and 4) and one 
which would have a dependent variable signifying recovery (reflecting years 2, 3, 4, and 
5).  This is not common, but it does occur. 
 Several avenues for future research exist.  First, the above limitations can be 
addressed through the use of better or more complete data, which will enable techniques 
such as survival analysis to be used more effectively.  Second, predictive models should 
be built similar to the evolution of the financial ratio literature in predicting demise.  
Finally, future studies should concentrate on drilling down further into elements in order 
to both gain greater understanding and to improve the likelihood of better data.  The use 
of sectors as a dummy glosses over a great deal of insight that could be had by looking at 
single subsectors or, better yet, activity codes.  Narrowing the scope in either subsector or 
geographical location also increases the researcher’s ability to gain further details not 
only on the financial characteristics of the nonprofit, but also to grasp the contextual 
factors that have a large impact on the future of an organization in peril.  The final essay 
in this dissertation uses this approach, conducting a qualitative and in-depth analysis of 
small and young nonprofits in a specific subsector and geographical area.  By 
interviewing people affiliated with both living and dead organizations, the details which 
are often missed at the macro-level of large datasets will be made more clear and the 
picture of surviving as a small and young nonprofit made more complete. 
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CHAPTER IV: DETERMINANTS OF DEMISE IN SMALL AND NEW NOT-
FOR-PROFIT ORGANIZATIONS 
 
Introduction 
 
  The previous two essays used the financial records for large numbers of 
nonprofits to gain insights into the growth and financial recovery processes.  They have 
also, however, shown the limitations of such large scale and financially-focused work 
when trying to uncover the causal mechanics that underlie an organization.  .  Therefore, 
this third essay provides a detailed and more personal account of the factors contributing 
to nonprofit demise through the recollections of the individuals who were a part of the 
organization while it was still alive. 
 Personal narratives have unique value to demise studies in the nonprofit sector.  
First, the details and context surrounding the demise process are better captured through a 
descriptive process.  Second, the United States does not have a definitive source of 
information regarding nonprofit demise, unlike countries with lists of deregistered 
charities such as Canada (Elson & Rogers, 2010).  The empirical definitions of 
organizational vulnerability and death vary from paper to paper, though the industry 
standard appears to have become three years of either non-reporting, program expense 
cutbacks (Greenlee & Trussel, 2000), or fund balance losses (J. Trussel, 2003; J.M. 
Trussel & Greenlee, 2004).  Other authors have used publicly provided lists of 
organizations which have failed, such as the Master Failed Public Charities list from the 
National Center for Charitable Statistics, but this list was only released for 2003 
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(National Center for Charitable Statistics, 2003).  However, these are at best 
approximations.  Therefore, the only truly reliable way to verify nonprofit death is 
through direct contact with the organization or the immediate organizational ecosystem 
surrounding where it used to be in order to verify the absence. 
 Several studies have utilized this approach.  Hager and Galaskiewicz (2002) use 
event history analysis of 31 closed nonprofits in the Minneapolis-St. Paul area, while 
Hager et al. (1996) utilizes a narrative approach to explain nonprofit demise.  Fernandez 
(2008) adopts a similar approach to explain closure for voluntary associations in Madrid, 
Spain.  In for-profit network analysis, Human and Provan (1997, 2000) conducted 
qualitative studies on two networks of small forestry product companies, shifting to 
demise studies when one of them dissolved.  Walsh and Bartunek (2011) use six 
qualitative case studies to study the demise, reorganization, and rebirth in large for-profit 
organizations, finding that entrenched organizational processes and identity were key to 
revival; Sutton (1987) studied smaller and newer firms and found that such adherence to 
the prior organization inhibited formation of another organization (Elsbach & Bechky, 
2009).   Mantere et al. (2013) emphasize that this approach is particularly salient for 
entrepreneurial failure, since the personal nature of the venture often entails emotional 
processes such as grief and recovery in addition to contextual elements. 
 None of these studies, however, have concentrated specifically on nonprofits that 
already possess the liabilities of youth and newness.  Using comparative case studies, this 
study analyzes the internal and external factors surrounding the demise of small and 
young mental health nonprofits in the state of  New York.  First, we define nonprofit 
demise, then we review theories of nonprofit financial demise, informing the following 
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frameworks and the development of a unique typology specifically tailored to young and 
new nonprofits.  The findings are presented, analyzed, and discussed before the paper 
concludes. 
 
Defining Nonprofit Demise 
 
The exact meaning of nonprofit “demise” is ambiguous in the literature.  Unlike 
commercial businesses, where the achievement of profit is both a measure of resource 
availability and of mission achievement, the success of a nonprofit can arguably be based 
on either financial or mission metrics.  The vast majority of studies, however, imply some 
kind of organization decline or destruction in the term “demise,” whether this means 
dissolution of the organization, a sudden or steep decline in activity, exit from an 
industry, or formal bankruptcy (Mellahi & Wilkinson, 2004).  
The major reason behind this continued ambiguity in “demise” is the difficulty in 
accessing data which conclusively shows which nonprofits are currently operating.  As 
mentioned in Chapter 3 scholars such as Tuckman and Chang (1991) address this 
difficulty by predicting which organizations are most at risk of service disruption by 
quintile.   Greenlee and Trussel (2000) use a three-year decrease in the program 
expenditure ratio to predict vulnerability to closure, while Hager (2001) uses three 
consecutive years of a failure to file tax forms as a proxy for organizational closure.  
However, Hager recognizes in other work that the only effective way of measuring 
organizational demise is through actual contact with the organization or its immediate 
ecosystem (Mark A. Hager, 1999; M.A. Hager, et al., 2004).  Regardless of 
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conceptualization, most organizational ecology studies consider “demise” to be a kind of 
organizational closure (J. Freeman, et al., 1983). 
Some studies maintain that “failure” should not focus on financial factors, but 
instead on the degree of mission achievement (Seibel, 1996).  Helmig et al. (2013) even 
go so far as to claim that a lack of resources and poor financial outcomes do not warrant 
the term “failure” because of government support is always available; this reflects the 
incorrect assumption that government support should not be considered a competitive 
resource.  On the contrary, the competition for government support is often fierce (S. 
Ashley & Faulk, 2010), and an organization that is struggling financially compared to 
other similar nonprofits will likely not fare well during the grant or contract process.  
However, we are not concerned here with the concept of nonprofit “failure” except in 
terms of the inability to achieve necessities such as resources or legitimacy, not in terms 
of their outcome measures.  This study focuses on nonprofit organizational closure, with 
the assumption that a nonprofit, regardless of how effective its methods, will cease 
operating without financial resources (J. Freeman, et al., 1983). 
 
Theories of Nonprofit Demise 
 
Organizational ecology began in the biological subfield of population ecology 
(M.T. Hannan & Freeman, 1993; Singh & Lumsden, 1990).  Organizational ecologists 
view organizations at a group level, with those organizations that possess the ability to 
adapt and thrive in its particular niche of the ecosystem providing the impetus for its 
species to evolve; these organizations either have superior means of extracting resources 
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(M.T. Hannan & Freeman, 1993; Pfeffer & Salancik, 2003) or possess unique beneficial 
attributes such as adaptability, entrainment, or resistance to environmental change.  
Adaptability describes the ability of an organization to acclimate to the environment, 
such as shifting between resources as they become more available in the niche (Ruef, 
1997). In a similar fashion, entrainment is the ability for an organization to synchronize 
to its environment in terms of timing; for example, the difficulties of human services 
nonprofits facing increased donations in accordance with the business cycle but increased 
needs counter the business cycle is an inability to establish entrainment (Pérez-Nordtvedt, 
Payne, Short, & Kedia, 2008).  Resistance is the ability for an organization to continue 
operations despite changes in the environment (Hirschman, 1970; Mellahi & Wilkinson, 
2004), such as the determination of the LiveStrong Foundation to continue on despite the 
legally and morally questionable activities of its founder. 
The study of an organization’s ability and method of reacting to change has 
created another theoretical movement from the same ecological foundation: resilience 
theory.  This capacity to survive in a dynamic system has four elements: latitude, 
resistance, precariousness, and panarchy (Walker, Holling, Carpenter, & Kinzig, 2004; D. 
Young & Kim, 2012).  Unlike several other approaches to adaptability, however, 
resiliency implies a level of inertia, where the organization attempts to absorb the 
upheaval rather than adapt to it or change a fundamental structure (Carpenter, Walker, 
Anderies, & Abel, 2001).  This seems very appropriate to the study of organizational 
mortality, where an organization and its management would prefer to live on and not 
change drastically or cease operations.  However, the focus of resiliency theory is the 
process of demise rather than the root causes.  Though not a focus of the current work, a 
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resiliency study would be a natural extension of the identification of causal elements 
undertaken here. 
Beyond these characteristics internal to the organization, however, are the 
dynamics of the niche itself, such as the amount of resources available and the population 
density.  Density theorists have shown that there is a U-shaped relationship between the 
number of other similar organizations in a niche and the number of organizational 
closures (J. A. C. Baum & Singh, 1994; Michael T Hannan, 1986; M.T. Hannan & 
Freeman, 1993).  Industries with a small number of organizations typically lack 
legitimacy and have difficulty pulling in resources, causing a high rate of failure.  As the 
niche and the organizational type gain legitimacy, competition for the resources 
increases, but so does the quantity of resources.  The abundant resources continue to draw 
in firms until the niche is too crowded to support the crowd, and organizational demise 
rate increases again.
85
 
Though Singh and Lumsden (1990) assert a convergence in organizational 
ecology and new institutional theories, there are enough separate elements to warrant 
explanation as a unique school of thought.  Similar to ecologists, institutionalists are 
focused on the relationship between the organization and the environment.  However, 
institutionalists are more concerned with the socio-historical context than with the current 
presence of competitors in the niche (P. J. DiMaggio & Powell, 1991).  These contextual 
elements can include social norms (Meyer & Rowan, 1977), organizational norms 
(Haverman, 1993), industry norms (R. Krishnan & Yetman, 2011), and both personal and 
organizational identity (Baron, 2004; Michael T. Hannan, 2005; Hsu & Hannan, 2005).  
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to the market until all potential opportunity for long-run profits have disappeared ((Krugman & Wells, 
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Regardless, the emphasis is on the nuance in the cultural constructs around the 
organization.  The concept of legitimacy, where an organization is accepted and 
embedded in its niche, has roots in both the institutional and the organizational ecology 
theories (H. E. Aldrich & Fiol, 1994; Human & Provan, 2000; Zucker, 1989); without 
legitimacy, an organization is isolated from the resources in its niche and will both as an 
organization and as a species be selected out of the evolutionary process. 
 There are also several theories which address the resources themselves.   First, 
resource partitioning theory suggests that the resources within a niche are best divided up 
amongst the inhabitants, allowing each organization type to consume either a particular 
resource or do so in a particular way (Glenn R. Carroll & Swaminathan, 2000; J. Freeman 
& Lomi, 1994).  This can happen either through specialization in a certain type of 
resource or by becoming a generalist, which can use several different types of resources 
effectively (Boone & Arjen van, 2004; Breckenridge, 2002; Jaffee, 2001).  As shown in 
Essays One and Two, relying on a variety of revenues can help the chances of 
organizational survival,  but will not necessarily help an organization grow;
86
 this is 
consistent with the literature (Greenlee & Trussel, 2000; Mark A. Hager, 2001; J.M. 
Trussel & Greenlee, 2004; H.P. Tuckman & Chang, 1991).  In resource dependence 
theory, an organization makes itself vulnerable to shocks by depending too highly on a 
single type of revenue – this is an extension of the logic found in resource partitioning.  
Resource dependence can occur with a wide variety of resources.  For example, 
Gronbjerg (1992, 1993) found that individual philanthropy and foundation grants are 
highly volatile; other studies have found that government funding can be fickle or subject 
to political cycles (Froelich, 1999; N. P. Marwell, 2004; Weisbrod, 1997).  However, 
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many organizations grow faster and larger through the specialization in a particular 
income source because it grants them additional efficiencies, such as experienced 
grantwriters or knowledge of the arcane government contractual compliance needs 
(Barman, 2002; W. Foster & Fine, 2007). 
According to Abzug (1999), the differences between the theories derive from their 
empirical approaches: institutionalists use case studies, resource dependency theorists use 
large databases, and population ecologists either use large databases or don’t report data 
at all.  Importantly for this study, however, is that all three incorporate the dynamics of 
the environment with the internal mechanisms of the organization, whether on an 
individual or a group level. 
 
Existing Frameworks of Organizational Demise 
 
 Using the demise theories, several scholars have developed typologies to explain 
the empirical occurrences of organizational demise.  As discussed in the Introduction to 
this dissertation, Stinchcombe (1965) described the liability of newness as a vulnerability 
in four specific ways.  First, new organizations do not have the benefit of learning inside 
the organization, and are forced to hire new skills from outside of the organization; 
second, the lack of routinized operations inside the organization forces a process of trial 
and error to find optimal methods.  Third, new organizations lack allies in their niche to 
rely on and share information; fourth, there is a lack of built-up relationships with clients 
and other resources, which would decrease the search costs of finding revenues 
(Lubatkin, Schulze, Mainkar, & Cotterill, 2001).  His typology is illustrated in Table 21. 
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Table 21 
Stinchcombe’s Theories for the Liability of Newness 
Type of 
Characteristic 
  
 
Internal 
 
 
Lack of in-house 
learning 
 
Lack of routine 
 
External 
 
Lack of allies 
 
Lack of established 
clients 
 
 
The for-profit sector likewise built models of organizational demise that 
emphasized the role of the niche.  One of the most well-known of these, Porter’s Five 
Forces, used insights from industrial organization to help managers develop strategies on 
identifying desirable market niches (Porter, 1979, 2008).  According to Porter, the threat 
of new entrants, existing competitors, and substitutes for the offered product all helped 
create intense pressure on the firm; these concerns strongly parallel those of 
Stinchcombe’s external factors.  These horizontal forces could be coupled with large 
amounts of power in the hands of the buyers and/or sellers.  Together, these five forces 
could drive an organization out of business or, at the very least, out of the niche (Madrid-
Guijarro, García-Pérez-de-Lema, & van Auken, 2011). 
At the same time that Porter developed the Five Forces for commercial 
businesses, Levine proposed four potential causes for decline in public organizations 
(Levine, 1978).  Similar to Stinchcombe, Levine divided the causes into internal and 
external factors, though suggested that the factors could also be categorized according to 
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political reasons and economic/technical reasons.  Both “political vulnerability” (internal) 
and “problem depletion” (external) address the level of attention and resources that can 
be gathered in support of the organization on a political level.  Similarly, “organizational 
atrophy” (internal) describes the process and human resource factors that can snowball in 
a declining organization, while “environmental atrophy” is the description for changes in 
the surrounding organizational niche that would impact the ability of the organization to 
keep functioning in the way it has been.  Levine’s typology helped spawn the field of 
“cutback management” (Levine, 1979), which combined elements of what would 
currently be considered crisis leadership and financial management. 
 In 1999, Hager augmented Levine’s typology of organizational demise in order to 
specifically address the existing theories and data from the nonprofit sector.  Using a 
study of 37 closed nonprofits from the Minneapolis area, Hager developed a framework 
of eight different explanations for nonprofit demise (see Table 22). 
 
 
Table 22 
 
Hager’s Framework of Not-for-profit Demise 
 Ecological/ 
Structural 
Legitimacy Relational Strategic 
Management 
 
Internal 
 
Newness and 
Smallness 
Commitment 
Theory 
Conflict 
Theory 
Human Resource 
Scarcity/Human 
Capital Theory 
 
External 
 
 
Niche Theory 
 
 
Institutionalization 
Theory 
 
 
Network 
Theory 
 
Mission 
Completion 
Theory 
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The Newness and Smallness Theories provide the impetus for this study: that 
younger and smaller organizations suffer mortality rates higher than other organizations.  
Niche Theory addresses the density and resource dependence arguments regarding 
demise that were discussed in the previous section.  Commitment Theory describes the 
internal lack of legitimacy which would afflict the organization if management loses the 
trust of its own organization to follow through on its promises.  Institutionalization 
Theory describes a similar lack of trust, but vis a vis the community rather than inside the 
organization.  Conflict Theory addresses the personal conflict between individuals in the 
nonprofit -- staff, volunteer, or board members – and its impact on the health of the 
organization.  The external version of relational difficulties is Network Theory, which 
addresses what could be a lack of allies (such as in Stinchcombe) or of social capital in 
general.  Human Capital Theory emphasizes the lack of managerial or expert knowledge 
in the organization, while Mission Completion Theory suggests that the nonprofit shut 
down simply because it had achieved its intended purpose and no longer needed to exist 
(Mark A. Hager, 1999). 
Using several types of analysis, Hager found strong empirical support for the 
Liabilities of Newness and Size and for Niche Theory.  Institutionalization Theory found 
some support, primarily in first-hand accounts.  Hager also found some support for 
Mission Completion Theory, which states that some organizations close because they 
accomplish their mission.  This is similar to Helmig et al.’s (2013) assertion that failure 
and success should be evaluated based on mission, except that Hager references 
completion in its relationship to organizational closure rather than as an end itself.  
However, since Hager found that it was more salient for small organizations than large, 
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the possibility of completion should be included in any potential framework for young 
and small nonprofit demise.  
 
A Proposed Framework of Demise for the Young and New 
 
 When seeking theoretical guidance for a study of organizational demise for the 
young and new specifically, both the Stinchcombe and the Hager frameworks offer 
advantages and difficulties.  The Stinchcombe typology applies specifically to the young 
and new, but excludes factors such as internal conflict or niche density.  The Hager 
framework offers more granularity, but offers the liabilities of newness and smallness as 
competing theories with other potential explanations; further, the potential for mission 
completion in a very young organization seems unlikely compared to other mission-
related concerns, such as lack of clarity or community buy-in.  The Stinchcombe 
typology could also potentially nest inside of the liability of smallness and newness 
category contained in the Hager framework.  However, several of the categories have 
substantial overlap between the two models: for example, Stinchcombe’s “lack of allies” 
maps almost directly to Hager’s “Network Theory.”  Therefore, an exploration of the 
causes of demise for small and young nonprofits is warranted since they may differ 
substantially from those organizations that are older or larger. 
This study proposes a modification of the Hager Framework to one especially 
tailored to the specific concerns of young and new nonprofits; this proposed typology, 
show in Table 23, will then set the direction of the empirical study. 
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Table 23 
 
Theories of Demise for Young and New Not-for-profits 
 Legitimacy Relational Resource 
Extraction 
 
Internal 
 
 
Commitment Theory 
 
Conflict Theory 
 
Human Resources 
Theory 
 
External 
 
 
Mission Theory 
 
 
Network Theory 
 
 
Niche Theory 
 
 
 
Commitment Theory 
 
 Though Levine (1978) described organizational atrophy in terms of the steady 
loss of organizational structure and roles, the primary liability of this kind for young and 
new organizations is not the decay of structure, but its initial absence.  However, this 
simply shifts the mechanism of the dangerous lack of internal legitimacy rather than 
removes it from consideration: rather than becoming disappointed after years of attempts, 
some nonprofits may not have sufficient buy-in to the mission from the beginning, and 
we would expect such organizations to be less robust than those who have strong internal 
support. 
The literature leads us to draw two opposing conclusions.  First, in accordance 
with Stinchcombe, new organizations should face increased mortality due to a lack of 
internal norms and commitment.  On the opposing side, however, we would expect 
enthusiasm for the mission and methods of the nonprofit to be extremely high initially, 
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then wearing off over time (Bruderl & Schussler, 1990; Fichman & Levinthal, 1991).  A 
large literature  in the “liability of adolescence” suggests a brief honeymoon period after 
the organization is first founded when it uses the original endowment of resources, after 
which increased organizational liability develops.  However, the liability of adolescence 
literature applies best to for-profit organizations, who are more likely to enter formal 
incorporation with a large amount of assets than a nonprofit (Bruderl & Schussler, 1990). 
 
Conflict Theory 
 
As noted in Hager (1999), interpersonal conflict can also contribute to the demise 
of an organization, and there is no argument to suggest that such conflicts would be 
limited to larger organizations.  Levine’s original typology of organizations listed conflict 
as an internal political element, and these discussions resemble several from the 
literatures regarding founder’s syndrome (Block & Rosenberg, 2002; D. Young & Kim, 
2012) and the role of powerful donors or managers (McCambridge, 2014).  Without a 
healthy and evenly-weighted power dynamic within the organization, tensions can erupt; 
this conflict, in turn, poses a threat to the organization’s lifespan (H. Aldrich, 2008). 
 
Human Resources Theory 
 
Similar to “Human Resource Scarcity/Human Capital Theory” in Hager (1999), 
Human Resource suggests that a younger and smaller nonprofits are more likely to close 
than older or larger nonprofits because their access to skilled human capital is more 
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limited.  This is not to say that smaller or newer nonprofits do not attract talented people, 
but rather ones that are entrepreneurial or feel passionately about the cause rather than 
have the experience in running a successful organization.  Unlike Commitment, this 
potential liability addresses not the enthusiasm and buy-in of the people involved in the 
organization, but their ability to run an organization successfully. 
For example, Carman and Nesbit (2013) found that many founders of small nonprofits 
have very little practical experience working in the sector in which their nonprofit 
operates, such as human services .  Similarly, Thornhill and Amit (2003) determined that 
Canadian bankruptcies of small for-profit companies were more common than for large 
ones because of the lack of managerial and financial management knowledge.  This is 
partially a function of a generally underdeveloped skill set for management skills in the 
nonprofit sector that has been answered by specialized degree programs and training 
(Light, 2000).  With this professionalization, however, have come increased wage and 
training costs (Hwang & Powell, 2009).  Small or young organizations may not be able to 
pay these increased costs, and thus cannot afford to bid on the most effective 
management. 
Beyond whether the staff possess the specialized knowledge to operate the 
organization is the constraint on their own time.  In smaller organizations, staff are often 
required to serve as generalists rather than specializing in a particular task; this comes at 
the cost of potential efficiencies (Hwang & Powell, 2009).  This inability to capitalize on 
economies of scale may exert a downward pressure on the size of the organization when 
competing against larger organizations, which can pass on these efficiencies in terms of 
lower costs or a higher degree of service per dollar.  This “survival of the fittest” 
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approach to internal mechanics dictated by the evolutionary approach of organizational 
ecology (M.A. Hager, et al., 2004).  Deceased organizations are more likely not to have 
been in possession of highly efficient methods of resource extraction compared to living 
organizations.  
 
Mission Theory 
 
External legitimacy or “Mission” describes the level of buy-in and support offered 
by the community to the not-for-profit, similar to Hager’s (1999) “Institutionalization 
Theory.”  To achieve this buy-in, a for-profit needs to have a market for its product, then 
convince the buyer that they are the best company to provide that product; for example, 
Human and Provan (1997, 2000) found that the difference in survival between two small 
forestry product collectives was the degree of legitimacy and acceptance by the one 
which remained.  Similarly, in the third sector, a not-for-profit must not only establish 
that their mission is worthwhile to the community, but that their organization is a 
legitimate means by which that goal can be achieved. 
Hager (1999) argues that the process of legitimization is how organizations 
overcome the liability of newness; “new” does not necessarily refer to chronological age, 
but to the organizations’ place in the community as an outsider.  Though this is intuitive, 
it ignores the potential for very new organizations to be perceived as extremely legitimate 
from the outset and for longstanding organizations to either never gain or to lose the 
credibility once held by them.  An example of the latter is Komen, which encountered 
substantial credibility difficulties following a controversial decision by its management 
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(Hale, 2013).  An organization’s credibility is arguably their most important resource 
(Oliver, 1996); trust can be difficult to win, while easy to lose.  In his book Exit, Voice, 
and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations, and States, Hirschman 
(1970, p. 45) contends that individuals who belong to membership organizations will tend 
to vocalize their disagreements rather than exit the organization (as opposed  to when 
they disagree with firms of whom they are customers).  However, this feeling of personal 
attachment to the organization (loyalty) will only extend so long as the individual 
believes that the expression of opinion is worth the cost to him or her of producing it.  
Once this trust has been breached, the individual will exit the organization, causing it to 
potentially weaken and encourage further exits by others in the community.  As 
suggested by a cooperative bank trying to decide whether to close a longstanding branch 
that has been losing money, ‘‘It is important that people have conﬁdence…I’m terriﬁed 
that we produce a pile of broken glass when we withdraw from here.  That we destroy 
what has been built up in a century” (Jäger & Beyes, 2010). 
 This single categorization, however, does not differentiate between the ways in 
which a new and small organization may have difficulties: whether the mission is 
legitimate, whether the mission has been fulfilled, and whether the organization is able to 
achieve the mission.  Therefore, further exploration will be needed to separate the exact 
source of the legitimacy problem.   
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Network Theory 
 
Beyond the considerations of whether an organization and its mission are 
legitimate, organizations need allies in order to promote cost-saving, network-building, 
and crisis management.  This was recognized by Porter as one of the five forces and by 
Hager (1999) as “Network Theory”: the flow of products and services between 
organizations as a means of achieving resource stability (Chew & Osborne, 2009; Osborn 
& Hagedoorn, 1997).  However, in the more targeted study of  Hager et al. (2004), the 
authors folded both neo-institutional theory and social capital theory into a lens for 
detailing exactly how an organization becomes “embedded” in its environment and 
prolongs its life. 
Hager et al. (2004) find strong evidence that the underdeveloped networks of new 
and small organizations contribute strongly to their higher rates of demise, but that 
strongly embedded new organizations should have demise rates similar to older, more 
established organizations.  Fichman and Levinthal (1991) posit that social relationships 
and organizational processes are analogous, with the depth and strength of the networks 
influencing the duration and quality of organizational life; this would imply that a new or 
small organization is like being the new kid on the block – the chances of being isolated 
and vulnerable are lower if you already had a friend (or better yet, twelve friends) on the 
first day of school.  The behavior of organizations across networks is also contagious; for 
example, Oertel and Walgenbach (2012) found that the closure of an organization 
increased the likelihood of all partner organizations closing as well, especially if the 
founders worked together. 
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Niche Theory 
 
The three external demise theories all share common traits, similar to the 
interweaving of elements in the environment.  Whereas Mission addressed the external 
legitimacy of the organization and Network its potential allies, Niche describes the 
availability of resources in the environment.  This captures not only how much available 
resource is there and what kinds are available, but also the density of other organizations 
(both friend and foe) that are competing for resources. 
One aspect of Niche Theory is possessing the knowledge of the available 
resources; especially in the burgeoning field of social enterprise, there are several types 
of funding, such as crowdsourcing, which may be available to organizations but suffers 
from its own  lack of institutional legitimacy (E. Searing, 2012).  The fact that it is a new 
resource lessens the intensity of the resource scarcity in that niche, but is only available to 
those organizations who know how to exploit it. This partially overlaps Human Resource 
Theory since the organization needs quality human capital to handle its resource 
extraction. 
 Another aspect of niche theory is that of density dependence (G.R. Carroll & 
Hannan, 1989; G.R. Carroll & Wade, 1991; Delacroix & Rao, 1994; M.T. Hannan & 
Carroll, 1992; J. D. Lecy & D. M. Van Slyke, 2012), where the number of other 
organizations in the market or niche directly impacts the health of the not-for-profit.  If 
the number of organizations in the niche is too small, then the market itself is in need of 
legitimation and there may be a shortage of resources; this will increase mortality.  
However, a resource-rich environment will attract a large number of competitors, which 
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will also likely increase mortality.  In regards to the mental health sector specifically, 
intuition does not lead us directly to either argument: the care and advocacy for mental 
health are an established field, but questions regarding scope, governance, and 
accessibility of mental health services (H.B. Milward & Provan, 2000). 
 
Data 
 
Unlike the previous two essays which used different publicly available sources of 
nonprofit financial information, such purely financial lenses do not provide the 
complexity and scope of information that underlie the causal reasons behind 
organizational demise. This essay takes a more targeted and qualitative analytical 
approach, which will require the construction of a unique dataset. This will require 
identifying a source or sources of information by which to find not-for-profits, 
determining inclusion criteria, and then describing the potential sample.  
 
Locating Potential Participants 
 
The first step in assembling this dataset is deciding how to locate the small and 
young not-for-profits.  The two previous essays have used either the National Center for 
Charitable Statistics (NCCS) Core Files or the Digitized Files.  For the purpose of this 
essay, the Digitized is not helpful since it only covers the years 1998 – 2003.  However, 
the Core Files are released every year, with the most recent release containing 
information for 2012.  Therefore, the Core Files are utilized in the initial list of 
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organizations.  The Core Files, however, only contain information from those not-for-
profits which filed a Form 990, which means that they made over $50,000 in revenues 
during the fiscal year (National Center for Charitable Statistics, 2012).  This means that a 
large portion of the small organizations may be overlooked.  Therefore, we also pool the 
2014 and 2011 Business Master Files assembled by the NCCS; these contain very little 
information aside from identification, but they contain all active nonprofits of any size 
during that year.  The Business Master Files are not used alone, however, since this study 
is interested in not-for-profits that have operated at any time in the last decade and may 
not currently be functioning.  
 
Inclusion and Exclusion Criteria 
 
Sector:  In a smaller comparative case study or qualitative work, the ability to 
construct and refute plausible counterfactuals is very important.  The initial subsector on 
which this study was proposed was child services;  This included the categories of 
Children and Youth Services, Adoption, Foster Care, and Child Day Care.  I have prior 
experience with this sector, in addition to various members of the dissertation committee  
(N. Marwell, Calabrese, & Krauskopf, 2012; D. R. Young, Finch, & Gonsiewski, 1977).    
However, not-for-profits in the child welfare subsector tend to be very large and/or very 
old, which means this subsector was not an ideal candidate for the study.  The next pilot, 
animal welfare, had almost the opposite problem, with not-for-profits being both rare and 
transient.  The final subsector which developed into the full analysis is the mental health 
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subsector, which contained a small mix of organizations which facilitated this type of 
study. 
The not-for-profits identify as being in the mental health subsector through the 
election of the National Taxonomy of Exempt Entities (NTEE) Code F in their Form 990 
or other official paperwork such as their exemption application.
87
  This subsector still 
contains a variety of organizations that can fit any of 24 different “core code” 
classifications such as Substance Abuse Prevention (F21) or Hot Lines and Crisis 
Intervention (F40).  Since programming and funding can vary substantially across types 
of organization in addition to the organization itself, the core code is important for the 
analysis. 
 Location:  The nonprofit regulations, resources, and reporting requirements can 
differ greatly between states; however, any test of ecological characteristics requires a 
comparison between at least two different environments; however, especially when 
working with a subsector such as mental health that depends heavily on the regulatory 
environment enacted by the state, control can come about through a degree of 
consistency.  Therefore, this study concentrates on a single state: New York.
88
  The 
environments within the state differ, however.  Three cities of similar characteristics were 
chosen: Albany, Buffalo, and Syracuse.  Their descriptions are shown in Table 24. 
All three cities are located in the state of New York, which means they are subject to the 
same state legislative environment in addition to competing for the same government 
                                                          
87
 Even if the classification appears to be in error, the self-selected status is maintained.  Potential 
misidentification is labelled where seen, however. 
88
 Two of the five members of the research team are currently located in New York; additionally I will be 
joining the faculty of University at Albany (SUNY) in the fall of 2015. 
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Medicare and Medicaid dollars.  Though not identical, each provides diversity in the 
local resource and social niche that strengthens the research design.   
 
 
Table 24 
 
City Characteristics  
 Albany
89
 Buffalo
90
 Syracuse
91
 
Population (2013) 98,424 258,959 144,669 
Estimated Per Capita 
      Income (2012) 
$23,399 $19,973 $17,417 
Median age 31.1 33.3 29.4 
% White 53.2% 46.1% 52.3% 
Population density (per 
      square mile) 
4,604 6,376 5,766 
 
 
 
 Age:  Since this study specifically addresses the liabilities of newness and demise, 
restrictions on both age and size are important; further, there are several mental health 
not-for-profits that are extraordinarily long-lived, so the establishment of a reasonable 
cut-off for potential sample participants is a necessity.  Since the most recent years 
available in the tax datasets are from 2012, this naturally provides a limit on one end of 
the spectrum; the year 2000 serves as the lower bound of when the nonprofits could have 
begun.  Since the information regarding the actual foundation of the organization is not 
reliable in the NCCS data, this study uses the year in which the Internal Revenue Service 
ruled that the organization was a 501(c)3 nonprofit organization.  Though this is an 
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 (City-data.com, 2015a) 
90
 (City-data.com, 2015b) 
91
 (City-data.com, 2015c) 
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imperfect measure of age, it does signal the beginning of stringent enforcement of 
particular organizational rules and procedures, so much of the argument regarding the 
liabilities of newness apply despite a potential gap between program functioning and 
formal incorporation. 
 Size:  Young organizations are not necessarily small, and vice versa; therefore, 
we also need to restrict the size of the organizations in our sample.  Similar to the other 
chapters, a not-for-profit must have made less than or equal to $150,000 in revenues 
during one of their years in the sample period. 
 Operational Status: Though not the basis for inclusion or exclusion, it was 
important to the study design that the NFPs which participate in the study be a mix of 
organizations that were currently functioning (“alive”) and those that were not (“dead”).  
This would allow us to develop potential explanations on why the NFPs closed using the 
other factors being explored in the study.  Ideally, there would have been enough 
respondents and homogeneity to allow direct matching of living and dead organizations, 
but the subsector characteristics made the possibility of a highly detailed match unlikely.  
Therefore, the initial status of an organization was determined based on three criteria.  
First, since the standard operationalization of demise in the nonprofit financial 
vulnerability literature is three years of missing Form 990s, all NFPs who had filed in 
2010, 2011, or 2012 in the Core Files were considered likely to be alive.  If an NFP did 
not meet this standard, then they were searched for in the Business Master Files (BMF).  
Since the BMF are available for more recent years than the Core Files and include NFPs 
of all sizes, this may yield further organizations that are either new or too small to have 
ever filed a full Form 990.  If, however, an organization’s disappearance from the Core 
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files indicates demise while their appearance in the BMF indicates possible life, we err on 
the side of the literature and classify the NFP as current scholarship would. 
 
Potential Sample and Recruitment 
 
 The sample parameters yielded a potential sample of 26 not-for-profits.  Of these 
organizations, an additional three were excluded based on erroneous classification.  One 
was excluded due to an incorrect reported location, with the actual location being out of 
scope.  One not-for-profit was excluded based on an incorrect file in the Form 990, which 
reported the organization as having revenues under $150,000 (verification through 
financial statements showed the organization had income of over $33 million in the year 
in question).  Finally, though one nonprofit fit the criteria for the sample, no email or 
phone contact information for the nonprofit could be located.
92
 
 Following identification of the potential sample, all 20 organizations were 
contacted via email and invited to take place in the study.  Contact method was chosen in 
order of preference in Table 25.   
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
92
 This organization is affiliated with a house of worship.  Though no email or direct phone number was 
available even through this location to the contact, I recognize that the institution could have been “dropped 
in on” and the contact made.  The decision not to do so was based on decorum and could be revisited in 
later studies. 
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Table 25 
Contact Method Order of Preference 
First 
Round 
* Current NFP website listing of email address for the Executive 
       Director 
 * Current NFP website listing of general information email address 
 * Current NFP website contact request form 
 * Current professional or LinkedIn email of contact person on the 
       Form 990 
 * Current personal email of contact person on the Form 990 
Second  * Current NFP phone number for Executive Director 
Round * Current NFP general phone number 
 * First round options in order of priority 
 
 
Dates of initial and follow-up contacts were noted.  Nine organizations agreed to be a part 
of the study, though only eight actually participated.
93
  The description of the potential 
study participants is illustrated in Figure 35. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
93
 One NFP signed the consent agreement, but then stopped returning calls and emails.  Contact attempts 
ceased after two emails and two calls. 
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Figure 35.  Study Participation 
 
 
Data Collection 
 
Each not-for-profit participant in the study was the subject of data collection from 
primary and secondary data sources.  The initial contact for participation in the study 
asked for permission to conduct a semi-structured interview of the person contacted.  The 
protocol for this interview is available in Appendix 3A.1.  The protocol is guided (but not 
limited) by the literature and proposed typology.  The text for the list of questions was 
not utilized in the interview, but rather used to inform the Survey Interviewer Tool 
located in Appendix Q.  All interviews except one were conducted in person in the city in 
which the no-for-profit is or was based; one of the interviews took place over the phone, 
Misidentified 
Sector 
3 
Misidentified 
Location 
1 
Misidentified Size 
1 
No Contact 
Information 
1 
Could Not 
Establish Contact 
10 
Refused 
1 
Accepted, but No 
Interview 
1 
Interviewed 
8 
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but using the same Survey Tool (shown in Appendix R).  Interview locations are shown 
in Figure 36.  Due to the large number that took place in a public or noisy setting, 
recordings of the interviews were not used, though permission was acquired as a part of 
the consent form.  Each interview took place between the period of February 23
rd
 and 
March 3
rd
, 2015.  All interviews were between 55 minutes and 110 minutes in length. 
 
 
 
Figure 36.  Interview Locations 
 
 
Secondary sources also play a role in the analysis.  Along with identification and 
confirmation of sample characteristics and primary data, , each organization’s “deceased” 
status was explored using secondary sources such as signs of current activity on their 
website or social media sites.  At the same time, information regarding programs, 
finances, board composition, and staffing were collected.  Further, any information that 
Coffee
Restaurant
Their place of employment
(unrelated to NFP)
Their place of employment
(related to NFP)
Phone
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describes the organization or a portion of its environment was noted (such as, but not 
limited to, contact information listed on tax forms, incorporation forms, public filings 
with state and local governments, documents from the organization, and social media 
sites for the organization and listed staff and board members).   
  
Analytical Methods 
 
Yin (2009, p. 4) lists the preservation of complexity as a strength of qualitative 
study, specifically that of the case study.  Accordingly, this chapter builds comparative 
case studies and synthesizes the findings in order to find support or a lack of support for 
the hypotheses. The low number of organizations within the potential sample means that 
some additional care must be taken to preserve confidentiality of the sources; however, 
the case studies themselves are rich even if those details are only included in the analysis 
and findings, but not the individual organizational narrative.
94
 
Miles and Huberman (1994, p. 10) provide guidelines on how to perform 
qualitative work which this study adheres to: data collection, data reduction, data display, 
and drawing conclusions.  All steps occur alongside extensive memoing regarding the 
process.  The first step, data collection, has been described in the previous two 
subsections.  The second step, data reduction, is necessary due to the copious amounts of 
documents generated through interviews and collection of secondary source materials.  
The reduction occurs in several steps.  First, all field notes were summarized following 
each interview, resulting in roughly four dense pages of field notes and quotes per 
                                                          
94
 For example, mentioning both the city and the activity code for an organization in its narrative will 
identify the organization.  Therefore, the narrative will not contain this information together, but the 
analysis will. 
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organization. These reports are then analyzed through a series of iterative codings in line 
with a “grounded theory” approach, which is often preferred when a comprehensive 
understanding of a situation is needed (Glaser, 1999).  The first layer of coding is the 
most open and close to natural utterances and understandings by the interviewees.  
Therefore, the initial open coding schema was developed on a write-up from the study 
randomly drawn from the eight available. Since a typology already informed the 
development of the interview protocol and survey tool, this study follows a more 
procedural approach to grounded theory similar to Strauss (Melia, 1996; A. Strauss & 
Corbin, 1990).  Following the example of Strauss (1987) and Strauss and Corbin (1990), 
the “thought chunks” in the write-up were each assigned a summary word based on the 
content of the chunk.  This open coding of the first write-up yielded 98 code tags, which 
were then assembled into 6 meta-codes (se Appendix 3A.3 and 3A.4)
95
.  These meta-
codes were then applied to the original test case and the remaining reports by conducting 
a themed coding sweep on each case per meta-code.  For example, for the meta-code 
“Conflict,” each write-up was hand-coded according to the content in relation to the 
theme.  This process was repeated for fresh copies of the write-up for each code.  Doing 
so allows each “thought chunk” to contribute to different analytical ideas without visually 
crowding out during the process of coding.  The meta-codes are also applied as needed to 
secondary information sources (please see Appendices S and T for coding schemes). 
Once the information has been coded, the third step in the Miles and Huberman 
(1994) process is to display the information.  Though this may sound like a trivial step, it 
is essential when dealing with large quantities of information and a crucial part of the 
                                                          
95
 These meta-codes, interestingly, were not exact matches to the typology used to formulate the survey, 
thus lending additional credence to the contention that true grounded theory work emerged. 
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analysis.  The primary display technique used in this study are word tables (R. Yin, 
Merchlinksy, & Adams-Kennedy, 1998; R. K. Yin, 2009), which uses the meta-codes to 
categorize across organizations.  More traditional graphing techniques are also used to 
analyze and discuss characteristics such as financial characteristics. 
Finally, as described by Miles and Huberman (1994), we draw conclusions based 
on the analysis.  No direct matching is able to occur based on the full portfolio of 
characteristics of the NFPs which took part in the study, though significant 
contrapositives can be constructed depending on the trait.  Though caveats will definitely 
exist due to the limitations of the data and the size of the sample, several important 
insights and avenues for future research are discussed.  
 
Findings 
 
Descriptives 
 
 The 8 organizations included in the sample conducted a variety of activities and 
represent all three cities in the study frame.  The sample is also initially split evenly 
between NFPs deemed dead and those deemed alive, with criteria seen in Table 26. 
Were all organizations still living, their average age would be 11.25 years, though 
the distribution is heavily skewed to the right to reflect the surge of tax exemption 
statuses granted in the early part of the turn of the century, If we assume that the final 
reporting date reflects their age at closure, this adjusts the average age in the study down 
to 5.25 years, though this includes the latter two NFPs that ceased existing almost 
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instantly.  Data curiosities such as this strongly motivate the confirmation of operating 
status during the interviews. 
 
 
Table 26 
Study Participants 
Org # Activity Activity Meaning Last 
Core 
Report 
BMF 
2014? 
Initial 
Diagnosis 
932 F21 ADSA96 Prevention NA Y Alive 
302 F20 ADSA Prevention 
and Treatment 
NA Y Alive 
361 F03 Professional Society 2005 Y Alive 
661 F01 Alliance/ Advocacy 2011 Y Alive 
991 F03 Professional Society 2009 N Dead 
201 F30 Mental Health 
Treatment 
2004 Y Dead 
732 F32 Community Mental 
Health Center 
1999 N Dead 
339 F32 Community Mental 
Health Center 
2000 N Dead 
 
 
 The organizations represent all three cities in the study scope, though not evenly: 
4 are located in Albany, 3 in Buffalo, and 1 in Syracuse.
97
  Two interviewees were female 
and 6 male, and all interviews were able to take place in person except for one phone 
interview.  One interview brought along a colleague as is their organization’s policy.  The 
                                                          
96
 Alcohol, Drug, and Substance Abuse (ADSA) 
97
 The NFP that signed the paperwork but then avoided contact was from Syracuse. 
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colleague, who also is involved in the nonprofit sector, signed the necessary paperwork 
and took part in the discussion, though only the information regarding the NFP under 
study or its traits were taken into account. 
 
Findings Regarding Operational Status 
 
 As Hager et al. (1996) discovered in their interviews of nonprofit managers whose 
organizations had closed, the notion of organizational demise is not a simple thing. 
We have determined, however, that there are several levels of nuance around whether an 
organization is considered alive or dead, as seen in Table 27. 
This is not altogether unexpected.  Hager (1999) described several different status 
types in his landmark study,  noting that several organizations had left the initial study of 
healthy organizations for reasons other than simple closure (which is what his study 
focused on).  Since this study included all organizations with particular geographical and 
other characteristics with various operational statuses, we would expect to see some 
heterogeneity.  However, compared to the exits that Hager noted, fully half of the exits 
were outright closures (37 of 73), whereas in this sample only 1 of the 5 NFPs that are 
not outright cases of living organizations was a clear closure. 
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Table 27 
Study Participants and State of Demise 
Org 
# 
Activity 
Meaning 
Last 
Core 
Report 
BMF14? 
Initial 
Diagnosis 
Final 
Diagnosis 
932 
 
ADSA 
Prevention 
 
NA 
 
Y 
 
Alive 
 
Alive 
 
302 
 
ADSA 
Prevention and 
Treatment 
 
NA 
 
Y 
 
Alive 
 
Resurrection 
 
361 
 
Professional 
Society 
 
2005 
 
Y 
 
Alive 
 
Alive 
 
661 
 
Alliance/ 
Advocacy 
 
2011 
 
Y 
 
Alive 
 
Alive 
 
991 
 
Professional 
Society 
 
2009 
 
N 
 
Dead 
 
Dead 
 
201 
 
Mental Health 
Treatment 
 
2004 
 
Y 
 
Dead 
 
Alive 
 
732 
 
Community 
Mental Health 
Center 
 
1999 
 
N 
 
Dead 
 
Zombie 
 
339 
 
Community 
Mental Health 
Center 
2000 
 
N 
 
Dead 
 
Re-
incarnation 
 
 
 
Since the remainder of the findings and discussion will address the potential 
causes of these different states, the classifications need clarification.  “Alive” means that 
the organization is an operational 501(c)3 organization as of March of 2015.  Three of the 
four NFPs that were originally classified as being alive retain that classification.  
“Resurrection” refers to the loss and regaining of exemption status for the exact same 
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organization: the identification number (EIN) and mission are identical to the previous 
one.  A “Zombie” is a NFP which has not formally disbanded, but no longer attempts to 
pursue its mission; the body of the organization is still there, but it longer accomplishes a 
purpose.  “Reincarnation” is when the majority of an organization will disband one entity 
and reform another with a similar purpose.  This differs from the definition used in Hager 
et al. (1996), where they describe as “reincarnated” any nonprofit which was removed 
from their original panel due to merger, acquisition, geographical relocation, or change in 
tax exemption status.  This study treats reincarnation as a death, but then rise in a related 
organization with the same actors.  Finally, “Dead” refers to an organization that has 
disbanded and no longer functions or continues on in any form.  The final diagnoses of 
operational status will be used alongside organizational numbers in the analytical tables. 
 
Findings on Emergent Themes from the Study
98
 
 
Mission
99
 
 The majority of the organizations which were interviewed are influencing the 
flow of information and/or funding around the state of New York (see Appendix U for 
the full results).  This occurred most often through direct education or advocacy toward 
members of the government, normally either state legislators or individuals associated 
within a particular state agency.  Distribution of the primary targets of programming and 
mission efforts are shown in Figure 37. 
                                                          
98
 The bulk of the analysis is contained in the Word Tables.  Since each theme has approximately seven 
pages of tables, however, these tables are located in the Appendices. 
99
 Though the “Mission” theme received the second-most number of mentions in the coding, it is discussed 
first due to the lack of detailed organizational summaries, which are not possible due to the need to protect 
interviewee confidentiality in a narrow and highly-integrated sample. 
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Figure 37.   Targets of Not-for-Profit Mission 
 
 
 Since 75% of the organizations targeted the government in some fashion, it is not 
surprising that all of the organizations with a dead or near-dead classification involve the 
government as a target.  It is notable, however, that both organizations that solely involve 
the government as a target are no longer alive in their original form.  Further, two of the 
three NFPs that are no longer alive targeted a very specific law or regulation, then either 
disappeared or reincarnated when that piece of legislation had either failed or changed. 
 
Internal Characteristics 
 The findings for the internal characteristics can be found in Appendix V, where 
the word table for each NFP has been subcategorized into six different sections.  The 
personal characteristics of the interviewees (who either are or were the Executive 
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
N
u
m
b
e
r 
o
f 
N
FP
s 
Own Members Professionals Government Society
188 
 
Directors of the NFPs they were representing) were diverse.  Almost half were currently 
or previously employed directly by the government, with another two having the bulk of 
their professional experience in the nonprofit sector and another two in the private 
commercial sector.  Notably, the two organizations with private commercial experience 
(302 and 932) did not spend the bulk of their time lobbying government, with the former 
being primarily member-facing and the latter educating the government as a means of 
achieving their primary objective of educating the public.  There were rarely paid staff, 
though several organizations would bring in consultants or reimburse volunteers for 
expenses.  The NFP with the largest paid staff is the only one clearly deceased. 
 Board size varied widely, from two to twenty, with even larger founding teams.  
The larger boards and founding teams were associated with organizations comprised of 
government representatives, often those who gained membership simply as a function on 
their job.  Clients and service recipients were often not explicitly included on the board, 
though this is somewhat muddled given that the mission of many organizations was 
advocacy and education of government officials.  The number of organizations that did 
ensure representation of service recipients on their boards (#361, #302, later 
reincarnations of #339) is somewhat muddled due to the mission objective often being 
state legislators or agencies.  Almost half of the organizations operated solely by 
consensus voting, and all of these organizations plus others had board members voice 
opposition by “voting with their feet” and not attending meetings.  Even when consensus 
was the default operational style, high levels of conflict amongst the board was very 
problematic to the organization. 
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Conflict 
 The findings regarding six different types of conflict are shown in the word tables 
in Appendix W.  Half of the interviewees reported deep levels of personal conflict 
stemming from the organization, though only one (the fully closed NFP) described this 
conflict in terms of internalizing the problems which came from operating the 
organization.  The other three organizations used that inner conflict to motivate their 
performance at their organization, with two of them having used the conflict to motivate 
the creation of the NFP itself (#361 and #932).  As seen elsewhere in the findings, these 
feelings of personal responsibility or guilt often lead to feelings of mission incompletion 
or inadequacy, but coupled with the internal conflict such self-reported shortcomings may 
be seen as overly harsh. 
 
 
Table 28 
Degree of Conflict within NFPs 
 #201 #302 #339 #361 #661 #732 #932 #991 
Self  -  -   - - - 
Within NFP - - -  - - -  - - 
Between NFPs   +  - -  - 
With State Govt -  - -  - -  
With Other +      - -  
With NYC -  -     - 
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 We can note several things in Table 28, which summarizes the presence, type, and 
degree of the conflicts found as very serious conflict (“- -“), conflict (“-“), or a notably 
positive relationship (“+”).  First, very high degrees of conflict within the organization 
are toxic, with both NFPs reporting this condition being either fully or mostly dead.
100
  
Second, the presence of external conflict may serve as a galvanizing force on the 
organization since all clearly alive organizations experience some form of external 
conflict, sometimes to a high degree.  Also, the area of New York City was often 
mentioned specifically as an adversary and motivation to set up the group as a means of 
power balance, especially amongst the organizations trying to sway governmental 
education and funding. 
 
Networks 
 The role of networks was highly intertwined with the personal characteristics of 
the interviewee (referred to in this section’s tables as “ED”) since it was often their 
contacts that were the hub of the network.  As shown in Figure 38, the professional 
contacts and network of the interviewee were utilized by every organization, with the 
resources of the board and the interviewee’s personal network not far behind.  Only one 
organization went out of their way to include other stakeholders, but as mentioned 
previously, this may be due to the overlap in stakeholder and member groups in some 
NFPs.  Word tables are presented in Appendix X. 
 
                                                          
100
 There is a danger of hindsight bias here, in that the interviewee could be attaching a bad experience with 
an increasingly bad memory.  There are two arguments that this is not spurious, however: first, the potential 
for an NFP to close while the individuals who founded it become closer through the experience is equally 
as likely.  Second, the reports of contention stem beyond the final closing stages of the organizations. 
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Figure 38.  Utilization of Network Resources by Source 
 
 
 There is also a wide variety of network participants and utilization, some of which 
is influenced by the levels and locations of conflict.  These relationships are summarized 
in Table 29, where the number of symbols are the different types of participants and the 
symbol represents a positive (“+”), negative (“-“), or mixed (“~”) relationship. 
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Table 29 
Types of Network Participants 
 #201 #302 #339 #361 #661 #732 #932 #991 
Funders     ~    
Local Govt. 
(Own) 
+  +    - - + - 
Local Govt. 
(Neighbor) 
+  +    ~  
NYC - ~  - -    - - 
State/Nat. Govt + ~  ~ ~  + + + ~ ~ 
Clients   + + +  + ++ 
Corporations   +  + + ~ +  
Other NFPs + + ~++ ++ ~ ~ ~ + + - - 
 
 
The greatest variety of relationships is with other NFPs, which reflects the diversity and 
complexity of these organizations; the exact participants can be seen in Appendix 3A.8.  
For example, the several types of relatively positive relationships enjoyed by #339 are 
with those NFPs that have a similar mission (though it was emphasized that these are 
“not necessarily allies”), smaller peer NFPs, and subsequent reincarnations of the same 
group of individuals in response to different legislative initiatives.  Parent NFPs are 
generally positive relationships (#201 and #302), but not necessarily so (#661, with a 
mixed relationship due to a schism at founding.)  The NFP with the most types of happy 
clients is the fully deceased organization, showing that happy service recipients do not 
necessarily provide longevity.  Further, with the exception of #661, the organizations 
with the most strained relationships with fellow NFPs are also the ones with the 
operational statuses at or closest to demise. 
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Financial Resources 
 The summarized publicly available financial information is shown in Figure 39. 
 
 
 
Figure 39.  Pooled Participant Financial Averages 
 
 
As anticipated, total assets and liabilities are very low, though net assets shows that these 
organizations on average have some funds stashed away.  Those net assets only appear to 
be about a third of the annual expenses, however, so there is not enough slack to prevent 
financial calamity.  It is encouraging to see that revenues exceed expenses on the whole, 
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meaning that organizations are not overreaching their budgets in their early years.  Also, 
though the “contributions” type of revenue appears very high for organizations that speak 
at length about contracts, the Form 990 on which the public information is based 
considers government  
There does not appear to be a unifying trend in revenue behavior for the 
interviewed group; Figures 40, 41, and 42 contain the publicly available information from 
the Core Files on the six NFPs contained there.
101
  One of the difficulties in this study 
was the general reticence of individual organizations to share financial information; 
therefore, much of the analysis relies on publicly available information or the interviews 
directly.
102
  The word tables are shown in Appendix Y. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
101
 The two NFPs that are a part of the study and identified only in the Business Master Files reported no 
revenues or assets in 2014. 
102
 I strongly suspect that it was the sharing of financial information that caused the loss of the organization 
that had signed the waiver, but chosen not to follow through with the interview.  They had inquired as to 
what that meant, which was their last communication to me (I had responded, plus then attempted to make 
contact when they were not engaging).  This made me reticent to push too hard regarding access to 
financial documents during the actual interviews. 
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Figure 40.  Total Revenues by Fiscal Year 
 
 
 Most of the NFPs do not report for very long periods of time, so Figure 40 does 
not offer a very helpful means to compare organizations that are the same age.  Instead, 
Figure 41 shows the average total revenues per reported age of the six organizations, with 
the number of yellow circles representing the number of NFPs reporting for that age.
103
  
We see a bump in the first years where an organization is burning through initial start-up 
capital and enthusiasm, which is then followed by a brief dip and another gradual climb 
before the number reporting drops to only a single RFP. 
 
 
                                                          
103
 Notice that there are, due to the incompleteness of the data, no reports for NFPs ages 8 or 10 years. 
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Figure 42.  Total Revenues by Age 
 
 
 The interviews provide more detailed information not only into the revenue 
portfolios but also into the decision processes behind the revenue choices.  Detailed 
findings are in Appendix Y, though the information is summarized in Table 30.   
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Table 30 
 
Types of Financial Resources and Opinions 
 #201 #302 #339 #361 #661 #732 #932 #991 
Source         
Government X  X     X 
Corporation       X  
Individual  X   X  X  
Foundation X   X   X X 
NFP X   X  X  X 
         
Expenses? Consult Rent Travel Travel Special 
Event 
Consult Promo Over-
head 
Full time 
employee? 
       X 
Consultant/ 
intern? 
X    X X   
Tough being 
new/small 
X  X X     
 
 
We see a wide variety of funding sources, with half reliant on a single source.  
Two of the four NFPs that have only one type of revenue are reliant on individual 
contributions, though they collect these donations very differently, with #302 relying on 
voluntary member contributions and #661 relying on special events fundraising.  #661, 
the third NFP which relies on a single revenue type, also relies on members for income, 
though the members are other established NFPs that pay a mandatory monthly fee.  NFP 
#339 has members that are governmental entities which pay voluntary amounts rather 
than mandatory ones. 
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Many organizations received government money, either directly from the 
government or indirectly through other NFP organizations.  Unlike other revenue 
sources, however, two of the NFPs who did not receive government funding were 
adamant about not trying to seek any.  Concerns regarding how government funding 
comes with regulations or appears to be an endorsement were expressed, and even those 
NFPs who received government funds joked about how regulations were going to force 
the mergers of small NFPs (#339) or that rapidly shifting government priorities had 
taught everyone to effectively “chase the money” (#201). 
Though no one’s only source of income, half of the organizations receive 
foundation grants.  NFP #361 described foundation grants as “the easiest way to ever get 
money,” though this does not appear to be a universal opinion: two NFPS specifically 
mentioned how difficult it is being small or new in attracting this type of funding.  
According to NFP #661: 
 
“In order to grow, you have to be credible, but credibility goes to 
those who have grown.  It’s a chicken and the egg problem.” 
 
Financial resources were the area of the study where most individuals mentioned 
specific difficulties in being small and new.  This transferred to missions as well: many of 
the NFPs exist for educational purposes, which in mental health is addressing the social 
stigma of talking about mental health.  NFP #932 in particular mentioned how difficult it 
was to raise money for an issue that it wasn’t acceptable to talk about, which simply 
underscored the importance of getting funding. 
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The Role of Government 
 The large role that government played in the interviews was unexpected, thus 
warranting an investigation into its own unique contribution; findings are summarized in 
this section, but more detailed analysis is located in Appendix Z.  First, looking at 
financial resources, we can see how pervasive government is in terms of involvement.  
Only two organizations do not involve government funding, one because it is peer-
supported and the other because many of its relationships with government are 
adversarial.  NFP #932 actively avoids government funding, despite potential synergies, 
due to such interactions “com[ing] with rules and look[ing] like an endorsement.”  This 
skepticism persists even among those who receive government funding for their non-NFP 
employment such as #361 and #661; both individuals deliberately avoid government 
monies in order to keep their organizations pure from influences they receive on a daily 
basis in other employment.  However, we also see that those with experience in 
government are often called to serve in NFPs that deal with the government either for 
funding or as targets of their mission. 
 As noted in earlier sections, many small and young mental health NFPs spend 
time trying to influence the time or financial resources of government.  One impact of a 
governmental mission focus is that these were the interviewees which offered 
information regarding success or failure, potentially because regulation or fund division 
provides an easier metric than attempting to stem addiction or encourage best practices in 
program development.  Additionally, attempting to influence state funds also meant that 
you were more likely to consider other NFPs both colleagues and adversaries; further, the 
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majority of those trying to influence state funds considered New York City a direct 
threat, and some considered this threat a motivation behind the formation of their NFP. 
 Three quarters of the interviewees considered some aspect of regulating the 
mental health sector or government in general problematic, as summarized in Figure 42. 
 
 
 
Figure 42.  Concerns Regarding the Government and Regulatory Environment 
 
 
 Organizations that were led by veterans of government work were most likely to 
be concerned about concentration of power, especially with recent legislative shifts in the 
health sector toward managed care: 
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“There are three agencies at the state government that are related: Mental 
Health, Developmental Disabilities, and Chemical Dependency.  But the 
800 pound gorilla in the room is the Department of Health, which now 
controls all the Medicaid funding (as opposed to each agency controlling 
their own, like it used to be).  This is like the Department of Health is 
driving the car with the three agencies like kids kicking the back of the 
seat in order to get the Department’s attention.” 
 
Another interviewee offered that there are “20 year cycles” of decentralization and 
centralization, and that there is apprehension that excessive consolidation is coming.  The 
dizzying number of new initiatives being promoted at the state level is widely predicted 
by the interviewees to cause additional consolidation of NFPs, especially ones that are 
small. 
  
Discussion of Typology Fit 
 
One of the complications in verifying the typology in Table 23 was the 
unexpected heterogeneity in what exactly the current operational status of the 
organization was.  An extensive literature in vulnerability and demise normally treats 
operational status as binary, either “alive” or “dead,” and it was upon this division that 
the typology was developed.  We have determined, however, that there are several levels 
of nuance around whether an organization is considered alive or dead.  Hager (1999) 
avoids this complication in his study by simply restricting his sample to straightforward 
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cases of death.  I chose not to do so for several reasons.  First, the incidence of “nuanced” 
definitions of organizational demise are more prevalent in my study on a percentage basis 
than in his; further, his sample was much larger and with less exclusion criteria.  It would 
therefore potentially decrease my generalizability to my population of interest if I were to 
base the outcome of organizational status on a very restricted portion of the 
organizations.  Second, the presence of an assortment of operational statuses enhances 
rather than detracts from the analysis.  This study is now able to offer analysis on how an 
organization was able to utilize a particular trait, such as compulsory board membership, 
to reincarnate itself with slight mission shifts. 
 
 
Table 31 
 
Typology of Organizational Demise for Small and Young NFPs (Restatement) 
 Legitimacy Relational Resource 
Extraction 
 
Internal 
 
 
Commitment Theory 
 
Conflict Theory 
 
Human Resources 
Theory 
 
External 
 
Mission Theory 
 
Network Theory 
 
Niche Theory 
 
 
 
Commitment Theory 
 
 Though this study uncovered significant difficulties in some circumstances with 
internal commitment, none of these instances appear to play a major role in the demise of 
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an organization.  Complaints regarding a lack of engagement are almost universal, though 
there are several circumstances which make it particularly acute.  First, the NFPs in 
which membership is considered an automatic function of some other role, such as in 
NFP #201, display a lack of buy-in to the group; this was remedied to some degree in 
later incarnations of the organization when the board was diversified across stakeholders.  
All three organizations for which membership is automatically conferred have undergone 
severe organizational duress, with #201 having a massive reorganization, #339 
reincarnating twice, and #991 closing down.  This trait does not appear to be causal, 
however, since it is in contrast to the observation of #932, which points out that the 
individuals who have remained with it the longest are the ones with personal and 
longstanding involvement.  Further, #201 continues to marshal back individuals to its 
reincarnations.  Second, however, we also see a marked decrease in commitment with 
consensus-style voting.  Those organizations which ran on consensus did not appear to 
have less disagreement, but rather disagreeing parties removed themselves from the 
situation during periods of higher conflict.  This is especially true of the organizations 
that do not have a galvanizing outside force, such as NFP #302. 
 
Conflict Theory 
 
 We do find support for the contention that internal conflict can drive an 
organization into dissipating, especially in the instance of NFP #991.  However, the key 
finding regarding conflict is that there are two very different kinds – internal and external 
– which play very different roles.  There was notable internal conflict in all cases except 
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one (NFP #361), and how that conflict was dealt with manifests in Commitment Theory.  
Whom that conflict was between, however, also makes a large difference.  In situations 
such as NFP #302, there were disagreements among lay members that caused a lack of 
leaders.  More insidious, however is when there was unproductive conflict management 
among leadership.  NFP #732, though technically still alive, has dwindled to only two 
members following a contentious existence.  NFP #991 had particular difficulty because 
internal conflicts stemmed from external conflicts that had become internalized through 
board sharing. 
 This is one of the main findings from the study: the roles of internal and external 
conflict are very different, and it is something that is not reflected especially well in the 
typology unless we consider external conflict to be part of Network Theory.  Unlike 
internal conflict, the existence of conflict with an outside organization actually causes a 
galvanizing force that increases buy-in and the chances at longevity.  For example, 
several of the Coordinating NFPs existed primarily to direct funding away from programs 
in the New York City area, which they viewed as receiving disproportionate attention.  In 
Grassroots organizations, both #932 and #361 use conflict with government as a major 
component of their education and advocacy missions.  The adage “the enemy of my 
enemy is my friend” may initially be peculiar in applying to networking amongst 
nonprofits, but it appears to have a strong influence in keeping these organizations 
healthy. 
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Human Resources Theory 
 
 Like Commitment Theory, this study finds several instances where the existence 
and impact of human resources within small and young nonprofits is clear; however, we 
do not have convincing evidence that it was these traits that solely or even predominantly 
led to existential problems for their organizations.  For example, one of the arguments for 
Human Resources Theory is that small and young NFPs are unable to attract and retain 
the most talented or experienced staff.  Though the only interviewee to explicitly express 
doubt in her ability and lack of experience in running a nonprofit represented the closed 
NFP, other NFPs such as the Zombie #732 and Reincarnation #339 have very highly 
talented and experienced individuals in charge.  Further, the interviewee who expressed a 
lack of confidence in her ability to lead effectively (#361) is operating a NFP very much 
alive.
104
 
 Another argument for Human Resources Theory is that organizations do not have 
“best practices” to fall back on or routines with which to save time.  Again, however, this 
does not appear to be the case.  The popularity of consensus decision-making indicates 
that, despite its inefficiencies, that it is a methodological choice based on a commitment 
to that type of governance.  Additionally, each of the interviewees came in with 
substantial backgrounds from one or more sectors of industry, which means that those 
practices could be imported into their NFP.  The common trope of the nonprofit manager 
with the professional degree and no experience does not appear to hold. 
 
                                                          
104
 Both individuals who expressed a lack of confidence in their abilities were the two female 
interviewees, so I would also consider the likelihood of a gender effect. 
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Mission Theory 
 
 The evidence supports mission completion as a better explanation than lack of 
commitment for the demise issues sustained by #201 and #339 since the participants did 
not shift substantially for #201 before and after the reorganization, but the regulatory 
environment and focus did.  Additionally, the shift in regulation also coincided with the 
reincarnations of #339; the expansion of the board into other stakeholders appears to be 
an opportunistic move rather than one that motivated the reincarnation process.  Finally, 
the cessation of activity for #732 came because of the legislative defeat of the regulation 
that brought about the existence of the organization in the first place, according to the 
interviewee.   
 This does not appear to hold for all types of organization in this study, however.  
The NFP with straightforward closure did not accomplish a mission, nor did its mission 
somehow disappear or lose legitimacy.  Additionally, some organizations (such as NFP 
#302 and NFP #932, which address addictions) do not ever expect to fully achieve their 
missions.  Therefore, some organizations must be closing for other reasons. 
 
Network Theory 
 
 As mentioned in Conflict Theory, one of the most influential portions of a NFP’s 
network appears to be whether an external conflict or adversary exists; this figure then 
provides a galvanizing force to the members and allies of the group.  However, there is 
also evidence that positive effects exist from more highly developed networks, especially 
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in this sector.  First, “[e]veryone in the field knows everyone else,” according to NPF 
#361.  This means that there will be reputational effects from whomever happens to be 
leading the organization, regardless of how old the organization happens to be.  This is 
somewhat linked to Human Resources Theory – the individuals you bring in will bring 
legitimacy and contacts in such a close-knit field.  This is also evident in the more 
detailed appendices tables, where there is evidence that the ED’s persona and 
professional contacts are heavily leveraged. 
 We can also see from Table 27 that all three organizations that have experienced a 
transitional form of death (Zombie, Reincarnation, and Dead) have tension amongst their 
other NFP peers.  NFP #661 also has tension with peers, but as an organization that is 
becoming dedicated solely to grant-making this may impact them differently than those 
in lobbying or service delivery; also, this NFP is undergoing radical board and potential 
funding source changes, so the impact of tense relations with a peer NFP network may 
yet emerge.  However, at the current time, an ED and board well-connected to clients and 
other NFPs appear important. 
 
Niche Theory 
 
 Though there are obvious signs of conflict at different levels of the niche, the 
classical theory that the sector is simply getting too crowded to support the nonprofit 
population does not hold in this case.  More nonprofits believed their services to be truly 
unique than that they had stiff competition, even for those who report significant inter-
organization conflict.  From an abstract sector standpoint, several leaders noted that small 
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nonprofits can be very “administratively inefficient” and that mergers may be required in 
order to save money and to have enough power to negotiate with managed care 
companies.  This was a particularly popular viewpoint among those who had significant 
personal government experience.  But almost all of those individuals followed the 
negative statement with a positive, such as the small NFP’s ability to better respond to 
clients and consumers.  Also, based on the diverse financing portfolios, there does not 
appear to be empirical evidence that the funding sources are being overly taxed to the 
point of starvation within the niche.  Though there is signs of donor strain (including in 
organizations which recognize and are taking action on it, such as NFP #661), but this 
does not appear to be the result of sector crowding. 
  
Conclusion 
 
 In conclusion, this study finds support for several of the potential causes of 
nonprofit demise in the newly proposed typology. Though evidence of all conditions 
were found to some degree, certain elements are more important in the operational status 
of certain types of organization.  Those NFPs whose targets are a particular regulation are 
likely to close due to mission completion or obsolescence when the regulation disappears; 
however, these are also the organizations that will either reincarnate or expand scope if 
other factors are favorable.  The brief disappearance of the NFP which was then 
resurrected appears to be attributable to Human Resources Theory, where the interviewee 
admitted that lack of knowledge caused the loss of tax exemption; this is also a common 
occurrence in practice.  Finally, the existence of conflict or competition with an outside 
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entity appears to boost the cohesion of the NFP, but tensions within the board (especially 
deep tensions such as existed for #732 and #991) are highly toxic. 
 
Limitations 
 
 There are several limitations to this study.  First, though the detail inherent in a 
qualitative study has allowed several unique insights that would not be possible with 
large datasets currently available, the generalizability is severely limited due to the 
unique factors that exist in the NFPs targeted by the study.  Not only is the number 
interviewed small, but it is possible that some of these effects are unique to the subsector, 
geographical location, or other factors aside from the organizations being young and 
small.  The number interviewed should be increased, which would allow better matching 
and potentially statistical testing of vulnerability, even using multiple types of 
vulnerability rather than simply binary. 
 There are also limitations to the study as a qualitative work.  Situational factors 
prevented the recording and transcribing of the interviews, which means that there is 
already a layer of editing that has occurred in the hand notation of the interviews.  
Further, since this was a dissertation project, the existence of a team of multiple coders 
and researchers was not possible, despite the fact that such practices increase the 
reliability of qualitative work.  Future extensions of this work should include a larger 
team in addition to more interviews in order to increase the validity of the findings. 
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Future Directions 
 
 Naturally, the first thoughts on future directions stem from the limitations.  Even 
maintaining the same framework, the number of organizations should be increased; 
different parameters can be relaxed as the research questions and abilities permit.  This 
would also help answer questions regarding why there was such a large difference in the 
heterogeneity across operational status, especially when compared to Hager (1999).  Are 
there fewer cases of outright closure due to the youth, smallness, subsector, location, or a 
combination of the above? 
 There are also questions regarding details uncovered during the course of this 
study that were not the focus, but merit further exploration.  For example, the role of 
government in the mental health sector is complex enough to warrant one or more studies 
on its own; further, the dual nature of conflict when located inside or outside the 
organization is fascinating.  Also, how endemic is the problem of “voting with your feet” 
to operating by consensus, and what does this mean for accountability and stewardship?  
Finally, this can help guide future projects that are trying to establish more thorough and 
useful panel datasets for nonprofit research. 
 
Policy Implications 
 
 Though the ability to generalize from this study alone is limited, there are a few 
cautious recommendations.  The first is that what appears to be a fairly pervasive sense of 
apprehension regarding the speed of regulatory change at the state level should be 
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heeded.  Several concerns that were voiced, from the potential lack of rural health 
coverage to the difficulties in combining certifications across several types of 
organizations that may need to merge, are issues that have serious impact not only on the 
nonprofit community, but on the public at large.  If we view the nonprofit sector as the 
“hollow state” implementers of social service delivery (H Brinton Milward, 1994), then 
such a widespread concern regarding the implementation of policy should be heeded. 
 Second, on a more general note, this study suggests that providing opportunities 
to develop board capacity and cohesion are in the best interest of organizational 
longevity.  This means that continued work on initiatives such as The Overhead Myth 
and the provision for adequate overhead and capacity training in the construction of 
grants and contracts would help strengthen the organization and, thus, the service 
delivery. 
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CHAPTER V: CONCLUSION 
 
 This dissertation has offered insight into the organizational lives of small and new 
not-for-profits.  This brings several unique contributions to the literature.  On the 
empirical side, this subset of the not-for-profit population has received limited dedicated 
attention, so this dissertation extends theory and empirical study into that niche.  On the 
theoretical side, this study has drilled down into the concepts of the liabilities of 
smallness and newness.  These concepts have been discussed for decades, but little study 
(especially on a large population) has been attempted to see how the mechanics of these 
two phenomena manifest in nonprofits beyond whether they actually exist.  The three 
essays in this collection have all concentrated on small and new not-for-profits in order to 
explore the space and test initial hypotheses of the general literature on this subgroup. 
 The first essay used three different estimation strategies to model the role of 
revenue type in the growth in young and small not-for-profits.  The focus of these models 
was the relationship between the revenue level or “income” effect and the portfolio or 
“substitution” effect of different types of revenue. Following the statistical modeling, a 
meta-analysis of the findings was conducted and used to draw conclusions.  The strongest 
takeaways are that individual subsectors need to be modeled independently; that 
increases in the percentage of a NFP’s revenue portfolio going to dues, indirect support, 
or non-mission income will suppress growth; and that when there is no “optimal” model, 
a nest of models to compare will offer additional insights due to their own strengths and 
weaknesses (such as the empirical discovery of probable Nickell bias). 
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 In the second essay, the study uses over twenty years of panel data to predict 
which factors indicate the impending recovery of a financially vulnerable small and 
young nonprofit.  Support for hypotheses based in the literature is mixed, with increased 
equity and revenue diversification being universally beneficial, but implications for 
improved surplus ratios varying between types of financial stress.  The liability of 
smallness has mixed support, while the liability of newness is absent.  The key insight, 
however, is that nonprofits need to save if they want to get healthy: bringing in revenues 
is not enough (or even adverse) to achieving solvency if the money is spent.  This is not 
an easy lesson for organizations created to serve others, but in times of financial distress, 
having net assets provides a needed life raft. 
 Finally, the third essay leaves behind the aggregation and data issues inherent in 
the large-scale work and uses a qualitative approach on a very select group: young and 
new mental health not-for-profits in the state of New York.  Using comparative case 
studies, this study analyzes the internal and external factors surrounding the demise of 
small and young mental health nonprofits.  First, the study defines nonprofit demise, then 
reviews theories of nonprofit financial demise; this review informs the development of a 
unique typology specifically tailored to young and new not-for-profits.  This study finds 
support for several of the potential causes of nonprofit demise in the newly proposed 
typology. Though evidence of all conditions were found to some degree, certain elements 
are more important in the operational status of certain types of organization.  Those NFPs 
whose targets are a particular regulation are likely to close due to mission completion or 
obsolescence when the regulation disappears; however, these are also the organizations 
that will either reincarnate or expand scope if other factors are favorable.  Finally, the 
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existence of conflict or competition with an outside entity appears to boost the cohesion 
of the NFP, but tensions within the board are particularly harmful. 
 This collection of essays will hopefully be useful to several audiences.  First, 
those individuals who are responsible for the operations of a nonprofit, such as the 
executive director, board, and other nonprofit staff, should find a large amount of 
practical advice on different stages of nonprofit organizational life.  Finds such as the 
limited usefulness of the surplus without savings for those organizations trying to 
overcome insolvency could be insightful.  Individuals who support such decisions, such 
as consultants and academics, will find the same takeaways useful.   
The individuals and organizations within the ecosystem of not-for-profits will also 
find this dissertation useful.  Foundations and other potential funders can help identify the 
growth factors for small organizations, which will include not only monetary support that 
could be used to boost capacity (second essay) but also conflict resolution techniques to 
avoid the internal conflict that was problematic in the third essay.  Foundations and 
consultants also have the first steps on how to help identify which nonprofits are at an 
increased risk of failing and what kind of support and advice they might need to 
overcome their financial stress. 
Nonprofit researchers and academics also may find this dissertation useful.  Aside 
from increasing the accumulation of knowledge regarding nonprofit operations, the first 
two essays contribute to the developing field of nonprofit financial management.  Also, 
the theoretical implications of the exploration of the liabilities of smallness and newness 
contained here will be of particular interest to organizational ecologists in addition to 
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nonprofit scholars.  Finally, the methodological debate regarding the fixed effects and 
dynamic analyses within the first essay may be of interest to scholars in the more general 
finance and econometric fields. 
Policy implications are many and varied.  Further exploration should occur on 
why there is a difference between the impact of government grants and government 
program service fees in order to ensure that nonprofits are being paid in the most 
effective way possible.  Such contracts and grants should also include adequate funding 
for overhead and other expenses that are not direct service delivery; as shown in the 
second essay, savings can often be more important in times of financial stress than mere 
revenue intake.  Perhaps most importantly, government needs to be aware of the large 
impact that their legislative or executive actions have on the nonprofit ecosystem.  There 
is a cacophony of protest from large corporate firms when the implementation of 
different managed care options shifts; however, those groups employing individuals that 
actually hand the medications to the most marginalized recipients of such services are 
also having to accommodate shifting requirements and administrative goals.  The modern 
hollow state fundamentally relies on effective contracting.  Expecting nonprofit service 
providers, especially young and small ones, to address constantly shifting requirements 
with no funding dedicated to capacity development in their contracts does not bode well 
for the service recipients or the state of civil society. 
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APPENDIX A: SUMMARY STATISTICS BY SUBSECTOR 
 
 
Table 32 
Summary Statistics for Total Expenses 
 Mean Median Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
Arts          218,853 129,111 589,984 0 14,101,435 
Health 745,531 143,488 5,901,668 0 269,049,856 
Human Svcs 249,297 128,080 905,249 0 39,254,280 
Public 315,640 135,203 2,188,647 0 138,371,424 
Edu (Exclu. Higher 
Edu.) 
281,105 136,591 911,472 0 49,619,184 
Higher Edu. 223,335 139,931 337,294 4,617 2,021,584 
Hospitals 7,582,619 219,661 84,966,467 0 1,685,639,040 
Other 228,972 129,559 935,888 0 51,900,100 
Total 385,183 132,325 8,572,376 0 1,685,639,040 
 
 
Table 33 
Summary Statistics for Private Giving 
 Mean Median Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
Arts          106,690 48,032 370,484 0 15,891,560 
Health 93,681 23,893 345,061 0 14,787,088 
Human Svcs 60,470 3,366 351,092 0 40,661,516 
Public 134,754 44,500 612,669 0 19,743,116 
Edu (Exclu. Higher 
Edu.) 
111,876 43,895 351,397 0 14,074,515 
Higher Edu. 83,892 32,718 218,777 0 2,622,046 
Hospitals 90,905 0 439,055 0 7,796,045 
Other 124,920 59,636 803,258 0 53,329,172 
Total 92,649 26,395 462,574 0 53,329,172 
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Table 34 
Summary Statistics for Dues 
 Mean Median Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
Arts 4,326 0 16,529 0 275,455 
Health 4,854 0 32,893 0 1,083,893 
Human Svcs 3,602 0 41,829 0 3,767,401 
Public 3,227 0 18,693 0 605,654 
Edu(Exclu Higher 4,657 0 21,900 0 497,144 
Higher Edu 6,357 0 26,437 0 244,943 
Hospitals 8,562 0 56,737 0 937,476 
Other 3,418 0 15,579 0 350,168 
Total 3,912 0 32,242 0 3,767,401 
 
Table 35 
Summary Statistics for Indirect Giving 
 Mean Median Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
Arts 13,539 0 410,430 0 26,056,986 
Health 16,394 0 295,098 0 20,527,736 
Human Svcs 6,263 0 73,586 0 5,365,971 
Public 8,692 0 105,972 0 5,192,108 
Edu(Exclu Higher 7,596 0 97,777 0 4,750,000 
Higher Edu 3,484 0 20,509 0 187,136 
Hospitals 93,488 0 769,636 0 9,847,839 
Other 9,402 0 90,411 0 2,354,300 
Total 9,738 0 192,050 0 26,056,986 
 
Table 36 
Summary Statistics for Program Service Revenue (Govt.) 
 Mean Median Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
Arts 799 0 11,952 0 444,610 
Health 14,014 0 197,832 0 7,503,152 
Human Svcs 5,920 0 88,636 0 7,616,047 
Public 3,242 0 94,016 0 7,831,080 
Edu(Exclu Higher 2,880 0 61,375 0 3,022,536 
Higher Edu 223 0 3,052 0 42,735 
Hospitals 1,177,323 0 20,402,061 0 435,095,360 
Other 1,530 0 19,492 0 541,418 
Total 16,183 0 1,980,197 0 435,095,360 
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Table 37 
Summary Statistics for Program Service Revenue (Private) 
 Mean Median Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
Arts 51,426 12,906 195,690 0 6,819,647 
Health 366,248 0 3,880,263 0 172,801,776 
Human Svcs 79,640 18,796 411,122 0 29,592,096 
Public 71,503 0 1,874,497 0 113,850,976 
Edu(Exclu Higher 72,489 0 271,132 0 5,913,296 
Higher Edu 103,231 15,008 287,188 0 1,887,252 
Hospitals 4,628,266 0 51,248,676 0 1,019,608,256 
Other 41,068 0 264,062 0 13,519,356 
Total 147,361 1,287 5,215,105 0 1,019,608,256 
 
Table 38 
Summary Statistics for Government Grants 
 Mean Median Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
Arts 27,364 0 277,489 0 17,902,160 
Health 45,630 0 261,755 0 11,290,368 
Human Svcs 56,670 0 561,046 0 39,036,552 
Public 41,720 0 178,047 0 6,714,491 
Edu(Exclu Higher 50,409 0 697,088 0 48,181,248 
Higher Edu 27,010 0 146,580 0 1,764,918 
Hospitals 12,336 0 81,305 0 1,285,617 
Other 27,614 0 168,388 0 8,059,661 
Total 46,416 0 456,619 0 48,181,248 
 
Table 39 
Summary Statistics for Non-Mission Income 
 Mean Median Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
Arts 36,788 1,259 351,157 0 18,800,856 
Health 117,345 1,198 3,638,813 0 246,230,160 
Human Svcs 29,121 717 286,956 0 21,402,936 
Public 59,340 1,947 478,308 0 22,500,842 
Edu(Exclu Higher 38,601 1,632 249,273 0 12,590,746 
Higher Edu 28,720 2,018 96,624 0 912,703 
Hospitals 399,230 11,226 3,451,399 0 58,591,560 
Other 44,529 1,098 709,091 0 45,321,760 
Total 50,876 1,049 1,335,065 0 246,230,160 
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Table 40 
Summary Statistics for Revenue Concentration 
 Mean Median Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
Arts 0.651 0.608 0.220 0.000 1.000 
Health 0.767 0.825 0.222 0.000 1.000 
Human Svcs 0.747 0.781 0.227 0.000 1.000 
Public 0.764 0.812 0.218 0.000 1.000 
Edu(Exclu Higher 0.753 0.785 0.212 0.000 1.000 
Higher Edu 0.755 0.774 0.207 0.360 1.000 
Hospitals 0.830 0.966 0.226 0.000 1.000 
Other 0.760 0.820 0.225 0.000 1.000 
Total 0.746 0.779 0.225 0.000 1.000 
 
Table 41 
Summary Statistics for Unrelated Business Income (UBI) 
 Mean Median Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
Arts 0.046 0.000 0.210 0.000 1.000 
Health 0.021 0.000 0.143 0.000 1.000 
Human Svcs 0.013 0.000 0.114 0.000 1.000 
Public 0.019 0.000 0.135 0.000 1.000 
Edu(Exclu Higher 0.018 0.000 0.133 0.000 1.000 
Higher Edu 0.015 0.000 0.124 0.000 1.000 
Hospitals 0.045 0.000 0.208 0.000 1.000 
Other 0.025 0.000 0.155 0.000 1.000 
Total 0.020 0.000 0.139 0.000 1.000 
 
Table 42 
Summary Statistics for Fixed Cost Ratio 
 Mean Median Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
Arts 0.102 0.050 0.142 0.000 1.000 
Health 0.111 0.041 0.179 0.000 1.000 
Human Svcs 0.209 0.098 0.238 0.000 1.000 
Public 0.078 0.016 0.156 0.000 1.000 
Edu(Exclu Higher 0.069 0.010 0.131 0.000 1.000 
Higher Edu 0.090 0.016 0.183 0.000 0.996 
Hospitals 0.084 0.019 0.172 0.000 0.989 
Other 0.082 0.035 0.129 0.000 1.000 
Total 0.137 0.049 0.201 0.000 1.000 
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Table 43 
Summary Statistics for Unrestricted Net Assets (UNA) 
 Mean Median Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
Arts 225,972 19,400 1,196,361 0 30,998,250 
Health 454,819 41,924 3,538,307 0 139,743,088 
Human Svcs 225,505 22,012 726,777 0 32,082,776 
Public 316,930 41,481 1,379,139 0 72,140,728 
Edu(Exclu Higher 160,798 23,171 652,608 0 19,494,144 
Higher Edu 148,801 48,814 292,072 0 1,709,455 
Hospitals 3,656,892 115,881 38,398,857 0 699,153,024 
Other 134,657 24,779 394,978 0 8,369,809 
Total 283,000 27,844 4,011,725 0 699,153,024 
 
Table 44 
Summary Statistics for Exemption Date 
 Mean Median Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
Arts 1994.911 1995 3.558 1988 2003 
Health 1994.753 1995 3.845 1988 2003 
Human Svcs 1994.997 1995 3.419 1988 2003 
Public 1995.194 1995 3.420 1988 2003 
Edu(Exclu Higher 1995.83 1996 3.661 1988 2003 
Higher Edu 1993.648 1994 3.390 1988 2003 
Hospitals 1993.729 1994 3.722 1988 2003 
Other 1995.337 1995 3.640 1988 2003 
Total 1995.103 1995 3.551 1988 2003 
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APPENDIX B: CORRELATION TABLES FOR CHAPTER 2 
 
 
 
Table 45 
Pearson’s Correlation Coefficients Amongst Revenue Variables 
 Total 
Size 
Total 
Size 
(lag) 
Private 
Giving 
Dues Indirect PSR 
Govt. 
PSR 
Private 
Govt. 
Grant 
Total Size 
(lag) 
0.659* 1       
Private 
Giving % 
-0.068* -0.106* 1      
Dues % -0.009* -0.003 -0.109* 1     
Indirect 
% 
-0.012* -0.031* -0.117* -0.031* 1    
PSR 
Govt. % 
0.022* 0.024* -0.141* -0.029* -0.027* 1   
PSR 
Private % 
0.050* 0.093* -0.531* -0.073* -0.123* -0.019* 1  
Govt. 
Grant % 
0.051* 0.015* -0.328* -0.082* -0.047* -0.073* -0.234* 1 
NMI % -0.032* 0.014* -0.230* -0.055* -0.070* -0.061* -0.244* -0.179* 
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Table 46 
Pearson’s Correlation Coefficients between Revenue Level and Portfolio Measures 
 Pearson's Correlation with its 
Own Ratio 
Private Giving 0.7646* 
Dues 0.6048* 
Indirect 0.2754* 
PSR Govt. 0.0342* 
PSR Private 0.0375* 
Govt. Grant 0.2413* 
NMI 0.0930* 
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APPENDIX C: AVERAGE REVENUE PORTFOLIO BY SUBSECTOR
105
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
                                                          
105
 Revenue percentages are in means; median size of total expenses for the sector is in parentheses. 
Arts  ($129,111) Private Giving
Dues
Indirect
Govt. PSR
Private PSR
Govt. Grants
Non-Mission Income
Health  ($143,488) Human  Services 
($128,080) 
Public  ($135,203) Education without 
Higher Ed  
($136,591) 
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Figure 43.  Average Revenue Portfolio by Sector 
 
Higher Ed  ($139,931) 
Private Giving
Dues
Indirect
Govt. PSR
Private PSR
Govt. Grants
Non-Mission Income
Hospitals  
($219,661) 
Other  ($129,559) 
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APPENDIX D: FULL ESTIMATION RESULTS, MODEL 1 (FIXED EFFECTS) 
Table 47 
 
Impact of Revenue Type on Growth, Fixed Effects Analysis, Arts Subsector 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
VARIABLES PrivGiving Dues Indirect GovtPSR PrivatePSR GovGrant NonMissInc 
        
Size (lag) 0.0096 0.0163 0.0168 0.0168 0.0095 0.0152 0.0044 
 (0.065) (0.063) (0.063) (0.063) (0.064) (0.063) (0.066) 
Revenue Type 
(lag) 
0.0243 -0.0007 0.0062 0.0097 0.0198** 0.0077* 0.0337*** 
 (0.015) (0.008) (0.010) (0.012) (0.008) (0.005) (0.012) 
Revenue Type 
% (lag) 
-0.0111 -0.1132 -0.0310 -0.5186* -0.2253 -0.0565 -0.5146** 
 (0.110) (0.188) (0.285) (0.277) (0.146) (0.114) (0.231) 
HHI (lag) -0.0116 -0.0635 -0.0440 -0.0587 0.0171 -0.0183 -0.0015 
 (0.139) (0.143) (0.143) (0.141) (0.141) (0.146) (0.131) 
UBI (lag) 0.1325 0.1271 0.1302 0.1288 0.1065 0.1327 0.1123 
 (0.106) (0.107) (0.107) (0.108) (0.107) (0.108) (0.109) 
Fixed Cost 
Ratio (lag) 
0.6778*** 0.6712** 0.6764** 0.6719** 0.6866** 0.6879** 0.6461** 
 (0.262) (0.267) (0.265) (0.267) (0.268) (0.267) (0.255) 
UNA (lag) 0.0163*** 0.0173*** 0.0172*** 0.0175*** 0.0169*** 0.0174*** 0.0162*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Age -0.0158 -0.0174 -0.0176 -0.0159 -0.0173 -0.0177 -0.0155 
 (0.041) (0.041) (0.041) (0.041) (0.041) (0.041) (0.041) 
FY2001 0.1167* 0.1156* 0.1152* 0.1137* 0.1147* 0.1147* 0.1118* 
 (0.068) (0.068) (0.068) (0.068) (0.068) (0.068) (0.067) 
FY2002 0.1134 0.1144 0.1142 0.1110 0.1114 0.1134 0.1057 
 (0.108) (0.108) (0.108) (0.108) (0.108) (0.109) (0.108) 
FY2003 0.1103 0.1126 0.1121 0.1073 0.1076 0.1112 0.1086 
 (0.150) (0.150) (0.150) (0.150) (0.149) (0.150) (0.150) 
Constant 11.2181*** 11.4161*** 11.3898*** 11.3942*** 11.3698*** 11.3723*** 11.3541*** 
 (0.781) (0.807) (0.802) (0.800) (0.790) (0.798) (0.798) 
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Observations 5,182 5,182 5,182 5,182 5,182 5,182 5,182 
R-squared 0.018 0.014 0.014 0.014 0.017 0.015 0.024 
Number of ein 1,829 1,829 1,829 1,829 1,829 1,829 1,829 
Corr -0.101 -0.0750 -0.0760 -0.0763 -0.0630 -0.0750 -0.110 
        
log likelihood -4098 -4107 -4107 -4107 -4101 -4106 -4082 
Within 
R-squared 
0.0178 0.0141 0.0142 0.0142 0.0167 0.0146 0.0238 
Between 
R-squared 
0.00511 0.00981 0.00970 0.00991 0.0148 0.0110 0.00696 
Overall 
R-squared 
0.00721 0.00812 0.00809 0.00779 0.0128 0.00883 0.00969 
Rho 0.668 0.665 0.665 0.665 0.664 0.665 0.670 
        
F-Stat 
(11,1828) 
3.976*** 4.090*** 4.004*** 4.123*** 4.317*** 4.288*** 4.861*** 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
For each revenue type, Wooldridge tests find AR(1) with Prob>F≈0 and fixed effects confirmed using Hausman test. 
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Table 48 
 
Impact of Revenue Type on Growth, Fixed Effects Analysis, Health Subsector 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4)      (5)    (6)  (7) 
VARIABLES Priv  
Giving 
Dues Indirect Govt 
PSR 
Private 
PSR 
Govt 
Grant 
Non 
MissInc 
        
Size (lag) 0.2077*** 0.2166*** 0.2160*** 0.2171*** 0.2140*** 0.2143*** 0.2081*** 
 (0.045) (0.044) (0.044) (0.044) (0.045) (0.044)  (0.043) 
Revenue Type 
(lag) 
0.0327*** 0.0164* 0.0148 0.0190 0.0131* 0.0230*** 0.0160 
 (0.011) (0.009) (0.010) (0.012) (0.008) (0.008) (0.010) 
Revenue Type 
% (lag) 
-0.1549 -0.1376 0.2641 -0.2545 -0.1947* -0.0543 -0.5686*** 
 (0.150) (0.257) (0.231) (0.192) (0.115) (0.120) (0.179) 
HHI (lag) 0.1868* 0.0930 0.1539 0.0932 0.1363 0.1718* 0.0880 
 (0.110) (0.095) (0.098) (0.096) (0.095) (0.101) (0.090) 
UBI (lag) 0.2882 0.3007 0.3088* 0.3027 0.3017 0.2996 0.3021 
 (0.188) (0.185) (0.187) (0.184) (0.185) (0.184) (0.191) 
Fixed Cost 
Ratio (lag) 
0.7037*** 0.7021*** 0.6859*** 0.7006*** 0.6948*** 0.6845*** 0.6505*** 
 (0.185) (0.185) (0.184) (0.185) (0.186) (0.184) (0.180) 
UNA (lag) 0.0291*** 0.0308*** 0.0308*** 0.0309*** 0.0305*** 0.0298*** 0.0301*** 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
Age -0.0546 -0.0557 -0.0568 -0.0557 -0.0542 -0.0537 -0.0478 
 (0.047) (0.047) (0.047) (0.047) (0.047) (0.047) (0.047) 
FY2001 0.0604 0.0621 0.0646 0.0618 0.0610 0.0616 0.0578 
 (0.075) (0.075) (0.074) (0.075) (0.075) (0.075) (0.075) 
FY2002 0.1498 0.1533 0.1528 0.1534 0.1503 0.1480 0.1377 
 (0.118) (0.118) (0.118) (0.118) (0.118) (0.118) (0.119) 
FY2003 0.1865 0.1955 0.1964 0.1960 0.1908 0.1836 0.1709 
 (0.166) (0.166) (0.165) (0.166) (0.166) (0.166) (0.168) 
Constant 9.0875*** 9.2196*** 9.1732*** 9.2245*** 9.2088*** 9.1427*** 9.2755*** 
 (0.578) (0.575) (0.573) (0.572) (0.570) (0.574) (0.558) 
        
Observations 6,616 6,616 6,616 6,616 6,616 6,616 6,616 
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R-squared 0.078 0.074 0.076 0.074 0.074 0.076 0.080 
Number of ein 2,230 2,230 2,230 2,230 2,230 2,230 2,230 
Corr 0.470 0.495 0.479 0.496 0.501 0.486 0.481 
        
log likelihood -7061 -7075 -7066 -7075 -7073 -7066 -7053 
Within 
R-squared 
0.0777 0.0738 0.0762 0.0738 0.0743 0.0762 0.0798 
Between 
R-squared 
0.435 0.464 0.452 0.466 0.470 0.463 0.451 
Overall 
R-squared 
0.396 0.417 0.407 0.419 0.421 0.414 0.411 
Rho 0.654 0.648 0.650 0.647 0.647 0.647 0.651 
        
F-Stat (11, 
2229) 
9.106*** 7.867*** 7.814*** 7.189*** 7.381*** 8.739*** 7.077*** 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
For each revenue type, Wooldridge tests find AR(1) with Prob>F≈0 and fixed effects confirmed using Hausman tests. 
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Table 49 
 
Impact of Revenue Type on Growth, Fixed Effects Analysis, Human Services Subsector 
 
 (1) (2)      (3)    (4)  (5) (6)  (7) 
VARIABLES Priv 
 Giving 
Dues Indirect Govt 
PSR 
Private 
PSR 
Govt 
Grant 
Non 
MissInc 
        
Size (lag) 0.1391*** 0.1422*** 0.1418*** 0.1425*** 0.1378*** 0.1432*** 0.1376*** 
 (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) 
Revenue  0.0075* 0.0086 0.0095** -0.0091* 0.0087* 0.0021 0.0153*** 
Type (lag) (0.005) (0.006) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) 
Revenue  -0.1626*** -0.1973 -0.1898* 0.3036*** -0.0206 0.0394 -0.1847*** 
Type % (lag) (0.063) (0.125) (0.107) (0.106) (0.053) (0.070) (0.071) 
HHI (lag) -0.0263 -0.0622 -0.0523 -0.0561 -0.0468 -0.0471 -0.0419 
 (0.053) (0.049) (0.050) (0.052) (0.056) (0.053) (0.049) 
UBI (lag) 0.1542*** 0.1493** 0.1505*** 0.1541*** 0.1518*** 0.1516*** 0.1421** 
 (0.059) (0.058) (0.058) (0.058) (0.058) (0.058) (0.059) 
Fixed Cost  0.4370*** 0.4319*** 0.4336*** 0.4338*** 0.4025*** 0.4358*** 0.4205*** 
Ratio (lag) (0.095) (0.097) (0.097) (0.096) (0.093) (0.096) (0.098) 
UNA (lag) 0.0124*** 0.0125*** 0.0124*** 0.0125*** 0.0124*** 0.0124*** 0.0118*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Age -0.0167 -0.0167 -0.0165 -0.0164 -0.0173 -0.0163 -0.0179 
 (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) 
FY2001 0.0387 0.0400 0.0399 0.0393 0.0403 0.0399 0.0396 
 (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) 
FY2002 0.0925** 0.0945** 0.0939** 0.0935** 0.0949** 0.0943** 0.0941** 
 (0.041) (0.041) (0.041) (0.041) (0.041) (0.041) (0.041) 
FY2003 0.1285** 0.1317** 0.1306** 0.1316** 0.1308** 0.1309** 0.1341** 
 (0.057) (0.056) (0.056) (0.056) (0.056) (0.057) (0.056) 
Constant 10.0247*** 10.0118*** 10.0065*** 10.0010*** 10.0169*** 9.9737*** 9.9942*** 
 (0.288) (0.287) (0.289) (0.288) (0.289) (0.293) (0.288) 
        
Observations 23,602 23,602 23,602 23,602 23,602 23,602 23,602 
R-squared 0.059 0.058 0.059 0.059 0.059 0.059 0.060 
Number of 
ein 
7,827 7,827 7,827 7,827 7,827 7,827 7,827 
230 
 
Corr 0.418 0.426 0.429 0.421 0.404 0.429 0.396 
        
log likelihood -17715 -17725 -17722 -17722 -17719 -17724 -17705 
Within R-
squared 
0.0592 0.0584 0.0587 0.0587 0.0589 0.0586 0.0601 
Between R-
squared 
0.375 0.381 0.384 0.379 0.366 0.386 0.357 
Overall R-
squared 
0.286 0.290 0.292 0.287 0.276 0.294 0.272 
Rho 0.705 0.705 0.705 0.705 0.706 0.704 0.707 
        
F-Stat (11, 
7826) 
19.46*** 18.48*** 18.50*** 18.83*** 18.22*** 18.08*** 21.17*** 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
For each revenue type, Wooldridge tests find AR(1) with Prob>F≈0 and fixed effects confirmed using Hausman test. 
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Table 50 
 
Impact of Revenue Type on Growth, Fixed Effects Analysis, Public Subsector 
 
    (1)   (2) (3)      (4)      (5)     (6)  (7) 
VARIABLES Priv  
Giving 
Dues Indirect Govt 
PSR 
Private 
PSR 
Govt 
Grant 
Non 
MissInc 
        
Size (lag) 0.0677* 0.0678* 0.0667* 0.0682* 0.0666* 0.0675* 0.0656 
 (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.041) 
Revenue  0.0167** 0.0154* 0.0255*** 0.0096 0.0127** 0.0084 0.0221** 
Type (lag) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.012) (0.006) (0.006) (0.009) 
Revenue  0.0343 -0.1360 -0.3525* 0.1199 -0.2664*** -0.0634 -0.3465** 
Type % (lag) (0.108) (0.165) (0.185) (0.192) (0.095) (0.097) (0.137) 
HHI (lag) -0.1033 -0.1358 -0.0987 -0.1352 -0.1062 -0.1085 -0.0944 
 (0.103) (0.095) (0.093) (0.096) (0.100) (0.103) (0.097) 
UBI (lag) 0.0484 0.0314 0.0380 0.0372 0.0380 0.0408 0.0441 
 (0.115) (0.118) (0.118) (0.118) (0.117) (0.119) (0.114) 
Fixed Cost  0.3194 0.2986 0.2948 0.2963 0.3166 0.3151 0.3139 
Ratio (lag) (0.251) (0.250) (0.251) (0.251) (0.254) (0.251) (0.251) 
UNA (lag) 0.0325*** 0.0334*** 0.0334*** 0.0334*** 0.0330*** 0.0332*** 0.0320*** 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) 
Age 0.0517 0.0483 0.0477 0.0482 0.0493 0.0483 0.0533* 
 (0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032) 
FY2001 -0.0616 -0.0589 -0.0569 -0.0577 -0.0589 -0.0576 -0.0658 
 (0.050) (0.050) (0.050) (0.050) (0.050) (0.050) (0.050) 
FY2002 -0.0656 -0.0626 -0.0613 -0.0602 -0.0627 -0.0614 -0.0746 
 (0.082) (0.082) (0.082) (0.082) (0.082) (0.082) (0.082) 
FY2003 -0.1077 -0.1002 -0.0995 -0.0963 -0.0995 -0.0993 -0.1138 
 (0.113) (0.113) (0.114) (0.113) (0.113) (0.113) (0.113) 
Constant 10.3354*** 10.5210*** 10.5056*** 10.5236*** 10.5143*** 10.5008*** 10.4197*** 
 (0.512) (0.503) (0.505) (0.503) (0.501) (0.499) (0.499) 
        
Observations 9,197 9,197 9,197 9,197 9,197 9,197 9,197 
R-squared 0.025 0.023 0.024 0.023 0.023 0.023 0.026 
Number of 
ein 
3,104 3,104 3,104 3,104 3,104 3,104 3,104 
232 
 
Corr 0.0607 0.0913 0.0886 0.0969 0.0956 0.104 0.0508 
        
log likelihood -9740 -9750 -9744 -9750 -9747 -9750 -9735 
Within R-
squared 
0.0248 0.0227 0.0239 0.0227 0.0233 0.0226 0.0258 
Between R-
squared 
0.0990 0.114 0.110 0.116 0.115 0.120 0.102 
Overall R-
squared 
0.0719 0.0816 0.0805 0.0832 0.0839 0.0865 0.0731 
Rho 0.696 0.693 0.694 0.693 0.693 0.693 0.695 
        
F-Stat (11, 
3103) 
***4.407 ***4.697 ***5.272 ***4.520 ***4.915 ***4.689 ***4.614 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
For each revenue type, Wooldridge tests find AR(1) with Prob>F≈0 and fixed effects confirmed using Hausman tests. 
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Table 51 
 
Impact of Revenue Type on Growth, Fixed Effects Analysis, Education (w/o Higher Ed) Subsector 
 
 (1) (2) (3)   (4)  (5) (6)  (7) 
VARIABLES Priv  
Giving 
Dues Indirect Govt 
PSR 
Private 
PSR 
Govt 
Grant 
Non 
MissInc 
        
Size (lag) 0.0784* 0.0800** 0.0810** 0.0808** 0.0765* 0.0787* 0.0759* 
 (0.040) (0.040) (0.040) (0.040) (0.041) (0.041) (0.041) 
Revenue  0.0083 0.0100* 0.0018 -0.0011 0.0157** 0.0131* 0.0159* 
Type (lag) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.011) (0.008) (0.007) (0.009) 
Revenue  -0.0421 -0.3106** 0.0515 0.0570 -0.0613 -0.0511 -0.2724 
Type % (lag) (0.102) (0.128) (0.175) (0.181) (0.098) (0.136) (0.170) 
HHI (lag) 0.0220 -0.0104 -0.0048 -0.0118 0.0391 0.0321 0.0024 
 (0.141) (0.130) (0.134) (0.130) (0.134) (0.132) (0.134) 
UBI (lag) 0.0638 0.0588 0.0667 0.0671 0.0660 0.0696 0.0514 
 (0.105) (0.105) (0.105) (0.105) (0.105) (0.105) (0.106) 
Fixed Cost  0.1303 0.1373 0.1362 0.1333 0.0981 0.1406 0.0954 
Ratio (lag) (0.246) (0.246) (0.245) (0.246) (0.246) (0.245) (0.242) 
UNA (lag) 0.0271*** 0.0270*** 0.0274*** 0.0273*** 0.0265*** 0.0270*** 0.0266*** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Age 0.0317 0.0304 0.0302 0.0301 0.0287 0.0292 0.0332 
 (0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032) 
FY2001 0.0312 0.0324 0.0323 0.0326 0.0326 0.0333 0.0303 
 (0.055) (0.054) (0.055) (0.055) (0.054) (0.054) (0.054) 
FY2002 0.0635 0.0657 0.0663 0.0668 0.0660 0.0681 0.0586 
 (0.084) (0.084) (0.084) (0.084) (0.084) (0.084) (0.084) 
FY2003 0.0501 0.0545 0.0547 0.0552 0.0528 0.0571 0.0476 
 (0.113) (0.112) (0.113) (0.113) (0.112) (0.112) (0.112) 
Constant 10.4204*** 10.4838*** 10.4647*** 10.4765*** 10.4444*** 10.4522*** 10.4499*** 
 (0.503) (0.520) (0.521) (0.519) (0.513) (0.516) (0.513) 
        
Observations 6,530 6,530 6,530 6,530 6,530 6,530 6,530 
R-squared 0.036 0.036 0.036 0.036 0.037 0.037 0.038 
Number of 
ein 
2,391 2,391 2,391 2,391 2,391 2,391 2,391 
234 
 
Corr 0.146 0.163 0.162 0.165 0.206 0.184 0.109 
        
log likelihood -5901 -5900 -5901 -5902 -5898 -5899 -5894 
Within R-
squared 
0.0361 0.0362 0.0358 0.0358 0.0370 0.0366 0.0380 
Between R-
squared 
0.0985 0.106 0.105 0.107 0.133 0.124 0.0772 
Overall R-
squared 
0.0992 0.106 0.106 0.107 0.129 0.120 0.0859 
Rho 0.660 0.659 0.659 0.659 0.656 0.657 0.664 
        
F-Stat (11, 
2390) 
7.159*** 7.910*** 6.338*** 6.375*** 8.115*** 7.622*** 7.923*** 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
For each revenue type, Wooldridge tests find AR(1) with Prob>F≈0 and fixed effects confirmed using Hausman tests. 
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Table 52 
 
Impact of Revenue Type on Growth, Fixed Effects Analysis, Higher Education Subsector 
 
 (1) (2) (3)          (4)      (5)       (6)       (7) 
VARIABLES Priv  
Giving 
Dues Indirect Govt 
PSR 
Private 
PSR 
Govt 
Grant 
Non 
MissInc 
        
Size (lag) 0.0482 0.0872 0.0933 0.0903 0.0715 0.0785 0.1164 
 (0.106) (0.114) (0.096) (0.113) (0.112) (0.113) (0.140) 
Revenue  0.0308 0.0024 0.1808* 0.0479 0.0346 0.0349 -0.0085 
Type (lag) (0.052) (0.019) (0.105) (0.033) (0.054) (0.092) (0.028) 
Revenue  -0.5045 -0.0444 -2.0070 0.3558 -0.2763 0.3813 -0.4418 
Type % (lag) (0.533) (0.238) (1.394) (0.489) (0.584) (1.347) (0.583) 
HHI (lag) 0.5424 0.3617 0.5105 0.6179 0.4422 0.4324 0.3147 
 (0.868) (0.784) (0.690) (0.851) (0.801) (0.868) (0.734) 
UBI (lag) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Fixed Cost  -2.1990 -2.3836 -2.1678 -2.4429 -2.4969 -1.7517 -2.8023 
Ratio (lag) (1.660) (1.775) (1.699) (1.725) (1.731) (1.101) (1.901) 
UNA (lag) 0.0482* 0.0502* 0.0367* 0.0459 0.0493* 0.0488* 0.0488* 
 (0.028) (0.028) (0.019) (0.030) (0.026) (0.029) (0.028) 
Age 0.3567 0.4056* 0.2760 0.4577* 0.3951 0.3953 0.4135* 
 (0.261) (0.239) (0.209) (0.247) (0.238) (0.260) (0.237) 
FY2001 -0.4126 -0.4774 -0.2745 -0.5513* -0.4514 -0.4710 -0.4923* 
 (0.322) (0.290) (0.234) (0.308) (0.299) (0.307) (0.295) 
FY2002 -0.8441 -0.9455* -0.6126 -1.0611* -0.9147 -0.9531 -0.9646* 
 (0.602) (0.552) (0.489) (0.574) (0.553) (0.596) (0.542) 
FY2003 -1.1091 -1.2380 -0.7582 -1.3984* -1.2153 -1.2336 -1.2709 
 (0.849) (0.795) (0.699) (0.811) (0.780) (0.867) (0.783) 
Constant 8.4433*** 7.8420*** 8.4270*** 7.3241*** 7.9271*** 7.8535*** 7.6632*** 
 (2.494) (2.220) (2.237) (2.376) (2.199) (2.567) (2.372) 
        
Observations 196 196 196 196 196 196 196 
R-squared 0.150 0.141 0.210 0.157 0.148 0.162 0.149 
Number of 
ein 
65 65 65 65 65 65 65 
236 
 
Corr -0.825 -0.856 -0.758 -0.879 -0.847 -0.850 -0.861 
        
log likelihood -146.1 -147.1 -138.9 -145.2 -146.3 -144.7 -146.2 
Within R-
squared 
0.150 0.141 0.210 0.157 0.148 0.162 0.149 
Between R-
squared 
0.00435 0.00489 0.00809 0.00638 0.00457 0.00923 0.00478 
Overall R-
squared 
0.00647 0.00590 0.0148 0.00812 0.00722 0.0131 0.00622 
Rho 0.843 0.863 0.804 0.885 0.858 0.861 0.866 
        
F-Stat (10,64) 3.877*** 3.127*** 4.292*** 5.717*** 3.601*** 4.039*** 2.799*** 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Wooldridge tests found AR(1) only in Indirect; fixed effects were confirmed using Hausman tests for all revenue types. 
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Table 53 
 
Impact of Revenue Type on Growth, Fixed Effects Analysis, Hospitals Subsector 
 
 (1) (2) (3)        (4)       (5)        (6)       (7) 
VARIABLES Priv 
 Giving 
Dues Indirect Govt 
PSR 
Private 
PSR 
Govt 
Grant 
Non 
MissInc 
        
Size (lag)  0.0713 0.0908 0.0664 0.0712 0.0352 0.0898 0.0589 
 (0.088) (0.095) (0.101) (0.087) (0.095) (0.095) (0.085) 
Revenue  0.1260*** -0.0406 0.0768 0.1234*** 0.0563 0.0142 0.0207 
Type (lag) (0.042) (0.049) (0.052) (0.046) (0.065) (0.024) (0.028) 
Revenue  -0.2593 1.0733 -0.4952 3.9282 0.8059 0.1476 -2.1868*** 
Type % (lag) (0.615) (1.297) (1.310) (4.188) (1.205) (0.446) (0.753) 
HHI (lag) 0.2911 -0.1921 0.2016 0.2217 -0.0588 -0.0619 0.2530 
 (0.542) (0.606) (0.532) (0.435) (0.391) (0.576) (0.525) 
UBI (lag) 1.7309** 1.7322* 1.5914* 0.9994* 1.4136* 1.7705* 1.5356** 
 (0.735) (1.030) (0.842) (0.514) (0.784) (1.032) (0.689) 
Fixed Cost  0.4794 0.5386 0.2819 0.3484 0.6106 0.5378 0.4544 
Ratio (lag) (0.718) (0.764) (0.752) (0.692) (0.724) (0.768) (0.778) 
UNA (lag) 0.0704 0.0767 0.0809 0.0761 0.0732 0.0754 0.0897* 
 (0.049) (0.053) (0.057) (0.053) (0.050) (0.054) (0.053) 
Age -0.4334* -0.4485** -0.4392* -0.4154* -0.3949* -0.4470** -0.3081 
 (0.219) (0.221) (0.227) (0.216) (0.216) (0.224) (0.233) 
FY2001 0.2609 0.2380 0.2214 0.1910 0.2015 0.2292 0.1864 
 (0.316) (0.306) (0.316) (0.305) (0.305) (0.312) (0.323) 
FY2002 0.7659 0.7405 0.6948 0.6941 0.5899 0.7220 0.5339 
 (0.536) (0.535) (0.561) (0.528) (0.525) (0.543) (0.576) 
FY2003 1.2604 1.3271* 1.2827 1.2853* 1.1331 1.3180* 0.8879 
 (0.770) (0.754) (0.782) (0.746) (0.747) (0.769) (0.809) 
Constant 12.6532*** 13.3642*** 13.1856*** 13.0353*** 13.1129*** 13.2544*** 12.9501*** 
 (1.596) (1.805) (1.893) (1.704) (1.672) (1.775) (1.673) 
        
Observations 536 536 536 536 536 536 536 
R-squared 0.141 0.098 0.104 0.126 0.136 0.096 0.181 
Number of 
ein 
162 162 162 162 162 162 162 
238 
 
Corr -0.484 -0.449 -0.449 -0.424 -0.419 -0.442 -0.376 
        
log likelihood -826.1 -839.1 -837.4 -830.5 -827.6 -839.6 -813.1 
Within R-
squared 
0.141 0.0979 0.104 0.126 0.136 0.0963 0.181 
Between R-
squared 
0.0337 0.0542 0.0418 0.0506 0.0738 0.0544 0.0749 
Overall R-
squared 
0.0393 0.0525 0.0421 0.0575 0.0749 0.0528 0.0879 
Rho 0.809 0.789 0.792 0.794 0.787 0.787 0.790 
        
F-Stat (11, 
161) 
2.782*** 1.628* 1.613* 4.020*** 2.332** 2.306** 3.080*** 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Wooldridge tests found AR(1) only in Non-Mission Income and Indirect; fixed effects were confirmed using Hausman tests for all revenue types. 
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Table 54 
 
Impact of Revenue Type on Growth, Fixed Effects Analysis, “Other” Subsector 
 
 (1) (2)   (3)   (4)  (5) (6)  (7) 
VARIABLES Priv  
Giving 
Dues Indirect Govt 
PSR 
Private 
PSR 
Govt 
Grant 
Non 
MissInc 
        
Size (lag) 0.1273** 0.1212** 0.1206** 0.1205** 0.1205** 0.1192** 0.1235** 
 (0.059) (0.052) (0.052) (0.052) (0.054) (0.053) (0.052) 
Revenue  -0.0062 -0.0042 0.0170 0.0221** 0.0025 0.0163* 0.0117 
Type (lag) (0.022) (0.010) (0.011) (0.010) (0.008) (0.009) (0.008) 
Revenue  0.1893 -0.1103 -0.1210 -0.3749** -0.0395 -0.2457 -0.3620** 
Type % (lag) (0.176) (0.265) (0.179) (0.178) (0.147) (0.174) (0.167) 
HHI (lag) 0.0081 0.0849 0.1231 0.1012 0.1023 0.1454 0.0852 
 (0.134) (0.086) (0.089) (0.086) (0.091) (0.097) (0.087) 
UBI (lag) -0.0555 -0.0595 -0.0600 -0.0620 -0.0641 -0.0603 -0.0645 
 (0.119) (0.119) (0.121) (0.121) (0.121) (0.121) (0.119) 
Fixed Cost  0.8538** 0.8731** 0.8624** 0.8727** 0.8763** 0.8595** 0.8556** 
Ratio (lag) (0.347) (0.390) (0.391) (0.391) (0.381) (0.385) (0.383) 
UNA (lag) 0.0162*** 0.0160*** 0.0156*** 0.0160*** 0.0159*** 0.0158*** 0.0153*** 
 (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) 
Age -0.0432 -0.0444 -0.0463 -0.0447 -0.0442 -0.0428 -0.0411 
 (0.038) (0.038) (0.038) (0.038) (0.038) (0.038) (0.038) 
FY2001 0.0696 0.0717 0.0725 0.0724 0.0714 0.0704 0.0677 
 (0.061) (0.061) (0.061) (0.061) (0.061) (0.060) (0.061) 
FY2002 0.1075 0.1118 0.1135 0.1126 0.1109 0.1058 0.1017 
 (0.094) (0.093) (0.094) (0.094) (0.094) (0.094) (0.095) 
FY2003 0.1404 0.1450 0.1476 0.1452 0.1431 0.1373 0.1307 
 (0.128) (0.126) (0.126) (0.126) (0.126) (0.127) (0.128) 
Constant 10.2192*** 10.2932*** 10.2637*** 10.2802*** 10.2746*** 10.2433*** 10.2167*** 
 (0.542) (0.603) (0.601) (0.602) (0.597) (0.575) (0.578) 
        
Observations 5,261 5,261 5,261 5,261 5,261 5,261 5,261 
R-squared 0.032 0.031 0.032 0.031 0.031 0.032 0.034 
Number of 
ein 
1,905 1,905 1,905 1,905 1,905 1,905 1,905 
240 
 
Corr 0.131 0.146 0.145 0.149 0.155 0.170 0.163 
        
log likelihood -3759 -3763 -3760 -3762 -3764 -3759 -3754 
Within R-
squared 
0.0323 0.0307 0.0318 0.0310 0.0306 0.0323 0.0340 
Between R-
squared 
0.137 0.148 0.147 0.148 0.151 0.158 0.165 
Overall R-
squared 
0.118 0.126 0.127 0.126 0.129 0.136 0.138 
Rho 0.666 0.664 0.665 0.664 0.664 0.663 0.662 
        
F-Stat (11, 
1904) 
4.311*** 2.535*** 2.797*** 3.525*** 3.059*** 4.374*** 4.403*** 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
For each revenue type, Wooldridge tests find AR(1) with Prob>F≈0 and fixed effects confirmed using Hausman tests. 
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Appendix 2A.5: Piecewise Absorption Regressions with Fixed Effects 
 
Table 55 
 
Piecewise Absorption Regressions with Fixed Effects, Private Giving in the Arts Subsector 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
VARIABLES Priv Giving -Years -Age -UNA -Fixed Cost -UBI -HHI -GivingRat -GivingLn 
          
Size (lag) 0.0096 0.0090 0.0148 0.0164 0.0147 0.0157 0.0158 0.0167 0.0244 
 (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) 
Revenue Type  0.0243*** 0.0241*** 0.0237*** 0.0252*** 0.0243*** 0.0242*** 0.0253*** 0.0242***  
(lag) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007)  
Rev. Type % -0.0111 -0.0140 -0.0138 -0.0178 -0.0044 -0.0056 -0.0204   
(lag) (0.087) (0.087) (0.087) (0.087) (0.088) (0.088) (0.079)   
HHI (lag) -0.0116 -0.0107 -0.0175 -0.0165 -0.0334 -0.0412    
 (0.104) (0.104) (0.104) (0.104) (0.105) (0.104)    
UBI (lag) 0.1325 0.1409 0.1533 0.1661 0.1775*     
 (0.108) (0.108) (0.107) (0.108) (0.108)     
Fixed Cost  0.6778*** 0.6565*** 0.6759*** 0.7038***      
Ratio (lag) (0.172) (0.172) (0.172) (0.172)      
UNA (lag) 0.0163*** 0.0160*** 0.0165***       
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)       
Age 0.0118 0.0158*        
 (0.009) (0.008)        
FY2001 -0.0276         
 (0.032)         
FY2002 0.0615**         
 (0.028)         
FY2003 0.0307         
 (0.026)         
Constant 11.1053*** 11.1074*** 11.1448*** 11.2244*** 11.3269*** 11.3300*** 11.2981*** 11.2882*** 11.4358*** 
 (0.212) (0.209) (0.208) (0.207) (0.206) (0.206) (0.190) (0.186) (0.182) 
          
Observations 5,182 5,182 5,182 5,182 5,182 5,182 5,182 5,182 5,182 
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R-squared 0.728 0.727 0.727 0.726 0.724 0.724 0.724 0.724 0.723 
log likelihood -4098 -4105 -4107 -4117 -4129 -4132 -4132 -4132 -4142 
Adj R-squared 0.578 0.577 0.577 0.575 0.573 0.573 0.573 0.573 0.572 
F-Stat 5.500 6.453 6.873 5.982 3.815 4.090 5.402 8.072 2.443 
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 56 
 
Piecewise Absorption Regressions with Fixed Effects, Private Giving in the Health Subsector 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
VARIABLES PrivGiving -Years -Age -UNA -FixedCost -UBI -HHI -GivingRat -GivingLn 
          
Size (lag) 0.2077*** 0.2087*** 0.2084*** 0.2102*** 0.2041*** 0.2057*** 0.2058*** 0.2100*** 0.2170*** 
 (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) 
Revenue Type  0.0327*** 0.0328*** 0.0328*** 0.0365*** 0.0365*** 0.0367*** 0.0332*** 0.0273***  
(lag) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.006)  
Rev. Type % -0.1549 -0.1571 -0.1561 -0.1919* -0.1912* -0.1939** -0.1446   
(lag) (0.099) (0.098) (0.098) (0.098) (0.099) (0.099) (0.094)   
HHI (lag) 0.1868* 0.1858* 0.1858* 0.1952* 0.1790* 0.1801*    
 (0.106) (0.106) (0.106) (0.107) (0.107) (0.107)    
UBI (lag) 0.2882* 0.2902* 0.2902* 0.2752* 0.2528     
 (0.163) (0.163) (0.163) (0.163) (0.164)     
Fixed Cost  0.7037*** 0.7021*** 0.7014*** 0.6977***      
Ratio (lag) (0.176) (0.176) (0.176) (0.177)      
UNA (lag) 0.0291*** 0.0295*** 0.0294***       
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)       
Age -0.0546 -0.0015        
 (0.040) (0.009)        
FY2001 0.0604         
 (0.065)         
FY2002 0.1498         
 (0.103)         
FY2003 0.1865         
 (0.141)         
Constant 9.0875*** 8.8215*** 8.8162*** 9.0036*** 9.1644*** 9.1493*** 9.2935*** 9.2335*** 9.3570*** 
 (0.271) (0.190) (0.187) (0.185) (0.181) (0.180) (0.159) (0.154) (0.152) 
          
Observations 6,616 6,616 6,616 6,616 6,616 6,616 6,616 6,616 6,616 
R-squared 0.807 0.807 0.807 0.806 0.805 0.805 0.805 0.805 0.804 
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log likelihood -7061 -7063 -7063 -7087 -7099 -7101 -7103 -7105 -7119 
Adj R-squared 0.708 0.708 0.708 0.706 0.705 0.705 0.705 0.705 0.704 
F-Stat 33.51 45.73 52.27 55.21 62.92 78.03 103.0 153.3 286.1 
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 57 
 
Piecewise Absorption Regressions with Fixed Effects, Private Giving in the Human Services Subsector 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
VARIABLES PrivGiving -Years -Age -UNA -FixedCost -UBI -HHI -GivingRat -GivingLn 
          
Size (lag) 0.1391*** 0.1395*** 0.1452*** 0.1462*** 0.1522*** 0.1526*** 0.1528*** 0.1572*** 0.1573*** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) 
Revenue Type  0.0075** 0.0076** 0.0076** 0.0083*** 0.0072** 0.0072** 0.0080*** 0.0011  
(lag) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002)  
Rev. Type % -0.1626*** -0.1640*** -0.1778*** -0.1787*** -0.1721*** -0.1711*** -0.1800***   
(lag) (0.041) (0.041) (0.041) (0.041) (0.041) (0.041) (0.040)   
HHI (lag) -0.0263 -0.0252 -0.0216 -0.0252 -0.0358 -0.0377    
 (0.040) (0.040) (0.040) (0.040) (0.040) (0.040)    
UBI (lag) 0.1542** 0.1525** 0.1605** 0.1675** 0.1709***     
 (0.066) (0.066) (0.066) (0.066) (0.066)     
Fixed Cost  0.4370*** 0.4363*** 0.4424*** 0.4444***      
Ratio (lag) (0.061) (0.061) (0.061) (0.061)      
UNA (lag) 0.0124*** 0.0125*** 0.0128***       
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)       
Age -0.0167 0.0194***        
 (0.016) (0.004)        
FY2001 0.0387         
 (0.026)         
FY2002 0.0925**         
 (0.040)         
FY2003 0.1285**         
 (0.055)         
Constant 10.0247*** 9.8542*** 9.9067*** 9.9812*** 10.0155*** 10.0139*** 9.9810*** 9.9209*** 9.9266*** 
 (0.104) (0.076) (0.076) (0.075) (0.075) (0.075) (0.066) (0.065) (0.064) 
          
Observations 23,602 23,602 23,602 23,602 23,602 23,602 23,602 23,602 23,602 
R-squared 0.787 0.787 0.786 0.786 0.785 0.785 0.785 0.785 0.785 
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log likelihood -17715 -17721 -17742 -17772 -17812 -17817 -17818 -17833 -17833 
Adj R-squared 0.681 0.681 0.680 0.679 0.678 0.678 0.678 0.678 0.678 
F-Stat 90.21 123.1 136.3 151.9 171.1 212.2 282.6 413.5 826.9 
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 58 
 
Piecewise Absorption Regressions with Fixed Effects, Private Giving in the Public Subsector 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
VARIABLES PrivGiving -Years -Age -UNA -FixedCost -UBI -HHI -GivingRat -GivingLn 
          
Size (lag) 0.0677*** 0.0676*** 0.0735*** 0.0776*** 0.0761*** 0.0763*** 0.0761*** 0.0772*** 0.0799*** 
 (0.012) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
Revenue Type  0.0167*** 0.0166*** 0.0163*** 0.0192*** 0.0188*** 0.0188*** 0.0220*** 0.0207***  
(lag) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005)  
Rev. Type % 0.0343 0.0338 0.0294 0.0139 0.0139 0.0124 -0.0295   
(lag) (0.079) (0.079) (0.079) (0.080) (0.080) (0.080) (0.075)   
HHI (lag) -0.1033 -0.1017 -0.1060 -0.1281 -0.1332 -0.1339    
 (0.090) (0.090) (0.090) (0.091) (0.091) (0.091)    
UBI (lag) 0.0484 0.0478 0.0560 0.0786 0.0741     
 (0.131) (0.131) (0.131) (0.132) (0.132)     
Fixed Cost  0.3194* 0.3206* 0.3612** 0.3675**      
Ratio (lag) (0.165) (0.165) (0.165) (0.165)      
UNA (lag) 0.0325*** 0.0326*** 0.0337***       
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)       
Age 0.0159 0.0234***        
 (0.011) (0.008)        
FY2001 -0.0359         
 (0.039)         
FY2002 -0.0257         
 (0.027)         
FY2003 0.0061         
 (0.025)         
Constant 10.5079*** 10.4537*** 10.5228*** 10.7454*** 10.7968*** 10.7971*** 10.6892*** 10.6735*** 10.8219*** 
Size (lag) (0.169) (0.161) (0.159) (0.158) (0.156) (0.156) (0.138) (0.132) (0.128) 
          
Observations 9,197 9,197 9,197 9,197 9,197 9,197 9,197 9,197 9,197 
R-squared 0.755 0.755 0.755 0.752 0.752 0.752 0.752 0.752 0.751 
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log likelihood -9740 -9741 -9748 -9795 -9799 -9799 -9801 -9801 -9816 
Adj R-squared 0.630 0.630 0.629 0.625 0.625 0.625 0.625 0.625 0.624 
F-Stat 14.07 19.15 20.63 13.39 15.07 18.76 24.28 36.34 53.04 
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 59 
 
Piecewise Absorption Regressions with Fixed Effects, Private Giving in the Education (without Higher Ed) Subsector 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
VARIABLES PrivGiving -Years -Age -UNA -FixedCost -UBI -HHI -GivingRat -GivingLn 
          
Size (lag) 0.0784*** 0.0779*** 0.0920*** 0.0958*** 0.0963*** 0.0966*** 0.0966*** 0.0993*** 0.1006*** 
 (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.011) (0.011) 
Revenue Type  0.0083 0.0084 0.0080 0.0100 0.0101 0.0101 0.0101 0.0067  
(lag) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006)  
Rev. Type % -0.0421 -0.0436 -0.0674 -0.0733 -0.0728 -0.0721 -0.0721   
(lag) (0.086) (0.086) (0.086) (0.087) (0.087) (0.087) (0.082)   
HHI (lag) 0.0220 0.0156 0.0095 0.0031 0.0004 0.0001    
 (0.103) (0.102) (0.103) (0.103) (0.103) (0.103)    
UBI (lag) 0.0638 0.0660 0.0770 0.0870 0.0866     
 (0.137) (0.137) (0.137) (0.138) (0.138)     
Fixed Cost  0.1303 0.1307 0.1938 0.1652      
Ratio (lag) (0.194) (0.194) (0.194) (0.195)      
UNA (lag) 0.0271*** 0.0270*** 0.0293***       
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)       
Age 0.0317 0.0475***        
 (0.038) (0.009)        
FY2001 0.0312         
 (0.061)         
FY2002 0.0635         
 (0.096)         
FY2003 0.0501         
 (0.133)         
Constant 10.4204*** 10.3798*** 10.4765*** 10.6254*** 10.6311*** 10.6294*** 10.6294*** 10.5939*** 10.6386*** 
 (0.215) (0.168) (0.168) (0.167) (0.167) (0.167) (0.144) (0.138) (0.133) 
          
Observations 6,530 6,530 6,530 6,530 6,530 6,530 6,530 6,530 6,530 
R-squared 0.768 0.768 0.766 0.764 0.764 0.764 0.764 0.764 0.764 
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log likelihood -5901 -5902 -5924 -5957 -5958 -5958 -5958 -5959 -5960 
Adj R-squared 0.633 0.633 0.631 0.627 0.627 0.627 0.627 0.627 0.627 
F-Stat 14.04 19.14 17.64 13.47 16.02 19.93 26.58 39.49 77.68 
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 60 
 
Piecewise Absorption Regressions with Fixed Effects, Private Giving in the Higher Education Subsector 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
VARIABLES PrivGiving -Years -Age -UNA -FixedCost -UBI -HHI -GivingRat -GivingLn 
          
Size (lag) 0.0482 0.0298 0.0305 0.0381 0.0500 0.0500 0.0586 0.1211** 0.1202** 
 (0.071) (0.070) (0.070) (0.070) (0.070) (0.070) (0.070) (0.061) (0.060) 
Revenue Type  0.0308 0.0386 0.0443 0.0536 0.0565 0.0565 0.0389 -0.0036  
(lag) (0.038) (0.037) (0.036) (0.036) (0.037) (0.037) (0.035) (0.025)  
Rev. Type % -0.5045 -0.6695 -0.7756* -0.8205* -0.9026** -0.9026** -0.7051*   
(lag) (0.448) (0.438) (0.425) (0.429) (0.429) (0.429) (0.407)   
HHI (lag) 0.5424 0.4670 0.5315 0.6299 0.6751 0.6751    
 (0.483) (0.475) (0.470) (0.473) (0.475) (0.475)    
UBI (lag) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000     
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)     
Fixed Cost  -2.1990* -2.0379* -1.9948* -1.8207      
Ratio (lag) (1.129) (1.131) (1.130) (1.140)      
UNA (lag) 0.0482** 0.0435** 0.0419**       
 (0.021) (0.021) (0.021)       
Age 0.0794* 0.0430        
 (0.048) (0.043)        
FY2001 0.2773*         
 (0.147)         
FY2002 0.1419         
 (0.146)         
FY2003 -0.0123         
 (0.142)         
Constant 9.9272*** 10.5905*** 10.8597*** 10.9724*** 10.6490*** 10.6490*** 11.1126*** 10.4045*** 10.3896*** 
 (0.986) (0.932) (0.891) (0.900) (0.882) (0.882) (0.823) (0.720) (0.710) 
          
Observations 196 196 196 196 196 196 196 196 196 
R-squared 0.708 0.698 0.695 0.685 0.679 0.679 0.674 0.666 0.666 
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log likelihood -146.1 -149.4 -150.1 -153.3 -155.2 -155.2 -156.8 -159.0 -159.0 
Adj R-squared 0.529 0.524 0.525 0.513 0.507 0.507 0.503 0.496 0.499 
F-Stat 2.131 2.438 2.682 2.355 2.278 2.278 2.346 1.988 3.985 
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 61 
 
Piecewise Absorption Regressions with Fixed Effects, Private Giving in the Hospital Subsector 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
VARIABLES PrivGiving -Years -Age -UNA -FixedCost -UBI -HHI -GivingRat -GivingLn 
          
Size (lag) 0.0713 0.0655 0.0661 0.0852* 0.0836* 0.0948** 0.0953** 0.1034** 0.1235*** 
 (0.043) (0.043) (0.044) (0.043) (0.043) (0.044) (0.044) (0.043) (0.043) 
Revenue Type  0.1260*** 0.1287*** 0.1306*** 0.1408*** 0.1441*** 0.1476*** 0.1418*** 0.1279***  
(lag) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.032) (0.027)  
Rev. Type % -0.2593 -0.1516 -0.1662 -0.3997 -0.4886 -0.6699 -0.5696   
(lag) (0.676) (0.676) (0.678) (0.679) (0.677) (0.679) (0.664)   
HHI (lag) 0.2911 0.3788 0.3934 0.2768 0.3017 0.3746    
 (0.517) (0.514) (0.516) (0.519) (0.519) (0.523)    
UBI (lag) 1.7309*** 1.6830*** 1.7243*** 1.6977*** 1.5101***     
 (0.572) (0.573) (0.575) (0.580) (0.565)     
Fixed Cost  0.4794 0.6415 0.8007 1.0262      
Ratio (lag) (0.721) (0.719) (0.717) (0.719)      
UNA (lag) 0.0704*** 0.0696*** 0.0714***       
 (0.026) (0.026) (0.026)       
Age -0.4334** -0.0969*        
 (0.208) (0.050)        
FY2001 0.2609         
 (0.343)         
FY2002 0.7659         
 (0.538)         
FY2003 1.2604*         
 (0.740)         
Constant 12.6532*** 10.6195*** 9.8517*** 10.3443*** 10.4474*** 10.3499*** 10.6588*** 10.4956*** 10.8186*** 
 (1.401) (0.822) (0.722) (0.706) (0.703) (0.708) (0.561) (0.528) (0.538) 
          
Observations 536 536 536 536 536 536 536 536 536 
R-squared 0.823 0.820 0.819 0.815 0.814 0.810 0.810 0.810 0.799 
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log likelihood -826.1 -830.1 -832.8 -838.3 -839.8 -844.9 -845.3 -845.8 -861.0 
Adj R-squared 0.739 0.738 0.736 0.731 0.730 0.726 0.726 0.726 0.711 
F-Stat 5.401 6.708 7.080 6.871 7.816 7.855 10.32 15.12 8.067 
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 62 
 
Piecewise Absorption Regressions with Fixed Effects, Private Giving in the “Other” Subsector 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
VARIABLES PrivGiving -Years -Age -UNA -FixedCost -UBI -HHI -GivingRat -GivingLn 
          
Size (lag) 0.1273*** 0.1272*** 0.1259*** 0.1291*** 0.1265*** 0.1263*** 0.1263*** 0.1175*** 0.1181*** 
 (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.014) (0.014) 
Revenue Type  -0.0062 -0.0062 -0.0061 -0.0051 -0.0079 -0.0080 -0.0077 0.0027  
(lag) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.006)  
Rev. Type % 0.1893** 0.1907** 0.1908** 0.1818** 0.2024** 0.2037** 0.2002***   
(lag) (0.081) (0.081) (0.081) (0.081) (0.081) (0.081) (0.073)   
HHI (lag) 0.0081 0.0107 0.0127 0.0134 -0.0107 -0.0095    
 (0.094) (0.094) (0.094) (0.094) (0.094) (0.094)    
UBI (lag) -0.0555 -0.0572 -0.0601 -0.0619 -0.0567     
 (0.110) (0.110) (0.110) (0.110) (0.110)     
Fixed Cost  0.8538*** 0.8481*** 0.8405*** 0.8638***      
Ratio (lag) (0.194) (0.194) (0.194) (0.194)      
UNA (lag) 0.0162*** 0.0162*** 0.0160***       
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)       
Age -0.0432 -0.0040        
 (0.034) (0.008)        
FY2001 0.0696         
 (0.055)         
FY2002 0.1075         
 (0.086)         
FY2003 0.1404         
 (0.119)         
Constant 10.2192*** 10.0600*** 10.0509*** 10.1215*** 10.2526*** 10.2525*** 10.2454*** 10.3622*** 10.3797*** 
 (0.240) (0.194) (0.193) (0.192) (0.191) (0.191) (0.177) (0.172) (0.168) 
          
Observations 5,261 5,261 5,261 5,261 5,261 5,261 5,261 5,261 5,261 
R-squared 0.758 0.758 0.758 0.757 0.755 0.755 0.755 0.755 0.755 
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log likelihood -3759 -3760 -3761 -3771 -3787 -3787 -3787 -3793 -3793 
Adj R-squared 0.619 0.619 0.619 0.618 0.616 0.616 0.616 0.615 0.615 
F-Stat 10.14 13.74 15.67 15.97 15.10 18.82 25.09 33.85 67.53 
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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APPENDIX F: FULL ESTIMATION RESULTS, MODEL 2 (DYNAMIC BY REVENUE TYPE) 
 
Table 63 
 
Impact of Revenue Type on Growth, Dynamic Analysis by Revenue Type, Arts Subsector 
 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
VARIABLES Priv Giving Dues Indirect G&M PSR Priv PSR Gov Grant NMI 
        
Size (lag) 0.2703*** 0.2784*** 0.2599*** 0.2939*** 0.2845*** 0.2943*** 0.2792*** 
 (0.062) (0.061) (0.068) (0.094) (0.062) (0.068) (0.069) 
Revenue Type 0.0377 0.0133 0.0402 0.0036 0.0469** 0.0299 0.0423* 
 (0.027) (0.017) (0.028) (0.039) (0.019) (0.020) (0.022) 
Revenue Type % -0.1291 -1.2500*** -0.5697 -0.2115 -0.3551 -0.4317 -1.1011*** 
 (0.280) (0.482) (0.847) (0.678) (0.275) (0.503) (0.366) 
HHI 0.2158 0.0373 -0.2387 -0.0147 0.1819 0.5190 0.2155 
 (0.354) (0.383) (0.389) (0.405) (0.373) (0.371) (0.370) 
UBI 0.0956 0.1508 0.2149 0.1242 0.0443 0.2239 -0.0309 
 (0.187) (0.170) (0.207) (0.250) (0.188) (0.210) (0.191) 
Fixed Cost Ratio (lag) 0.0536 -0.1038 -0.0512 -0.0770 0.0726 0.0331 0.0397 
 (0.294) (0.301) (0.320) (0.408) (0.291) (0.314) (0.295) 
UNA (lag) 0.0094 0.0121 0.0118 0.0068 0.0136* 0.0126 0.0092 
 (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
Date of Exemption 0.0040*** 0.0042*** 0.0044*** 0.0041*** 0.0040*** 0.0039*** 0.0041*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
FY2000 -0.0217 -0.0108 -0.0080 0.0009 0.0007 0.0022 0.0034 
 (0.026) (0.028) (0.029) (0.039) (0.026) (0.027) (0.030) 
FY2001 0.0216 0.0334 0.0288 0.0412 0.0172 0.0488* 0.0280 
 (0.026) (0.028) (0.028) (0.032) (0.025) (0.026) (0.030) 
FY2002 -0.0066 -0.0012 0.0021 -0.0028 -0.0202 0.0057 0.0076 
 (0.028) (0.029) (0.031) (0.035) (0.028) (0.029) (0.032) 
FY2003 -0.0358 -0.0289 -0.0237 -0.0253 -0.0441 -0.0224 -0.0157 
 (0.031) (0.031) (0.033) (0.040) (0.030) (0.030) (0.037) 
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Observations 5,228 5,228 5,228 5,228 5,228 5,228 5,228 
Number of ein 1,842 1,842 1,842 1,842 1,842 1,842 1,842 
        
Hansen J 94.09 101.1 88.66 84.65 90.53 93.37 92.56 
Hansen DF 91 91 91 91 91 91 91 
Hansen P-Val 0.391 0.221 0.550 0.667 0.494 0.412 0.435 
        
AR(2) P-Val 0.123 0.131 0.125 0.122 0.118 0.145 0.126 
Wald 615229 561880 561889 548271 610950 601928 525006 
Wald P-Val 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Robust errors adjusted using Windmeijer’s finite-sample correction. 
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Table 64 
 
Impact of Revenue Type on Growth, Dynamic Analysis by Revenue Type, Human Services Subsector 
 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
VARIABLES Priv Giving Dues Indirect G&M PSR Priv PSR Gov Grant NMI 
        
Size (lag) 0.3286*** 0.3171*** 0.3274*** 0.3099*** 0.3270*** 0.3349*** 0.3235*** 
 (0.025) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.026) (0.026) (0.028) 
Revenue Type 0.1185*** 0.0291* 0.0119 -0.0115 0.0808*** 0.0553*** 0.0447*** 
 (0.012) (0.015) (0.012) (0.016) (0.013) (0.014) (0.012) 
Revenue Type % -0.9285*** -0.5432 0.2227 0.3410 -1.0715*** -0.0838 -0.8399*** 
 (0.167) (0.337) (0.367) (0.333) (0.156) (0.229) (0.163) 
HHI 0.6241*** 0.1599 0.1667 0.0670 0.7913*** 0.6626*** 0.2496 
 (0.199) (0.189) (0.191) (0.162) (0.216) (0.235) (0.194) 
UBI 0.4150** 0.4028** 0.4089** 0.4818*** 0.3604** 0.4343** 0.4157** 
 (0.202) (0.163) (0.170) (0.159) (0.160) (0.185) (0.181) 
Fixed Cost Ratio (lag) 0.3063** 0.1743 0.2112* 0.1005 0.1490 0.3247** 0.0823 
 (0.129) (0.126) (0.124) (0.122) (0.125) (0.136) (0.127) 
UNA (lag) 0.0032 0.0114*** 0.0117*** 0.0092** 0.0117*** 0.0089** 0.0071* 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Date of Exemption 0.0035*** 0.0039*** 0.0038*** 0.0040*** 0.0036*** 0.0035*** 0.0038*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
FY2000 -0.0122 -0.0168* -0.0138 -0.0185* -0.0047 -0.0109 -0.0181* 
 (0.011) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
FY2001 0.0005 -0.0061 -0.0009 -0.0077 0.0090 0.0048 -0.0076 
 (0.012) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.012) (0.011) 
FY2002 -0.0119 -0.0019 -0.0015 -0.0027 0.0113 -0.0044 0.0009 
 (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.012) (0.012) (0.013) (0.014) 
FY2003 0.0004 0.0172 0.0187 0.0125 0.0139 0.0128 0.0315** 
 (0.014) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.014) (0.016) 
        
Observations 23,727 23,727 23,727 23,727 23,727 23,727 23,727 
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Number of ein 7,820 7,820 7,820 7,820 7,820 7,820 7,820 
        
Hansen J 182.4 236.9 233.5 243.2 229.5 211.5 242.4 
Hansen DF 91 91 91 91 91 91 91 
Hansen P-Val 4.47e-08 0 0 0 0 0 0 
        
AR(2) P-Val 0.335 0.389 0.398 0.387 0.421 0.383 0.403 
Wald 2.314e+06 2.242e+06 2.256e+06 2.216e+06 2.349e+06 2.135e+06 2.175e+06 
Wald P-Val 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Robust errors adjusted using Windmeijer’s finite-sample correction. 
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Table 65 
 
Impact of Revenue Type on Growth, Dynamic Analysis by Revenue Type, Health Subsector 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
VARIABLES Priv Giving Dues Indirect G&M PSR Priv PSR Gov Grant NMI 
        
Size (lag) 0.5333*** 0.5643*** 0.5626*** 0.5675*** 0.5271*** 0.5167*** 0.5405*** 
 (0.056) (0.056) (0.055) (0.057) (0.053) (0.056) (0.055) 
Revenue Type 0.1303*** 0.0411* 0.0429** 0.1052** 0.1585*** 0.1154*** 0.0787*** 
 (0.023) (0.025) (0.020) (0.051) (0.024) (0.022) (0.028) 
Revenue Type % -0.8502*** -0.1287 -0.4333 -1.3843* -1.8601*** -0.7457* -1.7743*** 
 (0.267) (0.546) (0.552) (0.782) (0.333) (0.385) (0.437) 
HHI 1.3447*** 0.9433*** 0.9254** 0.9930*** 1.9003*** 1.2958*** 1.1376*** 
 (0.404) (0.340) (0.381) (0.347) (0.434) (0.385) (0.370) 
UBI -0.2463 0.1333 0.2436 0.0160 0.0721 0.3070 0.0066 
 (0.577) (0.522) (0.593) (0.484) (0.431) (0.497) (0.426) 
Fixed Cost Ratio (lag) 0.9190** 0.7631** 0.7310** 0.7445** 0.5314* 0.6962** 0.5776 
 (0.376) (0.367) (0.366) (0.373) (0.300) (0.344) (0.386) 
UNA (lag) 0.0223** 0.0265*** 0.0256** 0.0302*** 0.0282*** 0.0245** 0.0315*** 
 (0.009) (0.010) (0.010) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.011) 
Date of Exemption 0.0019*** 0.0021*** 0.0021*** 0.0021*** 0.0018*** 0.0022*** 0.0021*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
FY2000 -0.0131 0.0139 0.0095 0.0011 0.0054 -0.0174 -0.0239 
 (0.037) (0.035) (0.036) (0.039) (0.040) (0.037) (0.037) 
FY2001 -0.0518 -0.0153 -0.0283 -0.0290 -0.0325 -0.0375 -0.0765** 
 (0.035) (0.035) (0.034) (0.038) (0.039) (0.035) (0.036) 
FY2002 -0.0561 -0.0188 -0.0295 -0.0174 -0.0366 -0.0592 -0.0802* 
 (0.039) (0.037) (0.037) (0.039) (0.041) (0.037) (0.041) 
FY2003 -0.0723* -0.0429 -0.0580 -0.0504 -0.0746* -0.0747* -0.0798* 
 (0.040) (0.039) (0.039) (0.040) (0.042) (0.039) (0.046) 
        
Observations 6,666 6,666 6,666 6,666 6,666 6,666 6,666 
Number of ein 2,230 2,230 2,230 2,230 2,230 2,230 2,230 
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Hansen J 161.1 160.2 164.9 160.6 153.8 149.5 175.1 
Hansen DF 91 91 91 91 91 91 91 
Hansen P-Val 8.43e-06 1.03e-05 3.48e-06 9.46e-06 4.36e-05 0.000108 2.84e-07 
        
AR(2) P-Val 0.281 0.240 0.238 0.237 0.260 0.293 0.230 
Wald 478569 512987 501592 500379 457274 435258 419055 
Wald P-Val 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Robust errors adjusted using Windmeijer’s finite-sample correction. 
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Table 66 
 
Impact of Revenue Type on Growth, Dynamic Analysis by Revenue Type, Public Subsector 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
VARIABLES Priv Giving Dues Indirect G&M PSR Priv PSR Gov Grant NMI 
        
Size (lag) 0.2584*** 0.2790*** 0.3120*** 0.2687*** 0.3134*** 0.2919*** 0.2763*** 
 (0.052) (0.047) (0.044) (0.047) (0.047) (0.044) (0.050) 
Revenue Type 0.0736*** 0.0427** 0.0162 0.0322 0.0629*** 0.0651*** 0.0500** 
 (0.025) (0.022) (0.021) (0.038) (0.015) (0.019) (0.023) 
Revenue Type % -0.4684 -1.2440 0.3151 -0.4300 -0.6521** -0.4311 -0.9361*** 
 (0.299) (0.917) (0.563) (0.523) (0.261) (0.319) (0.310) 
HHI -0.0336 -0.3438 -0.0998 -0.7173* -0.1185 0.3133 0.0992 
 (0.391) (0.345) (0.361) (0.372) (0.366) (0.395) (0.356) 
UBI 0.5025 0.5759 0.5604 0.5077 0.4877 0.6682* 0.6314* 
 (0.344) (0.384) (0.386) (0.400) (0.371) (0.371) (0.371) 
Fixed Cost Ratio (lag) 0.1199 0.0203 0.1320 -0.1418 0.0428 -0.0515 -0.2461 
 (0.333) (0.278) (0.269) (0.313) (0.270) (0.273) (0.321) 
UNA (lag) 0.0224*** 0.0232*** 0.0225*** 0.0232*** 0.0284*** 0.0223*** 0.0224*** 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
Date of Exemption 0.0041*** 0.0043*** 0.0040*** 0.0045*** 0.0039*** 0.0039*** 0.0041*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
FY2000 0.0292 0.0286 0.0418 0.0240 0.0465* 0.0296 0.0314 
 (0.026) (0.025) (0.027) (0.028) (0.026) (0.026) (0.027) 
FY2001 0.0252 0.0267 0.0264 0.0213 0.0244 0.0203 0.0160 
 (0.027) (0.025) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.026) (0.028) 
FY2002 0.0349 0.0346 0.0286 0.0300 0.0335 0.0130 0.0209 
 (0.030) (0.028) (0.030) (0.030) (0.029) (0.028) (0.031) 
FY2003 0.0102 0.0098 0.0066 0.0075 0.0124 -0.0126 0.0022 
 (0.032) (0.030) (0.032) (0.031) (0.031) (0.030) (0.034) 
        
Observations 9,228 9,228 9,228 9,228 9,228 9,228 9,228 
Number of ein 3,104 3,104 3,104 3,104 3,104 3,104 3,104 
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Hansen J 100.3 101.0 104.5 99.73 110.0 87.11 112.8 
Hansen DF 91 91 91 91 91 91 91 
Hansen P-Val 0.236 0.222 0.157 0.249 0.0854 0.596 0.0605 
        
AR(2) P-Val 0.304 0.253 0.212 0.247 0.216 0.234 0.265 
Wald 480742 588005 614729 579949 612965 620390 551109 
Wald P-Val 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Robust errors adjusted using Windmeijer’s finite-sample correction. 
265 
 
Table 67 
 
Impact of Revenue Type on Growth, Dynamic Analysis by Revenue Type, Education (without Higher Ed) Subsector 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
VARIABLES Priv Giving Dues Indirect G&M PSR Priv PSR Gov Grant NMI 
        
Size (lag) 0.3179*** 0.3184*** 0.3140*** 0.3340*** 0.3147*** 0.2718*** 0.3224*** 
 (0.054) (0.051) (0.052) (0.080) (0.043) (0.051) (0.054) 
Revenue Type 0.1256*** 0.0343** 0.0368 0.0418 0.0956*** 0.0700*** 0.0644*** 
 (0.030) (0.017) (0.024) (0.058) (0.021) (0.025) (0.023) 
Revenue Type % -1.1884*** -0.9271*** -0.5818 -0.1157 -0.7290*** -0.0800 -1.1147*** 
 (0.272) (0.339) (0.798) (1.920) (0.272) (0.494) (0.319) 
HHI 1.1474** 0.5300 0.5462 0.5831 0.7662** 0.8271** 0.8755** 
 (0.451) (0.348) (0.353) (1.068) (0.380) (0.405) (0.373) 
UBI 0.3845 0.1605 0.1180 0.4533 0.3517 0.2575 0.3102 
 (0.535) (0.283) (0.386) (1.063) (0.534) (0.564) (0.386) 
Fixed Cost Ratio (lag) 0.7211* 0.7497* 0.5590 0.5865 0.5719 0.7175* 0.8863** 
 (0.426) (0.437) (0.421) (0.979) (0.399) (0.412) (0.391) 
UNA (lag) 0.0251*** 0.0286*** 0.0328*** 0.0302 0.0273*** 0.0221*** 0.0245*** 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.019) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
Date of Exemption 0.0032*** 0.0037*** 0.0037*** 0.0036*** 0.0035*** 0.0038*** 0.0034*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
FY2000 0.0202 0.0329 0.0237 -0.0017 0.0136 0.0331 0.0205 
 (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.094) (0.027) (0.028) (0.029) 
FY2001 0.0225 0.0311 0.0259 0.0303 0.0158 0.0536* 0.0194 
 (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.079) (0.030) (0.032) (0.032) 
FY2002 0.0087 0.0259 0.0282 0.0226 0.0079 0.0352 0.0258 
 (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.059) (0.030) (0.033) (0.035) 
FY2003 0.0042 0.0212 0.0128 -0.0033 -0.0202 0.0374 0.0063 
 (0.033) (0.032) (0.033) (0.101) (0.032) (0.035) (0.040) 
        
Observations 6,558 6,558 6,558 6,558 6,558 6,558 6,558 
Number of ein 2,388 2,388 2,388 2,388 2,388 2,388 2,388 
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Hansen J 124.0 128.8 128.3 143.5 116.2 129.9 126.6 
Hansen DF 91 91 91 91 91 91 91 
Hansen P-Val 0.0123 0.00559 0.00612 0.000375 0.0384 0.00468 0.00811 
        
AR(2) P-Val 0.655 0.571 0.619 0.579 0.583 0.721 0.538 
Wald 497922 481687 488746 403514 458748 466002 439835 
Wald P-Val 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Robust errors adjusted using Windmeijer’s finite-sample correction. 
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Table 68 
 
Impact of Revenue Type on Growth, Dynamic Analysis by Revenue Type, Higher Education Subsector 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
VARIABLES Priv Giving Dues Indirect G&M PSR Priv PSR Gov Grant NMI 
        
Size (lag) 0.1956 0.2774* 0.2669* 0.3406* 0.2162 0.2732 0.2590 
 (0.127) (0.168) (0.142) (0.178) (0.205) (0.239) (0.184) 
Revenue Type 0.0935* 0.0165 0.0548 0.0053 0.1771** 0.2264 -0.0017 
 (0.053) (0.022) (0.157) (0.086) (0.081) (0.240) (0.038) 
Revenue Type % -1.6489** -0.6956 0.2771 -3.0168 -1.6734** -1.7295 0.0159 
 (0.700) (0.814) (1.396) (2.110) (0.811) (3.064) (0.641) 
HHI 1.5766* 0.7298** 1.0831 0.1743 1.5104 -0.0395 0.3975 
 (0.871) (0.362) (0.719) (0.572) (0.935) (0.814) (0.576) 
UBI 1.3289 1.0742 1.7588* 0.8759 -0.2233 1.2954 0.8330 
 (0.990) (0.923) (0.907) (1.139) (0.990) (1.184) (1.219) 
Fixed Cost Ratio (lag) -0.1140 -0.8931 -0.6840 0.1611 -0.2071 0.9694 0.7692 
 (3.188) (1.841) (2.851) (0.854) (1.128) (2.502) (1.149) 
UNA (lag) 0.0492 0.0224 0.0538 0.0198 0.0525 0.0267 0.0317 
 (0.032) (0.052) (0.035) (0.030) (0.045) (0.023) (0.032) 
Date of Exemption 0.0039*** 0.0039*** 0.0036*** 0.0037*** 0.0035*** 0.0040*** 0.0040*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
FY2000 0.3354 0.2814 0.3133 0.2848 0.3962* 0.2308 0.2748 
 (0.230) (0.293) (0.224) (0.207) (0.223) (0.163) (0.225) 
FY2001 0.1532 0.1264 0.0968 0.0995 0.2084 0.0577 0.1265 
 (0.173) (0.176) (0.197) (0.177) (0.197) (0.198) (0.249) 
FY2002 0.0741 0.0358 0.0904 0.0948 0.0833 0.1384 0.1020 
 (0.157) (0.221) (0.211) (0.169) (0.223) (0.155) (0.174) 
FY2003 0.1708 0.1184 0.1294 0.1649 0.1749 0.1576 0.1597 
 (0.183) (0.253) (0.193) (0.174) (0.221) (0.150) (0.189) 
        
Observations 196 196 196 196 196 196 196 
Number of ein 65 65 65 65 65 65 65 
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Hansen J 40.39 43.74 45.79 42.70 42.80 42.16 41.27 
Hansen DF 77 77 66 66 77 71 77 
Hansen P-Val 1.000 0.999 0.973 0.988 0.999 0.997 1.000 
        
AR(2) P-Val 0.741 0.936 0.996 0.889 0.988 0.622 0.840 
Wald 29130 49388 16926 28180 18417 29584 27286 
Wald P-Val 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Robust errors adjusted using Windmeijer’s finite-sample correction. 
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Table 69 
 
Impact of Revenue Type on Growth, Dynamic Analysis by Revenue Type, Hospitals Subsector 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
VARIABLES Priv Giving Dues Indirect G&M PSR Priv PSR Gov Grant NMI 
        
Size (lag) 0.4486** 0.4876** 0.4494** 0.4993*** 0.4092* 0.5080** 0.3589* 
 (0.198) (0.206) (0.210) (0.187) (0.224) (0.214) (0.208) 
Revenue Type -0.0171 0.1255 0.2408** 0.2702** 0.0835 0.1752*** 0.2084** 
 (0.094) (0.089) (0.114) (0.125) (0.109) (0.046) (0.097) 
Revenue Type % -0.1010 -1.1676 -9.1381** -10.1384* 0.6297 -3.9761*** -2.8289*** 
 (1.182) (1.734) (4.386) (5.389) (1.667) (1.179) (0.773) 
HHI -0.5965 0.2983 -0.5509 -0.2824 -0.0243 0.4062 0.5128 
 (1.096) (1.050) (1.214) (1.078) (1.353) (1.214) (1.010) 
UBI 1.2545 1.0522 0.5981 0.8334 0.5644 1.2284 0.2760 
 (0.930) (0.822) (0.712) (0.869) (0.655) (0.815) (0.582) 
Fixed Cost Ratio (lag) 0.6664 1.2328 0.7364 0.7724 0.7191 0.9433 0.1431 
 (1.179) (0.986) (1.207) (0.811) (1.086) (1.028) (1.018) 
UNA (lag) 0.0198 0.0089 -0.0034 0.0311 0.0432 0.0130 -0.0001 
 (0.027) (0.028) (0.034) (0.024) (0.034) (0.029) (0.036) 
Date of Exemption 0.0037*** 0.0030* 0.0038** 0.0031** 0.0032*** 0.0028 0.0035** 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) 
FY2000 -0.1897 -0.2074 -0.3475 -0.1848 -0.1251 -0.1967 -0.0904 
 (0.242) (0.166) (0.260) (0.225) (0.210) (0.204) (0.184) 
FY2001 -0.2558 -0.2593 -0.4641* -0.2742 -0.2282 -0.3094 -0.1108 
 (0.226) (0.180) (0.241) (0.191) (0.207) (0.192) (0.199) 
FY2002 -0.1702 -0.1938 -0.3563 -0.1293 -0.0883 -0.2114 -0.0666 
 (0.218) (0.211) (0.242) (0.196) (0.214) (0.229) (0.207) 
FY2003 0.0114 -0.1141 -0.2843 -0.0384 -0.0102 -0.1137 0.0313 
 (0.223) (0.183) (0.211) (0.221) (0.231) (0.263) (0.230) 
        
Observations 538 538 538 538 538 538 538 
Number of ein 160 160 160 160 160 160 160 
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Hansen J 92.58 74.93 89.21 65.60 96.29 84.21 82.06 
Hansen DF 89 89 89 83 89 89 89 
Hansen P-Val 0.377 0.857 0.474 0.920 0.280 0.624 0.686 
        
AR(2) P-Val 0.143 0.155 0.176 0.159 0.136 0.164 0.194 
Wald 14129 16363 11904 17609 11392 17628 9801 
Wald P-Val 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Robust errors adjusted using Windmeijer’s finite-sample correction. 
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Table 70 
 
Impact of Revenue Type on Growth, Dynamic Analysis by Revenue Type, Other Subsector 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
VARIABLES Priv Giving Dues Indirect G&M PSR Priv PSR Gov Grant NMI 
        
Size (lag) 0.2725*** 0.3001*** 0.3146*** 0.3472*** 0.2955*** 0.2813*** 0.2817*** 
 (0.061) (0.070) (0.068) (0.073) (0.062) (0.063) (0.065) 
Revenue Type 0.1344*** -0.0119 0.0366 0.0522 0.0829*** 0.0484** 0.0397** 
 (0.031) (0.025) (0.029) (0.038) (0.022) (0.022) (0.020) 
Revenue Type % -0.8389*** 0.8241 -0.8435 -0.8087 -0.6028* -1.0230* -0.8072** 
 (0.282) (0.970) (0.581) (0.607) (0.348) (0.544) (0.366) 
HHI 1.0217** 0.0338 0.3045 0.2855 0.5447 0.1053 0.0703 
 (0.431) (0.416) (0.474) (0.452) (0.379) (0.453) (0.365) 
UBI 0.1956 0.2662 0.2120 0.0816 0.1495 0.2254 -0.0132 
 (0.313) (0.191) (0.176) (0.236) (0.218) (0.234) (0.319) 
Fixed Cost Ratio (lag) -0.2152 -0.3437 -0.0866 0.0743 -0.0257 -0.1410 -0.2123 
 (0.461) (0.473) (0.515) (0.503) (0.485) (0.470) (0.496) 
UNA (lag) 0.0148* 0.0090 0.0100 0.0133 0.0076 0.0100 0.0128 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.008) 
Date of Exemption 0.0035*** 0.0041*** 0.0039*** 0.0037*** 0.0038*** 0.0042*** 0.0041*** 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
FY2000 -0.0239 -0.0227 -0.0155 -0.0316 -0.0227 -0.0195 -0.0211 
 (0.032) (0.031) (0.032) (0.036) (0.030) (0.031) (0.030) 
FY2001 -0.0313 -0.0190 -0.0177 -0.0217 -0.0217 -0.0287 -0.0375 
 (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.035) (0.032) (0.033) (0.030) 
FY2002 -0.0411 -0.0119 -0.0222 -0.0401 -0.0369 -0.0199 -0.0227 
 (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.036) (0.033) (0.034) (0.034) 
FY2003 -0.0496 -0.0401 -0.0609 -0.0543 -0.0583* -0.0403 -0.0412 
 (0.037) (0.036) (0.038) (0.039) (0.034) (0.036) (0.038) 
        
Observations 5,286 5,286 5,286 5,286 5,286 5,286 5,286 
Number of ein 1,904 1,904 1,904 1,904 1,904 1,904 1,904 
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Hansen J 120.7 146.4 130.7 134.5 124.3 127.2 123.7 
Hansen DF 91 91 91 91 91 91 91 
Hansen P-Val 0.0204 0.000209 0.00407 0.00206 0.0118 0.00733 0.0129 
        
AR(2) P-Val 0.724 0.682 0.725 0.639 0.751 0.762 0.905 
Wald 639530 594591 619718 626515 567392 573812 626938 
Wald P-Val 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Robust errors adjusted using Windmeijer’s finite-sample correction. 
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APPENDIX G: SENSITIVITY RESULTS FOR LAGGED TERMS IN DYNAMIC MODELS 
 
Table 71 
 
Sensitivity Analysis: Dynamic Analysis with Non-Lagged Fixed Costs, Arts Subsector 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
VARIABLES Priv 
Giving 
Dues Indirect G&M PSR Priv PSR Gov Grant NMI 
        
Size (lag) 0.2682*** 0.2806*** 0.2635*** 0.2805*** 0.2836*** 0.2929*** 0.2788*** 
 (0.062) (0.060) (0.067) (0.086) (0.062) (0.068) (0.069) 
Revenue Type 0.0372 0.0129 0.0388 0.0042 0.0456** 0.0299 0.0426* 
 (0.027) (0.018) (0.028) (0.037) (0.018) (0.020) (0.022) 
Revenue Type % -0.1221 -1.2109** -0.5473 -0.2220 -0.3442 -0.4707 -1.1024*** 
 (0.279) (0.487) (0.802) (0.669) (0.278) (0.494) (0.366) 
HHI 0.2093 0.0257 -0.2085 0.0254 0.1765 0.5105 0.2142 
 (0.359) (0.383) (0.386) (0.482) (0.374) (0.376) (0.370) 
UBI 0.1036 0.1564 0.2203 0.1399 0.0487 0.2283 -0.0304 
 (0.191) (0.172) (0.208) (0.255) (0.188) (0.209) (0.192) 
Fixed Cost Ratio  0.1710 -0.0822 -0.2970 -0.0722 -0.0015 -0.1711 0.1573 
 (0.451) (0.417) (0.443) (0.579) (0.423) (0.455) (0.443) 
UNA (lag) 0.0093 0.0119 0.0114 0.0085 0.0134* 0.0125 0.0091 
 (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
Date of Exemption 0.0040*** 0.0042*** 0.0044*** 0.0042*** 0.0040*** 0.0039*** 0.0041*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
FY2000 -0.0219 -0.0105 -0.0048 0.0169 0.0026 0.0031 0.0027 
 (0.027) (0.028) (0.029) (0.042) (0.026) (0.028) (0.030) 
FY2001 0.0217 0.0337 0.0322 0.0539 0.0177 0.0487* 0.0274 
 (0.026) (0.028) (0.028) (0.035) (0.026) (0.027) (0.030) 
274 
 
FY2002 -0.0075 -0.0010 0.0019 0.0056 -0.0208 0.0041 0.0077 
 (0.029) (0.029) (0.031) (0.036) (0.028) (0.029) (0.032) 
FY2003 -0.0358 -0.0286 -0.0220 -0.0148 -0.0427 -0.0218 -0.0155 
 (0.031) (0.031) (0.033) (0.039) (0.030) (0.030) (0.036) 
        
Observations 5,228 5,228 5,228 5,228 5,228 5,228 5,228 
Number of ein 1,842 1,842 1,842 1,842 1,842 1,842 1,842 
        
Hansen J 92.60 100.6 84.77 86.09 89.50 92.10 92.21 
Hansen DF 91 91 91 91 91 91 91 
Hansen P-Val 0.434 0.230 0.664 0.626 0.525 0.448 0.445 
        
AR(2) P-Val 0.123 0.130 0.126 0.127 0.117 0.145 0.126 
Wald 601130 556716 550716 535469 600719 594614 523221 
Wald P-Val 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 72 
 
Sensitivity Analysis: Dynamic Analysis with Non-Lagged UNA, Arts Subsector 
 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
VARIABLES Priv 
Giving 
Dues Indirect G&M PSR Priv PSR Gov Grant NMI 
        
Size (lag) 0.2620*** 0.2680*** 0.2496*** 0.2820*** 0.2744*** 0.2799*** 0.2718*** 
 (0.060) (0.059) (0.065) (0.075) (0.060) (0.065) (0.067) 
Revenue Type 0.0382 0.0150 0.0412 -0.0013 0.0467** 0.0319 0.0407* 
 (0.027) (0.017) (0.028) (0.038) (0.019) (0.020) (0.022) 
Revenue Type % -0.1183 -1.2169*** -0.6358 -0.1598 -0.3139 -0.5247 -1.0987*** 
 (0.281) (0.456) (0.849) (0.635) (0.286) (0.502) (0.379) 
HHI 0.2254 0.0388 -0.2676 0.0596 0.1751 0.4961 0.2228 
 (0.359) (0.397) (0.386) (0.482) (0.376) (0.376) (0.372) 
UBI 0.1122 0.1517 0.2349 0.1473 0.0766 0.2574 -0.0065 
 (0.194) (0.171) (0.216) (0.234) (0.199) (0.216) (0.197) 
Fixed Cost Ratio (lag)  0.0407 -0.0895 -0.0564 -0.0732 0.0525 0.0339 0.0364 
 (0.300) (0.304) (0.325) (0.350) (0.297) (0.319) (0.301) 
UNA 0.0077 0.0074 0.0104 0.0045 0.0190 0.0107 0.0148 
 (0.011) (0.012) (0.013) (0.012) (0.013) (0.012) (0.012) 
Date of Exemption 0.0041*** 0.0043*** 0.0045*** 0.0042*** 0.0040*** 0.0040*** 0.0041*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
FY2000 -0.0190 -0.0077 -0.0038 0.0074 0.0078 0.0046 0.0041 
 (0.027) (0.028) (0.029) (0.038) (0.026) (0.028) (0.030) 
FY2001 0.0233 0.0336 0.0311 0.0436 0.0214 0.0514* 0.0295 
 (0.026) (0.028) (0.028) (0.031) (0.026) (0.027) (0.030) 
FY2002 -0.0043 0.0014 0.0048 0.0032 -0.0155 0.0068 0.0070 
 (0.028) (0.029) (0.031) (0.034) (0.028) (0.029) (0.033) 
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FY2003 -0.0298 -0.0220 -0.0169 -0.0159 -0.0357 -0.0148 -0.0118 
 (0.030) (0.030) (0.033) (0.037) (0.030) (0.030) (0.036) 
        
Observations 5,228 5,228 5,228 5,228 5,228 5,228 5,228 
Number of ein 1,842 1,842 1,842 1,842 1,842 1,842 1,842 
        
Hansen J 94.61 102.3 89.33 85.13 90.91 94.82 92.04 
Hansen DF 91 91 91 91 91 91 91 
Hansen P-Val 0.377 0.197 0.530 0.654 0.483 0.371 0.450 
        
AR(2) P-Val 0.122 0.132 0.125 0.120 0.121 0.145 0.127 
Wald 602388 557198 547345 534594 598127 591737 513469 
Wald P-Val 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 73 
 
Sensitivity Analysis: Dynamic Analysis with Non-Lagged Fixed Costs and Non-Lagged UNA, Arts Subsector 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
VARIABLES Priv Giving Dues Indirect G&M PSR Priv PSR Gov Grant NMI 
        
Size (lag) 0.2602*** 0.2701*** 0.2538*** 0.2742*** 0.2740*** 0.2794*** 0.2716*** 
 (0.060) (0.058) (0.065) (0.070) (0.060) (0.065) (0.067) 
Revenue Type 0.0378 0.0148 0.0389 -0.0012 0.0449** 0.0315 0.0411* 
 (0.027) (0.017) (0.028) (0.038) (0.019) (0.020) (0.022) 
Revenue Type % -0.1124 -1.1811** -0.5806 -0.1539 -0.2982 -0.5646 -1.0987*** 
 (0.280) (0.462) (0.821) (0.638) (0.289) (0.493) (0.379) 
HHI 0.2230 0.0299 -0.2345 0.0740 0.1626 0.4864 0.2214 
 (0.363) (0.396) (0.386) (0.468) (0.378) (0.381) (0.372) 
UBI 0.1199 0.1558 0.2388 0.1503 0.0815 0.2617 -0.0064 
 (0.197) (0.172) (0.216) (0.236) (0.199) (0.215) (0.197) 
Fixed Cost Ratio  0.1530 -0.1238 -0.3384 -0.0843 -0.0760 -0.2277 0.1334 
 (0.467) (0.432) (0.455) (0.524) (0.438) (0.474) (0.455) 
UNA 0.0072 0.0077 0.0104 0.0059 0.0191 0.0112 0.0145 
 (0.012) (0.012) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.012) (0.012) 
Date of Exemption 0.0041*** 0.0043*** 0.0044*** 0.0042*** 0.0040*** 0.0040*** 0.0041*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
FY2000 -0.0192 -0.0069 -0.0007 0.0218 0.0094 0.0059 0.0035 
 (0.027) (0.028) (0.029) (0.042) (0.026) (0.028) (0.030) 
FY2001 0.0234 0.0344 0.0347 0.0553* 0.0217 0.0514* 0.0290 
 (0.026) (0.028) (0.028) (0.034) (0.026) (0.027) (0.030) 
FY2002 -0.0054 0.0015 0.0046 0.0106 -0.0166 0.0048 0.0071 
 (0.029) (0.029) (0.031) (0.035) (0.028) (0.029) (0.033) 
FY2003 -0.0303 -0.0217 -0.0152 -0.0071 -0.0343 -0.0140 -0.0117 
 (0.031) (0.030) (0.032) (0.037) (0.030) (0.030) (0.036) 
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Observations 5,228 5,228 5,228 5,228 5,228 5,228 5,228 
Number of ein 1,842 1,842 1,842 1,842 1,842 1,842 1,842 
        
Hansen J 93.23 101.7 85.54 85.95 89.83 93.25 91.78 
Hansen DF 91 91 91 91 91 91 91 
Hansen P-Val 0.416 0.209 0.642 0.630 0.515 0.415 0.457 
        
AR(2) P-Val 0.122 0.132 0.127 0.125 0.121 0.145 0.126 
Wald 590462 552549 538700 523354 589420 585808 512059 
Wald P-Val 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
  
279 
 
APPENDIX H: SENSITIVITY RESULTS, MODEL 2 WITH A CONSTANT TERM (DYNAMIC BY REVENUE TYPE) 
 
Table 74 
 
Impact of Revenue Type on Growth, Dynamic Analysis by Revenue Type, Arts Subsector (w Constant) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
VARIABLES Priv Giving Dues Indirect G&M PSR Priv PSR Gov Grant NMI 
        
Size (lag) 0.2714*** 0.2811*** 0.2600*** 0.2930*** 0.2904*** 0.2970*** 0.2796*** 
 (0.064) (0.063) (0.069) (0.091) (0.064) (0.069) (0.071) 
Revenue Type 0.0393 0.0137 0.0401 0.0027 0.0462** 0.0296 0.0452** 
 (0.027) (0.017) (0.028) (0.034) (0.019) (0.020) (0.021) 
Revenue Type % -0.1489 -1.2413** -0.5635 -0.3071 -0.3325 -0.4182 -1.1103*** 
 (0.273) (0.491) (0.850) (0.657) (0.276) (0.502) (0.369) 
HHI 0.1807 -0.0125 -0.2335 -0.1949 0.1065 0.4661 0.1636 
 (0.343) (0.362) (0.367) (0.369) (0.353) (0.354) (0.354) 
UBI 0.0921 0.1557 0.2155 0.1432 0.0554 0.2245 -0.0341 
 (0.186) (0.170) (0.206) (0.228) (0.187) (0.209) (0.190) 
Fixed Cost Ratio (lag) 0.0621 -0.0930 -0.0538 0.0474 0.0694 0.0398 0.0418 
 (0.292) (0.301) (0.318) (0.372) (0.287) (0.313) (0.295) 
UNA (lag) 0.0100 0.0127* 0.0117 0.0073 0.0141* 0.0131* 0.0100 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) 
Date of Exemption 0.0010 0.0025 0.0044 0.0070 0.0074 0.0018 0.0005 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) 
FY2000 -0.0208 -0.0110 -0.0082 -0.0270 -0.0001 0.0024 0.0039 
 (0.026) (0.028) (0.029) (0.031) (0.026) (0.027) (0.030) 
FY2001 0.0239 0.0341 0.0287 0.0203 0.0143 0.0493* 0.0297 
 (0.026) (0.029) (0.029) (0.030) (0.026) (0.027) (0.032) 
FY2002 -0.0033 0.0003 0.0018 -0.0134 -0.0234 0.0072 0.0121 
 (0.029) (0.030) (0.032) (0.034) (0.029) (0.031) (0.034) 
FY2003 -0.0320 -0.0274 -0.0238 -0.0558 -0.0493 -0.0211 -0.0102 
 (0.032) (0.034) (0.036) (0.039) (0.032) (0.033) (0.039) 
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Constant 6.1171 3.4323 -0.1019 -5.5152 -6.7824 4.1643 7.1973 
 (14.126) (13.193) (13.155) (13.898) (12.144) (12.550) (14.463) 
        
Observations 5,228 5,228 5,228 5,228 5,228 5,228 5,228 
Number of ein 1,842 1,842 1,842 1,842 1,842 1,842 1,842 
        
Hansen J 94.22 101.1 88.64 83.09 90.10 93.57 92.84 
Hansen DF 91 91 91 91 91 91 91 
Hansen P-Val 0.388 0.221 0.550 0.710 0.507 0.406 0.427 
        
AR(2) P-Val 0.123 0.129 0.125 0.114 0.114 0.141 0.125 
Wald 39.13 66.13 40.67 28.78 59.95 55.06 42.73 
Wald P-Val 0.000100 1.68e-09 5.57e-05 0.00424 2.30e-08 1.76e-07 2.51e-05 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 75 
 
Impact of Revenue Type on Growth, Dynamic Analysis by Revenue Type, Health Subsector (w Constant) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
VARIABLES Priv Giving Dues Indirect G&M PSR Priv PSR Gov Grant NMI 
        
Size (lag) 0.5556*** 0.5831*** 0.5787*** 0.5811*** 0.5431*** 0.5380*** 0.5397*** 
 (0.057) (0.055) (0.054) (0.057) (0.053) (0.056) (0.055) 
Revenue Type 0.1071*** 0.0390 0.0448** 0.0873* 0.1419*** 0.1015*** 0.0915*** 
 (0.022) (0.024) (0.019) (0.051) (0.024) (0.021) (0.025) 
Revenue Type % -0.6781** -0.0545 -0.4774 -1.1013 -1.7367*** -0.6747* -1.3686*** 
 (0.273) (0.545) (0.545) (0.761) (0.318) (0.367) (0.429) 
HHI 1.1479*** 0.8149** 0.8419** 0.8415** 1.6588*** 1.0473*** 1.0647*** 
 (0.398) (0.319) (0.369) (0.338) (0.420) (0.370) (0.351) 
UBI -0.2695 0.1243 0.2050 0.0307 0.0595 0.2734 0.0233 
 (0.511) (0.502) (0.552) (0.486) (0.426) (0.482) (0.427) 
Fixed Cost Ratio (lag) 0.9239** 0.8304** 0.7891** 0.8047** 0.5554* 0.6770** 0.5996 
 (0.374) (0.370) (0.363) (0.376) (0.297) (0.341) (0.383) 
UNA (lag) 0.0227** 0.0280*** 0.0256*** 0.0306*** 0.0294*** 0.0261*** 0.0332*** 
 (0.009) (0.010) (0.010) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010) 
Date of Exemption 0.0385*** 0.0418*** 0.0426*** 0.0407*** 0.0342*** 0.0375*** 0.0453*** 
 (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) 
FY2000 -0.0350 -0.0110 -0.0130 -0.0254 -0.0184 -0.0356 -0.0550 
 (0.036) (0.034) (0.036) (0.038) (0.039) (0.036) (0.036) 
FY2001 -0.0850** -0.0498 -0.0641* -0.0682* -0.0665* -0.0670** -0.1090*** 
 (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.036) (0.038) (0.034) (0.035) 
FY2002 -0.1061*** -0.0715** -0.0848** -0.0773** -0.0797** -0.0988*** -0.1248*** 
 (0.037) (0.036) (0.037) (0.038) (0.038) (0.036) (0.038) 
FY2003 -0.1321*** -0.1115*** -0.1249*** -0.1229*** -0.1274*** -0.1296*** -0.1312*** 
 (0.040) (0.039) (0.040) (0.040) (0.040) (0.038) (0.042) 
        
Constant -73.0602*** -79.1811*** -80.7017*** -77.0882*** -64.5683*** -70.5318*** -86.3184*** 
 (11.060) (11.533) (11.628) (11.653) (12.328) (12.223) (14.263) 
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Observations 6,666 6,666 6,666 6,666 6,666 6,666 6,666 
Number of ein 2,230 2,230 2,230 2,230 2,230 2,230 2,230 
        
Hansen J 147.5 138.2 141.7 139.0 139.0 136.1 150.4 
Hansen DF 91 91 91 91 91 91 91 
Hansen P-Val 0.000167 0.00104 0.000529 0.000895 0.000895 0.00156 8.93e-05 
        
AR(2) P-Val 0.266 0.242 0.239 0.243 0.255 0.282 0.245 
Wald 221.9 191.9 166.2 177.7 276.2 226.4 210.8 
Wald P-Val 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 76 
 
Impact of Revenue Type on Growth, Dynamic Analysis by Revenue Type, Human Services Subsector (w Constant) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
VARIABLES Priv Giving Dues Indirect G&M PSR Priv PSR Gov Grant NMI 
        
Size (lag) 0.3378*** 0.3378*** 0.3499*** 0.3341*** 0.3429*** 0.3551*** 0.3325*** 
 (0.025) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.026) (0.027) (0.028) 
Revenue Type 0.1079*** 0.0260* 0.0143 -0.0156 0.0758*** 0.0513*** 0.0601*** 
 (0.012) (0.016) (0.011) (0.016) (0.012) (0.013) (0.011) 
Revenue Type % -1.0053*** -0.6391* 0.2330 0.3787 -0.9804*** 0.0010 -0.7570*** 
 (0.165) (0.349) (0.358) (0.333) (0.157) (0.229) (0.159) 
HHI 0.5055*** 0.0867 0.1262 0.0059 0.6506*** 0.6033*** 0.2285 
 (0.193) (0.183) (0.185) (0.158) (0.212) (0.228) (0.188) 
UBI 0.4018** 0.3690** 0.3843** 0.4462*** 0.3475** 0.4221** 0.3050* 
 (0.193) (0.162) (0.170) (0.158) (0.156) (0.186) (0.181) 
Fixed Cost Ratio (lag) 0.3496*** 0.2259* 0.2641** 0.1640 0.1983 0.3730*** 0.1509 
 (0.124) (0.122) (0.120) (0.118) (0.122) (0.131) (0.122) 
UNA (lag) 0.0033 0.0104** 0.0111*** 0.0087** 0.0107*** 0.0078** 0.0053 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Date of Exemption 0.0129*** 0.0189*** 0.0200*** 0.0183*** 0.0159*** 0.0205*** 0.0243*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
FY2000 -0.0178* -0.0235** -0.0205** -0.0252** -0.0110 -0.0182* -0.0272*** 
 (0.011) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
FY2001 -0.0076 -0.0168 -0.0120 -0.0179 -0.0011 -0.0069 -0.0210* 
 (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.011) (0.012) (0.012) 
FY2002 -0.0191 -0.0139 -0.0153 -0.0156 0.0005 -0.0188 -0.0094 
 (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) 
FY2003 -0.0084 0.0024 0.0022 -0.0023 0.0016 -0.0051 0.0233 
 (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.013) (0.013) (0.014) (0.015) 
        
Constant -18.6981*** -30.0084*** -32.4620*** -28.7693*** -24.6884*** -34.1280*** -41.0756*** 
 (6.171) (5.531) (5.434) (5.417) (5.319) (5.566) (6.017) 
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Observations 23,727 23,727 23,727 23,727 23,727 23,727 23,727 
Number of ein 7,820 7,820 7,820 7,820 7,820 7,820 7,820 
        
Hansen J 179.8 216.5 210.8 223.4 214.7 187.8 211.6 
Hansen DF 91 91 91 91 91 91 91 
Hansen P-Val 8.61e-08 0 0 0 0 1.06e-08 0 
        
AR(2) P-Val 0.339 0.396 0.406 0.396 0.421 0.395 0.367 
Wald 450.9 247.7 260.0 229.6 324.3 326.9 320.7 
Wald P-Val 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 77 
 
Impact of Revenue Type on Growth, Dynamic Analysis by Revenue Type, Public Subsector (w Constant) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
VARIABLES Priv Giving Dues Indirect G&M PSR Priv PSR Gov Grant NMI 
        
Size (lag) 0.2684*** 0.2942*** 0.3228*** 0.2828*** 0.3260*** 0.3018*** 0.2874*** 
 (0.051) (0.047) (0.044) (0.048) (0.048) (0.045) (0.050) 
Revenue Type 0.0715*** 0.0436** 0.0174 0.0287 0.0614*** 0.0614*** 0.0561*** 
 (0.025) (0.022) (0.021) (0.037) (0.015) (0.020) (0.022) 
Revenue Type % -0.4774 -1.1127 0.2978 -0.3638 -0.6293** -0.3840 -0.9791*** 
 (0.298) (0.958) (0.562) (0.522) (0.259) (0.319) (0.303) 
HHI -0.1198 -0.4303 -0.2191 -0.8318** -0.2635 0.1859 0.0474 
 (0.388) (0.346) (0.356) (0.355) (0.361) (0.398) (0.354) 
UBI 0.4927 0.5699 0.5484 0.4951 0.4778 0.6585* 0.6149* 
 (0.346) (0.383) (0.391) (0.405) (0.375) (0.372) (0.373) 
Fixed Cost Ratio (lag) 0.1899 0.1003 0.1998 -0.0652 0.1148 0.0095 -0.1691 
 (0.326) (0.275) (0.268) (0.315) (0.269) (0.271) (0.320) 
UNA (lag) 0.0230*** 0.0235*** 0.0225*** 0.0232*** 0.0283*** 0.0225*** 0.0224*** 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
Date of Exemption 0.0060 0.0089 0.0113** 0.0098* 0.0115** 0.0049 0.0083 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) 
FY2000 0.0276 0.0274 0.0383 0.0218 0.0438* 0.0285 0.0286 
 (0.026) (0.025) (0.028) (0.028) (0.026) (0.026) (0.027) 
FY2001 0.0237 0.0232 0.0209 0.0175 0.0193 0.0188 0.0119 
 (0.027) (0.026) (0.027) (0.028) (0.027) (0.026) (0.028) 
FY2002 0.0346 0.0311 0.0230 0.0267 0.0282 0.0130 0.0184 
 (0.030) (0.029) (0.030) (0.031) (0.029) (0.028) (0.031) 
FY2003 0.0089 0.0051 -0.0004 0.0025 0.0056 -0.0131 -0.0002 
 (0.032) (0.031) (0.032) (0.032) (0.031) (0.030) (0.034) 
        
Constant -3.8353 -9.3663 -14.5625 -10.6059 -15.1272 -1.9597 -8.5748 
 (11.470) (11.622) (10.721) (11.125) (10.764) (10.730) (11.325) 
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Observations 9,228 9,228 9,228 9,228 9,228 9,228 9,228 
Number of ein 3,104 3,104 3,104 3,104 3,104 3,104 3,104 
        
Hansen J 101.0 99.88 102.6 98.65 107.9 87.83 112.4 
Hansen DF 91 91 91 91 91 91 91 
Hansen P-Val 0.223 0.246 0.191 0.274 0.109 0.575 0.0636 
        
AR(2) P-Val 0.291 0.239 0.203 0.235 0.207 0.225 0.255 
Wald 84.51 98.95 98.61 84.71 133.1 112.3 80.84 
Wald P-Val 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 78 
 
Impact of Revenue Type on Growth, Dynamic Analysis by Revenue Type, Education (without Higher Ed) Subsector (w Constant) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
VARIABLES Priv Giving Dues Indirect G&M PSR Priv PSR Gov Grant NMI 
        
Size (lag) 0.3230*** 0.3291*** 0.3240*** 0.3450*** 0.3237*** 0.2783*** 0.3204*** 
 (0.057) (0.053) (0.054) (0.068) (0.046) (0.054) (0.054) 
Revenue Type 0.1125*** 0.0294* 0.0399 0.0430 0.0815*** 0.0657*** 0.0769*** 
 (0.030) (0.017) (0.024) (0.047) (0.021) (0.025) (0.021) 
Revenue Type % -1.1185*** -0.8457** -0.6389 -0.2316 -0.6567** -0.0686 -0.9533*** 
 (0.279) (0.342) (0.778) (1.010) (0.262) (0.486) (0.318) 
HHI 1.0090** 0.4042 0.5018 0.4663 0.5582 0.7272* 0.8287** 
 (0.452) (0.338) (0.345) (0.652) (0.366) (0.398) (0.363) 
UBI 0.4012 0.1623 0.1496 0.4789 0.3374 0.2737 0.3475 
 (0.544) (0.295) (0.387) (0.542) (0.515) (0.542) (0.361) 
Fixed Cost Ratio (lag) 0.7260* 0.7639* 0.5778 0.6008 0.6094 0.7322* 0.8635** 
 (0.422) (0.430) (0.416) (0.512) (0.398) (0.406) (0.384) 
UNA (lag) 0.0260*** 0.0299*** 0.0342*** 0.0309*** 0.0291*** 0.0225*** 0.0247*** 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.010) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
Date of Exemption 0.0184*** 0.0219*** 0.0221*** 0.0230*** 0.0128* 0.0176*** 0.0251*** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) 
FY2000 0.0115 0.0220 0.0159 -0.0128 0.0066 0.0252 0.0116 
 (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.041) (0.027) (0.028) (0.028) 
FY2001 0.0090 0.0128 0.0094 0.0100 0.0092 0.0400 0.0020 
 (0.030) (0.031) (0.031) (0.040) (0.030) (0.033) (0.032) 
FY2002 -0.0086 0.0016 0.0053 -0.0082 0.0016 0.0167 0.0098 
 (0.031) (0.032) (0.032) (0.046) (0.030) (0.034) (0.033) 
FY2003 -0.0175 -0.0075 -0.0155 -0.0375 -0.0282 0.0152 -0.0084 
 (0.034) (0.034) (0.035) (0.043) (0.033) (0.036) (0.038) 
        
Constant -30.2394** -36.2151*** -36.6533*** -38.6334*** -18.4170 -27.4018** -43.1688*** 
 (11.945) (11.938) (11.765) (12.447) (13.169) (11.879) (13.671) 
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Observations 6,558 6,558 6,558 6,558 6,558 6,558 6,558 
Number of ein 2,388 2,388 2,388 2,388 2,388 2,388 2,388 
        
Hansen J 122.3 123.6 122.7 137.6 115.5 127.4 119.8 
Hansen DF 91 91 91 91 91 91 91 
Hansen P-Val 0.0161 0.0130 0.0150 0.00118 0.0427 0.00708 0.0233 
        
AR(2) P-Val 0.633 0.538 0.598 0.544 0.538 0.686 0.531 
Wald 129.2 82.17 91.60 87.10 124.3 113.8 106.1 
Wald P-Val 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 79 
 
Impact of Revenue Type on Growth, Dynamic Analysis by Revenue Type, Higher Ed Subsector (w Constant) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
VARIABLES Priv Giving Dues Indirect G&M PSR Priv PSR Gov Grant NMI 
        
Size (lag) 0.1967 0.2563 0.2822* 0.3563** 0.2271 0.2927 0.2533 
 (0.129) (0.158) (0.162) (0.179) (0.192) (0.251) (0.209) 
Revenue Type 0.0978* 0.0156 0.0621 0.0054 0.1787** 0.1958 -0.0082 
 (0.058) (0.035) (0.141) (0.086) (0.077) (0.261) (0.041) 
Revenue Type % -1.7463** -0.3600 0.3351 -2.8515 -1.7221** -1.2969 0.0627 
 (0.867) (0.509) (1.254) (2.214) (0.756) (3.396) (0.717) 
HHI 1.5440* 0.4551 1.0845 0.3702 1.5070 -0.0410 0.3522 
 (0.842) (0.439) (0.723) (0.689) (0.928) (0.849) (0.444) 
UBI 1.3387 0.8035 1.7590* 1.0660 -0.1913 1.3402 0.7796 
 (1.121) (0.981) (0.966) (1.173) (0.953) (1.282) (1.184) 
Fixed Cost Ratio (lag) -0.3158 -0.4473 -0.5225 -0.0510 -0.1831 1.0140 0.7262 
 (3.225) (1.297) (2.605) (0.727) (1.074) (2.665) (1.186) 
UNA (lag) 0.0519 0.0104 0.0536 0.0219 0.0516 0.0253 0.0352 
 (0.036) (0.018) (0.037) (0.033) (0.042) (0.023) (0.039) 
Date of Exemption -0.0079 -0.0028 0.0004 0.0084 -0.0097 0.0001 -0.0031 
 (0.023) (0.019) (0.024) (0.022) (0.032) (0.027) (0.022) 
FY2000 0.3666 0.2070 0.3223 0.3009 0.3927* 0.2119 0.2809 
 (0.255) (0.157) (0.214) (0.231) (0.210) (0.199) (0.264) 
FY2001 0.1858 0.0568 0.1020 0.0950 0.2107 0.0458 0.1532 
 (0.193) (0.132) (0.198) (0.185) (0.193) (0.212) (0.274) 
FY2002 0.1004 0.0190 0.0960 0.0918 0.0934 0.1239 0.1298 
 (0.179) (0.136) (0.219) (0.182) (0.216) (0.166) (0.208) 
FY2003 0.2033 0.0884 0.1385 0.1597 0.1838 0.1453 0.1851 
 (0.211) (0.140) (0.195) (0.181) (0.216) (0.166) (0.215) 
        
Constant 23.4509 13.8771 6.2093 -9.7132 26.0918 7.5763 14.1588 
 (45.364) (37.910) (47.848) (45.221) (64.141) (54.277) (44.478) 
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Observations 196 196 196 196 196 196 196 
Number of ein 65 65 65 65 65 65 65 
        
Hansen J 40.93 38.20 46.15 43.57 42.45 42.08 41.33 
Hansen DF 77 77 66 66 77 71 77 
Hansen P-Val 1.000 1.000 0.970 0.985 1.000 0.998 1.000 
        
AR(2) P-Val 0.730 0.819 0.961 0.938 0.991 0.662 0.828 
Wald 23.81 32.17 27.59 31.22 18.62 24.28 15.96 
Wald P-Val 0.0216 0.00130 0.00636 0.00182 0.0981 0.0186 0.193 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 80 
 
Impact of Revenue Type on Growth, Dynamic Analysis by Revenue Type, Hospitals (without Higher Ed) Subsector (w Constant) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
VARIABLES Priv Giving Dues Indirect G&M PSR Priv PSR Gov Grant NMI 
        
Size (lag) 0.4419** 0.4768** 0.4157* 0.4815*** 0.4070* 0.4950** 0.3670* 
 (0.197) (0.207) (0.213) (0.182) (0.221) (0.213) (0.204) 
Revenue Type -0.0175 0.1118 0.2476** 0.2504** 0.0859 0.1732*** 0.2108** 
 (0.101) (0.092) (0.119) (0.118) (0.106) (0.045) (0.084) 
Revenue Type % -0.2838 -1.1845 -9.3782** -8.1557 0.4287 -3.5666*** -2.5845*** 
 (1.296) (1.769) (4.344) (5.327) (1.641) (1.376) (0.745) 
HHI -0.6270 0.1950 -0.7085 0.0730 -0.0485 0.3375 0.4563 
 (1.189) (1.152) (1.237) (0.800) (1.448) (1.163) (0.897) 
UBI 1.1607 1.0315 0.4287 0.7029 0.6112 1.1064 0.2890 
 (0.911) (0.904) (0.757) (0.857) (0.647) (0.807) (0.692) 
Fixed Cost Ratio (lag) 0.6639 1.2861 0.7595 0.7547 0.6417 0.9739 0.0370 
 (1.147) (0.896) (1.073) (0.837) (1.088) (0.964) (1.070) 
UNA (lag) 0.0213 0.0099 0.0081 0.0280 0.0437 0.0200 0.0016 
 (0.029) (0.030) (0.035) (0.023) (0.033) (0.027) (0.036) 
Date of Exemption 0.0551* 0.0445 0.0510 0.0502* 0.0290 0.0400 0.0195 
 (0.031) (0.027) (0.036) (0.027) (0.041) (0.026) (0.052) 
FY2000 -0.1889 -0.2118 -0.3154 -0.1839 -0.1381 -0.1919 -0.0948 
 (0.237) (0.161) (0.264) (0.214) (0.208) (0.206) (0.169) 
FY2001 -0.2781 -0.3150* -0.4365* -0.2798 -0.2405 -0.2700 -0.1321 
 (0.235) (0.187) (0.257) (0.184) (0.206) (0.178) (0.177) 
FY2002 -0.1927 -0.2506 -0.3436 -0.1676 -0.0920 -0.2110 -0.0645 
 (0.229) (0.225) (0.235) (0.188) (0.213) (0.209) (0.205) 
FY2003 -0.0193 -0.1710 -0.2551 -0.0969 -0.0363 -0.1226 0.0155 
 (0.218) (0.196) (0.225) (0.220) (0.223) (0.188) (0.211) 
        
Constant -102.4742* -82.5065 -93.7626 -93.8952* -51.3408 -74.0018 -31.9346 
 (59.801) (54.562) (71.284) (53.529) (81.060) (51.517) (104.462) 
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Observations 538 538 538 538 538 538 538 
Number of ein 160 160 160 160 160 160 160 
        
Hansen J 94.24 74.39 88.90 63.74 95.25 79.96 78.62 
Hansen DF 89 89 89 83 89 89 89 
Hansen P-Val 0.332 0.867 0.483 0.942 0.306 0.743 0.776 
        
AR(2) P-Val 0.152 0.158 0.171 0.152 0.140 0.156 0.193 
Wald 26.39 63.27 58.87 107.3 48.72 65.96 56.45 
Wald P-Val 0.00944 5.67e-09 3.63e-08 0 2.34e-06 1.81e-09 9.94e-08 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 81 
  
Impact of Revenue Type on Growth, Dynamic Analysis by Revenue Type, Other Subsector (w Constant) 
 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
VARIABLES Priv Giving Dues Indirect G&M PSR Priv PSR Gov Grant NMI 
        
Size (lag) 0.2789*** 0.3146*** 0.3228*** 0.3484*** 0.3092*** 0.2929*** 0.2852*** 
 (0.063) (0.071) (0.071) (0.074) (0.063) (0.066) (0.066) 
Revenue Type 0.1267*** -0.0082 0.0375 0.0464 0.0776*** 0.0466** 0.0412** 
 (0.032) (0.024) (0.029) (0.035) (0.021) (0.022) (0.020) 
Revenue Type % -0.7918*** 0.7916 -0.9322 -0.7451 -0.5771* -1.0024* -0.7488** 
 (0.286) (0.895) (0.591) (0.533) (0.339) (0.552) (0.374) 
HHI 0.8106* -0.2073 0.0370 0.0855 0.3441 -0.1246 -0.1136 
 (0.444) (0.412) (0.465) (0.478) (0.382) (0.452) (0.358) 
UBI 0.1515 0.2513 0.1684 0.0614 0.0981 0.1714 -0.0635 
 (0.338) (0.171) (0.198) (0.242) (0.234) (0.260) (0.345) 
Fixed Cost Ratio (lag) -0.1608 -0.2707 -0.0322 0.0985 0.0429 -0.0933 -0.1794 
 (0.463) (0.474) (0.511) (0.488) (0.479) (0.471) (0.496) 
UNA (lag) 0.0162** 0.0115 0.0124 0.0149* 0.0101 0.0128 0.0140* 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.008) 
Date of Exemption 0.0108* 0.0138** 0.0135** 0.0129** 0.0114** 0.0144** 0.0136** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
FY2000 -0.0281 -0.0309 -0.0206 -0.0395 -0.0245 -0.0255 -0.0245 
 (0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.039) (0.030) (0.032) (0.030) 
FY2001 -0.0399 -0.0330 -0.0312 -0.0381 -0.0303 -0.0415 -0.0475 
 (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.037) (0.033) (0.034) (0.031) 
FY2002 -0.0524 -0.0320 -0.0411 -0.0587 -0.0486 -0.0378 -0.0363 
 (0.036) (0.038) (0.037) (0.041) (0.034) (0.036) (0.035) 
FY2003 -0.0638 -0.0625 -0.0825** -0.0752* -0.0719** -0.0618 -0.0562 
 (0.039) (0.039) (0.040) (0.043) (0.036) (0.039) (0.040) 
Constant -14.5579 -19.3977 -19.1073 -18.1308 -15.0762 -20.4290* -18.8389 
 (11.062) (12.038) (12.457) (13.055) (11.499) (12.201) (11.656) 
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Observations 5,286 5,286 5,286 5,286 5,286 5,286 5,286 
Number of ein 1,904 1,904 1,904 1,904 1,904 1,904 1,904 
        
Hansen J 119.8 144.5 128.0 131.5 123.0 124.2 120.7 
Hansen DF 91 91 91 91 91 91 91 
Hansen P-Val 0.0232 0.000304 0.00638 0.00351 0.0143 0.0119 0.0202 
        
AR(2) P-Val 0.705 0.677 0.722 0.648 0.735 0.758 0.922 
Wald 58.41 54.35 41.26 31.65 56.20 43.41 42.39 
Wald P-Val 4.39e-08 2.37e-07 4.43e-05 0.00157 1.10e-07 1.93e-05 2.86e-05 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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APPENDIX I: FULL ESTIMATION RESULTS, MODEL 3 (DYNAMIC FULL PORTFOLIO) 
 
Table 82 
 
Impact of Revenue Type on Growth, Dynamic Analysis of Full Portfolio 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
VARIABLES Arts Health Human 
Svcs 
Public Edu w/o 
Higher 
Higher Edu Hospitals Other 
         
Size (lag) 0.3183*** 0.5555*** 0.3369*** 0.2787*** 0.2784*** 0.1667 0.4632*** 0.2914*** 
 (0.065) (0.054) (0.027) (0.046) (0.053) (0.148) (0.139) (0.061) 
% Dues -1.0674** 0.2255 -0.1156 -1.0107 -0.2154 0.3684 0.4751 0.3792 
 (0.421) (0.453) (0.335) (0.736) (0.341) (0.973) (0.646) (0.558) 
% Indirect 0.6525 0.1227 0.7132** 0.4692 0.3630 2.2274 -4.6526 -0.2993 
 (0.526) (0.485) (0.341) (0.388) (0.574) (2.770) (3.884) (0.335) 
% Program 
Service Revenue 
(Govt.) 
-0.3379 0.3554 0.3236* 0.1077 1.4404*** 0.2174 3.1977 0.1620 
 (0.375) (0.331) (0.171) (0.272) (0.541) (1.484) (6.761) (0.251) 
% Program 
Service Revenue 
(Private) 
-0.0352 0.1435 -0.2146 0.0989 0.5628** 1.0459* 1.3246** 0.2518 
 (0.247) (0.279) (0.134) (0.209) (0.285) (0.573) (0.634) (0.234) 
% Govt. Grants -0.1601 0.8434*** 0.4595** 0.2545 1.0688*** 1.8309 -1.7492 0.0966 
 (0.275) (0.301) (0.194) (0.227) (0.306) (1.278) (2.170) (0.353) 
% NMI -1.3592*** -0.9156** -0.3375 -0.4933* -0.1758 0.7698 0.2313 -0.3138 
 (0.382) (0.407) (0.212) (0.298) (0.335) (0.647) (1.013) (0.336) 
Revenue 
Concentration 
-0.2572 0.7642** 0.4365** -0.1098 0.4130 -0.1395 -1.6242 0.1304 
 (0.338) (0.387) (0.180) (0.333) (0.309) (0.715) (1.615) (0.272) 
UBI 0.2898 0.3767 0.4988*** 0.5544 0.5618 0.8688 0.6411 -0.0065 
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 (0.211) (0.438) (0.187) (0.374) (0.441) (1.054) (0.610) (0.329) 
Fixed Cost Ratio 
(lag) 
0.0159 0.4750 0.1280 -0.2744 0.8082** 0.2806 1.1510 -0.1546 
 (0.268) (0.324) (0.133) (0.305) (0.351) (1.421) (0.984) (0.426) 
UNA (lag) 0.0067 0.0316*** 0.0109*** 0.0229*** 0.0256*** 0.0374 0.0282 0.0136 
 (0.008) (0.010) (0.004) (0.007) (0.007) (0.041) (0.030) (0.009) 
Exemption Date 0.0042*** 0.0022*** 0.0037*** 0.0042*** 0.0039*** 0.0044*** 0.0038*** 0.0041*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) 
FY2000 0.0252 -0.0380 -0.0145 0.0137 0.0157 0.2057 -0.3271 -0.0278 
 (0.027) (0.035) (0.010) (0.025) (0.028) (0.221) (0.260) (0.030) 
FY2001 0.0188 -0.0722** -0.0030 0.0035 0.0278 0.0560 -0.3793 -0.0272 
 (0.027) (0.035) (0.011) (0.026) (0.031) (0.218) (0.244) (0.032) 
FY2002 -0.0143 -0.0911** -0.0037 0.0003 0.0211 0.1208 -0.2432 -0.0300 
 (0.029) (0.037) (0.013) (0.029) (0.032) (0.205) (0.258) (0.035) 
FY2003 -0.0519 -0.1181*** 0.0042 -0.0196 0.0106 0.1909 -0.2066 -0.0750** 
 (0.032) (0.039) (0.013) (0.031) (0.034) (0.209) (0.286) (0.037) 
         
Observations 5,228 6,666 23,727 9,228 6,558 196 538 5,286 
Number of Not-
for-Profits 
1,842 2,230 7,820 3,104 2,388 65 160 1,904 
         
Hansen J 125.0 201.6 268.8 151.0 160.6 39.38 127.0 177.4 
Hansen DF 143 143 143 143 143 119 141 143 
Hansen P-Val 0.859 0.000907 9.98e-10 0.307 0.149 1 0.794 0.0268 
         
AR(2) P-Val 0.110 0.232 0.474 0.245 0.657 0.502 0.125 0.862 
Wald 542834 411841 2.108e+06 556229 480275 47295 14688 553476 
Wald P-Val 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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APPENDIX J: COMPARISON OF FIXED EFFECTS AND DYNAMIC MODELS IN 
THE ARTS SUBSECTOR 
 
 
Table 83 
 
Comparison of FE and Dynamic Models in the Arts Sector 
 
 Private Giving Non-Mission Income 
 (1) (2) (1) (2) 
VARIABLES FE Dynamic FE Dynamic 
     
Size (lag) 0.0060 0.2872*** 0.0011 0.3065*** 
 (0.065) (0.059) (0.067) (0.065) 
Revenue Type 0.0248* 0.0358 0.0347*** 0.0424** 
 (0.015) (0.025) (0.012) (0.021) 
Revenue Type % -0.0438 -0.1237 -0.5163** -1.1253*** 
 (0.106) (0.276) (0.236) (0.369) 
HHI 0.0027 0.2602 -0.0015 0.2535 
 (0.139) (0.348) (0.133) (0.352) 
UBI 0.1394 0.0970 0.1190 -0.0407 
 (0.108) (0.187) (0.111) (0.192) 
Fixed Cost Ratio (lag) 0.7104*** 0.1082 0.6737*** 0.0978 
 (0.265) (0.292) (0.257) (0.290) 
UNA (lag) 0.0167*** 0.0099 0.0166*** 0.0111 
 (0.005) (0.007) (0.004) (0.008) 
FY2000  -0.0243  -0.0011 
  (0.026)  (0.029) 
FY2001 0.0948*** 0.0236 0.0903*** 0.0303 
 (0.033) (0.026) (0.032) (0.029) 
FY2002 0.0739** -0.0059 0.0664* 0.0093 
 (0.036) (0.028) (0.035) (0.032) 
FY2003 0.0527 -0.0346 0.0516 -0.0165 
 (0.044) (0.030) (0.044) (0.036) 
Constant 11.1836*** 7.8280*** 11.3115*** 7.7506*** 
 (0.747) (0.753) (0.759) (0.796) 
     
Observations 5,133 5,133 5,133 5,133 
R-squared 0.019  0.026  
Number of ein 1,821 1,821 1,821 1,821 
Corr -0.0845  -0.109  
log likelihood -3881  -3862  
Within R-squared 0.0189  0.0261  
Between R-squared 0.00783  0.00858  
Overall R-squared 0.00864  0.0107  
Rho 0.681  0.683  
F-Stat 4.400  5.302  
Hansen J  94.52  92.97 
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Hansen DF  91  91 
Hansen P-Val  0.379  0.423 
AR(2) P-Val  0.119  0.120 
Wald  42.78  44.64 
Wald P-Val  1.18e-05  5.60e-06 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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APPENDIX K: DETAILED SUMMARY STATISTICS (SOLVENCY MODEL) 
 
Part I.  Organizations that Became Solvent 
 
Table 84 
Summary Statistics for First Year Equity Ratio (Winsorized) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 85 
Summary Statistics for First Year Surplus Ratio (Winsorized) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
106
 There were two mysteries with these “largest” values.  First, the largest numbers are not all the same 
because the winsorizing took place as a part of the cleaning and before the small and young sample was 
created.  The second is based on nonprofits providing incorrect simple math on the Form 990, where I 
discovered that almost 10% did not have Assets – Liabilities = Fund Balances.  I had to choose to introduce 
sample bias due to arbitrary removal of a few outliers, a loss of 10% of the sample based on a math error, 
or to leave the data intact and try to minimize the few outliers remaining. I chose the latter option. 
 Percentiles  Smallest    
1% -1.512  -1.512  Observations 1659 
5% -1.512  -1.512    
10% -1.208  -1.512  Mean -.326 
25% -.430  -1.512  Std. Dev. .946 
       
50% -.156    Variance .895 
   Largest  Skewness 27.632 
75% -.052  .733  Kurtosis 997.96 
90% -.018  .802    
95% -.007  1.025    
99% .003  33.601
106
    
 Percentiles  Smallest    
1% -3.606  -3.606  Observations 1659 
5% -1.323  -3.606    
10% -.677  -3.606  Mean -.249 
25% -.263  -3.606  Std. Dev. .660 
       
50% -.083    Variance .435 
   Largest  Skewness -3.244 
75% .0002  .987  Kurtosis 16.051 
90% .103  .987    
95% .256  .987    
99% .987  .987    
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Table 86 
Summary Statistics for First Year Revenue Concentration 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 87 
Summary Statistics for First Year Size 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Percentiles  Smallest    
1% .328  .239  Observations 1659 
5% .443  .264    
10% .501  .271  Mean .806 
25% .606  .273  Std. Dev. .210 
       
50% .905    Variance .044 
   Largest  Skewness -.663 
75% 1  1  Kurtosis 1.991 
90% 1  1    
95% 1  1    
99% 1  1    
 Percentiles  Smallest    
1% 0  0  Observations 1659 
5% 10.434  0    
10% 10.684  0  Mean 11.355 
25% 11.022  0  Std. Dev. 1.479 
       
50% 11.464    Variance 2.188 
   Largest  Skewness -5.075 
75% 11.830  16.435  Kurtosis 41.630 
90% 12.268  16.470    
95% 12.717  16.590    
99% 14.180  17.064    
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Table 88 
Summary Statistics for First Year Age 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 89 
Summary Statistics for Second Year Equity Ratio  
   
 Percentiles  Smallest    
1% -1  -1  Observations 1659 
5% -1  -1    
10% 0  -1  Mean 2.700 
25% 1  -1  Std. Dev. 2.319 
       
50% 2    Variance 5.377 
   Largest  Skewness .266 
75% 4  7  Kurtosis 2.032 
90% 6  7    
95% 7  7    
99% 7  7    
 Percentiles  Smallest    
1% -1.512  -1.512  Observations 1659 
5% -1.512  -1.512    
10% -.913  -1.512  Mean -.247 
25% -.273  -1.512  Std. Dev. 1.129 
       
50% -.097    Variance 1.274 
   Largest  Skewness 32.313 
75% -.032  .548  Kurtosis 1223.842 
90% -.009  .979    
95% -.004  2.161    
99% .047  42.346    
302 
 
 
Table 90 
Summary Statistics for Second Year Surplus Ratio 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 91 
Summary Statistics for Second Year Revenue Concentration 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 Percentiles  Smallest    
1% -2.793  -3.606  Observations 1659 
5% -.591  -3.606    
10% -.324  -3.606  Mean -.048 
25% -.058  -3.606  Std. Dev. .470 
       
50% .008    Variance .221 
   Largest  Skewness -4.643 
75% .077  .987  Kurtosis 34.256 
90% .212  .987    
95% .388  .987    
99% .922  .987    
 Percentiles  Smallest    
1% .326  .243  Observations 1659 
5% .425  .252    
10% .494  .257  Mean .800 
25% .590  .268  Std. Dev. .214 
       
50% .894    Variance .046 
   Largest  Skewness -.641 
75% .999  1  Kurtosis 1.948 
90% 1  1    
95% 1  1    
99% 1  1    
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Table 92 
Summary Statistics for Second Year Size 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 93 
Summary Statistics for Second Year Age 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 Percentiles  Smallest    
1% 8.857  0  Observations 1659 
5% 10.553  0    
10% 10.749  0  Mean 11.603 
25% 11.153  0  Std. Dev. 1.239 
       
50% 11.613    Variance 1.536 
   Largest  Skewness -4.533 
75% 12.028  15.747  Kurtosis 48.136 
90% 12.599  15.887    
95% 13.157  16.498    
99% 14.657  16.981    
 Percentiles  Smallest    
1% 0  0  Observations 1659 
5% 0  0    
10% 1  0  Mean 3.700 
25% 2  0  Std. Dev. 2.319 
       
50% 3    Variance 5.377 
   Largest  Skewness .266 
75% 5  8  Kurtosis 2.032 
90% 7  8    
95% 8  8    
99% 8  8    
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Part II.  Organizations which Did Not Become Solvent 
 
 
Table 94 
Summary Statistics for First Year Equity Ratio (Winsorized) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 95 
Summary Statistics for First Year Surplus Ratio (Winsorized) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 Percentiles  Smallest    
1% -1.512  -1.512  Observations 8553 
5% -1.512  -1.512    
10% -1.512  -1.512  Mean -.628 
25% -1.177  -1.512  Std. Dev. .573 
       
50% -.429    Variance .328 
   Largest  Skewness -.116 
75% -.140  2.075  Kurtosis 5.734 
90% -.045  5.228    
95% -.018  5.271    
99% -.001  5.327    
 Percentiles  Smallest    
1% -3.606  -3.606  Observations 8553 
5% -1.832  -3.606    
10% -.886  -3.606  Mean -.317 
25% -.396  -3.606  Std. Dev. .794 
       
50% -.135    Variance .631 
   Largest  Skewness -2.492 
75% -.012  .987  Kurtosis 11.086 
90% .139  .987    
95% .811  .987    
99% .987  .987    
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Table 96 
Summary Statistics for First Year Revenue Concentration 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 97 
Summary Statistics for First Year Size 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Percentiles  Smallest    
1% .357  .224  Observations 8553 
5% .472  .240    
10% .505  .249  Mean .823 
25% .632  .252  Std. Dev. .203 
       
50% .938    Variance .041 
   Largest  Skewness -.779 
75% .998  1  Kurtosis 2.102 
90% 1  1    
95% 1  1    
99% 1  1    
 Percentiles  Smallest    
1% 0  0  Observations 8553 
5% 9.195  0    
10% 10.586  0  Mean 10.992 
25% 10.996  0  Std. Dev. 2.497 
       
50% 11.453    Variance 6.236 
   Largest  Skewness -3.735 
75% 11.827  16.841  Kurtosis 16.965 
90% 12.231  17.153    
95% 12.731  17.167    
99% 14.103  17.214    
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Table 98 
Summary Statistics for First Year Age 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 99 
Summary Statistics for Second Year Equity Ratio 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 Percentiles  Smallest    
1% -1  -1  Observations 8553 
5% 0  -1    
10% 0  -1  Mean 3.528 
25% 2  -1  Std. Dev. 2.342 
       
50% 4    Variance 5.486 
   Largest  Skewness -.143 
75% 6  7  Kurtosis 1.917 
90% 7  7    
95% 7  7    
99% 7  7    
 Percentiles  Smallest    
1% -1.512  -1.512  Observations 8553 
5% -1.512  -1.512    
10% -1.512  -1.512  Mean -.681 
25% -1.352  -1.512  Std. Dev. .577 
       
50% -.502    Variance .333 
   Largest  Skewness -.006 
75% -.169  1.000  Kurtosis 5.497 
90% -.056  5.228    
95% -.027  5.271    
99% -.003  5.327    
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Table 100 
Summary Statistics for Second Year Surplus Ratio 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 101 
Summary Statistics for Second Year Revenue Concentration 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Percentiles  Smallest    
1% 0  0  Observations 8553 
5% 9.621  0    
10% 10.630  0  Mean 11.128 
25% 11.074  0  Std. Dev. 2.464 
       
50% 11.565    Variance 6.073 
   Largest  Skewness -3.771 
75% 11.936  17.274  Kurtosis 17.627 
90% 12.448  17.300    
95% 12.885  17.403    
99% 14.408  17.431    
 Percentiles  Smallest    
1% -3.606  -3.606  Observations 8553 
5% -1.130  -3.606    
10% -.659  -3.606  Mean -.210 
25% -.305  -3.606  Std. Dev. .671 
       
50% -.079    Variance .450 
   Largest  Skewness -2.884 
75% .061  .987  Kurtosis 15.418 
90% .168  .987    
95% .643  .987    
99% .987  .987    
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Table 102 
Summary Statistics for Second Year Size 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 103 
Summary Statistics for Second Year Age 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Percentiles  Smallest    
1% .345  .224  Observations 8553 
5% .467  .239    
10% .503  .249  Mean .819 
25% .625  .256  Std. Dev. .204 
       
50% .930    Variance .042 
   Largest  Skewness -.755 
75% .997  1  Kurtosis 2.083 
90% 1  1    
95% 1  1    
99% 1  1    
 Percentiles  Smallest    
1% 0  0  Observations 8553 
5% 1  0    
10% 1  0  Mean 4.528 
25% 3  0  Std. Dev. 2.342 
       
50% 5    Variance 5.486 
   Largest  Skewness -.143 
75% 7  8  Kurtosis 1.917 
90% 8  8    
95% 8  8    
99% 8  8    
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APPENDIX L: DETAILED SUMMARY STATISTICS (STABILITY MODEL) 
 
Part I.  Organizations which Became Stable 
 
Table 104 
Summary Statistics for First Year Equity Ratio (Winsorized) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 105 
Summary Statistics for First Year Surplus Ratio (Winsorized) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Percentiles  Smallest    
1% -1.512  -1.512  Observations 11292 
5% -.226  -1.512    
10% -.018  -1.512  Mean .772 
25% .081  -1.512  Std. Dev. 3.578 
       
50% .259    Variance 12.803 
   Largest  Skewness 10.275 
75% .594  42.346  Kurtosis 115.774 
90% 1.101  42.346    
95% 1.816  42.346    
99% 10.910  42.346    
 Percentiles  Smallest    
1% -3.606  -3.606  Observations 11929 
5% -.775  -3.606    
10% -.399  -3.606  Mean -.020 
25% -.125  -3.606  Std. Dev. .606 
       
50% .020    Variance .367 
   Largest  Skewness -3.241 
75% .208  .987  Kurtosis 19.205 
90% .519  .987    
95% .757  .987    
99% .987  .987    
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Table 106 
Summary Statistics for First Year Revenue Concentration 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 107 
Summary Statistics for First Year Size 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 Percentiles  Smallest    
1% .329  .226  Observations 11292 
5% .416  .231    
10% .490  .232  Mean .800 
25% .600  .237  Std. Dev. .214 
       
50% .897    Variance .046 
   Largest  Skewness -.657 
75% .997  1  Kurtosis 1.979 
90% 1  1    
95% 1  1    
99% 1  1    
 Percentiles  Smallest    
1% 8.851  0  Observations 11292 
5% 10.352  0    
10% 10.581  0  Mean 11.291 
25% 10.920  0  Std. Dev. 1.182 
       
50% 11.920    Variance 1.397 
   Largest  Skewness -5.394 
75% 11.318  17.071  Kurtosis 55.808 
90% 12.132  17.167    
95% 12.524  17.559    
99% 13.596  17.876    
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Table 108 
Summary Statistics for First Year Age 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 109 
Summary Statistics for Second Year Equity Ratio 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Percentiles  Smallest    
1% -1  -1  Observations 11292 
5% -1  -1    
10% 0  -1  Mean 2.554 
25% 0  -1  Std. Dev. 2.406 
       
50% 2    Variance 5.789 
   Largest  Skewness .327 
75% 4  7  Kurtosis 1.953 
90% 6  7    
95% 7  7    
99% 7  7    
 Percentiles  Smallest    
1% -1.512  -1.512  Observations 11929 
5% -.407  -1.512    
10% -.140  -1.512  Mean .753 
25% .004  -1.512  Std. Dev. 4.609 
       
50% .089    Variance 21.243 
   Largest  Skewness 8.426 
75% .292  42.346  Kurtosis 74.974 
90% .764  42.346    
95% 1.479  42.346    
99% 42.346  42.346    
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Table 110 
Summary Statistics for Second Year Surplus Ratio 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 111 
Summary Statistics for Second Year Revenue Concentration 
 
   
 Percentiles  Smallest    
1% -3.606  -3.606  Observations 11929 
5% -1.353  -3.606    
10% -.689  -3.606  Mean -.301 
25% -.290  -3.606  Std. Dev. .652 
       
50% -.120    Variance .425 
   Largest  Skewness -3.602 
75% -.037  .987  Kurtosis 17.653 
90% .004  .987    
95% .080  .987    
99% .566  .987    
 Percentiles  Smallest    
1% .324  .218  Observations 11929 
5% .413  .229    
10% .483  .234  Mean .794 
25% .589  .235  Std. Dev. .216 
       
50% .886    Variance .047 
   Largest  Skewness -.614 
75% .997  1  Kurtosis 1.925 
90% 1  1    
95% 1  1    
99% 1  1    
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Table 112 
Summary Statistics for Second Year Size 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 113 
Summary Statistics for Second Year Age 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 Percentiles  Smallest    
1% 0  0  Observations 11929 
5% 10.125  0    
10% 10.499  0  Mean 11.171 
25% 10.854  0  Std. Dev. 1.481 
       
50% 11.293    Variance 2.194 
   Largest  Skewness -5.422 
75% 11.737  16.382  Kurtosis 42.166 
90% 12.100  16.755    
95% 12.439  16.786    
99% 13.456  17.431    
 Percentiles  Smallest    
1% 0  0  Observations 11929 
5% 0  0    
10% 1  0  Mean 3.554 
25% 1  0  Std. Dev. 2.406 
       
50% 3    Variance 5.789 
   Largest  Skewness .327 
75% 5  8  Kurtosis 1.953 
90% 7  8    
95% 8  8    
99% 8  8    
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Part II.  Organizations which Did Not Become Stable 
 
Table 114 
Summary Statistics for First Year Equity Ratio (Winsorized) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 115 
Summary Statistics for First Year Surplus Ratio (Winsorized) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Percentiles  Smallest    
1% -1.512  -1.512  Observations 16817 
5% -1.512  -1.512    
10% -1.393  -1.512  Mean .306 
25% -.314  -1.512  Std. Dev. 3.535 
       
50% .054    Variance 12.495 
   Largest  Skewness 10.458 
75% .322  42.346  Kurtosis 120.636 
90% .776  42.346    
95% 1.180  42.346    
99% 9.517  42.346    
 Percentiles  Smallest    
1% -3.606  -3.606  Observations 16817 
5% -1.266  -3.606    
10% -.663  -3.606  Mean -.163 
25% -.251  -3.606  Std. Dev. .728 
       
50% -.049    Variance .530 
   Largest  Skewness -2.779 
75% .095  .987  Kurtosis 13.687 
90% .416  .987    
95% .786  .987    
99% .987  .987    
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Table 116 
Summary Statistics for First Year Revenue Concentration 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 117 
Summary Statistics for First Year Size 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Percentiles  Smallest    
1% .346  .221  Observations 16817 
5% .458  .221    
10% .502  .224  Mean .823 
25% .636  .234  Std. Dev. .205 
       
50% .937    Variance .042 
   Largest  Skewness -.806 
75% .999  1  Kurtosis 2.180 
90% 1  1    
95% 1  1    
99% 1  1    
 Percentiles  Smallest    
1% 0  0  Observations 16817 
5% 10.326  0    
10% 10.620  0  Mean 11.192 
25% 10.984  0  Std. Dev. 1.982 
       
50% 11.427    Variance 3.928 
   Largest  Skewness -4.534 
75% 11.829  17.654  Kurtosis 26.635 
90% 12.278  17.739    
95% 12.773  17.813    
99% 14.112  18.926    
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Table 118 
Summary Statistics for First Year Age 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 119 
Summary Statistics for Second Year Equity Ratio 
  
 Percentiles  Smallest    
1% -1.512  -1.512  Observations 16817 
5% -1.512  -1.512    
10% -1.512  -1.512  Mean .099 
25% -.511  -1.512  Std. Dev. 3.489 
       
50% -.021    Variance 12.171 
   Largest  Skewness 11.013 
75% .119  42.346  Kurtosis 130.943 
90% .403  42.346    
95% .792  42.346    
99% 6.206  42.346    
 Percentiles  Smallest    
1% -3.606  -3.606  Observations 16817 
5% -1.449  -3.606    
10% -.767  -3.606  Mean -.315 
25% -.344  -3.606  Std. Dev. .693 
       
50% -.131    Variance .480 
   Largest  Skewness -3.093 
75% -.038  .987  Kurtosis 14.887 
90% .007  .987    
95% .094  .987    
99% .987  .987    
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Table 120 
Summary Statistics for Second Year Surplus Ratio 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 121 
Summary Statistics for Second Year Revenue Concentration 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Percentiles  Smallest    
1% -1  -1  Observations 16817 
5% -1  -1    
10% 0  -1  Mean 3.006 
25% 1  -1  Std. Dev. 2.421 
       
50% 3    Variance 5.864 
   Largest  Skewness .086 
75% 5  7  Kurtosis 1.846 
90% 6  7    
95% 7  7    
99% 7  7    
 Percentiles  Smallest    
1% .342  .224  Observations 16817 
5% .453  .229    
10% .501  .246  Mean .819 
25% .631  .249  Std. Dev. .205 
       
50% .928    Variance .042 
   Largest  Skewness -.782 
75% .998  1  Kurtosis 2.155 
90% 1  1    
95% 1  1    
99% 1  1    
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Table 122 
Summary Statistics for Second Year Size 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 123 
Summary Statistics for Second Year Age 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Percentiles  Smallest    
1% 0  0  Observations 16817 
5% 10.131  0    
10% 10.590  0  Mean 11.174 
25% 10.982  0  Std. Dev. 2.055 
       
50% 11.437    Variance 4.224 
   Largest  Skewness -4.402 
75% 11.872  16.967  Kurtosis 24.737 
90% 12.306  16.981    
95% 12.738  17.301    
99% 14.021  17.607    
 Percentiles  Smallest    
1% 0  0  Observations 16817 
5% 0  0    
10% 1  0  Mean 4.006 
25% 2  0  Std. Dev. 2.422 
       
50% 4    Variance 5.864 
   Largest  Skewness .086 
75% 6  8  Kurtosis 1.846 
90% 7  8    
95% 8  8    
99% 8  8    
319 
 
APPENDIX M: PREDICTORS OF NONPROFIT FINANCIAL RECOVERY 
 FOR SMALL AND YOUNG NONPROFITS, FULL LOGISTIC 
 REGRESSION RESULTS 
 
Table 124 
 
Predictors of Nonprofit Financial Recovery for Young and Small Nonprofits, Full 
Logistic Regression Results 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Insolvency 
Year 1 
Insolvency 
Year 2 
Disruption 
Year 1 
Disruption 
Year 2 
     
Equity Ratio 1.084*** 1.644*** 0.062*** 0.059*** 
 (0.122) (0.158) (0.006) (0.006) 
Surplus Ratio -0.142** 0.029 0.376*** 0.191*** 
 (0.056) (0.106) (0.027) (0.026) 
Revenue Concentration -0.290** -0.364** -0.587*** -0.595*** 
 (0.142) (0.143) (0.063) (0.064) 
Size -0.022 -0.037 0.052*** 0.029*** 
 (0.018) (0.023) (0.010) (0.009) 
Age -0.120*** -0.099*** -0.060*** -0.070*** 
 (0.013) (0.013) (0.005) (0.005) 
     
Sector: Arts -0.431 -0.679 -0.472*** -0.473*** 
 (0.501) (0.521) (0.167) (0.177) 
Sector: Education -0.346 -0.549 -0.185 -0.172 
 (0.504) (0.523) (0.168) (0.178) 
Sector: Environment -0.211 -0.441 -0.187 -0.163 
 (0.514) (0.534) (0.175) (0.184) 
Sector: Health -0.446 -0.569 -0.517*** -0.530*** 
 (0.502) (0.521) (0.168) (0.178) 
Sector: Human 
Services 
-0.853* -0.958* -0.716*** -0.726*** 
 (0.496) (0.515) (0.164) (0.174) 
Sector: International -0.358 -0.554 -0.346* -0.321* 
 (0.532) (0.549) (0.181) (0.190) 
Sector: Mutual Benefit -0.429 -0.224 -0.023 -0.095 
 (1.212) (1.228) (0.364) (0.369) 
Sector: Public Benefit -0.062 -0.196 -0.313* -0.305* 
 (0.506) (0.525) (0.169) (0.178) 
Sector: Religious -0.274 -0.492 -0.424** -0.432** 
 (0.504) (0.524) (0.168) (0.178) 
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Sector: Unclassified 0.777 0.932 0.203 0.171 
 (0.897) (0.856) (0.569) (0.592) 
Sector: Supporting 1 
Org. 
0.104 0.047 0.024 0.080 
 (0.517) (0.538) (0.173) (0.182) 
Sector: Sector 
Fundraising 
-0.462 -0.519 -0.251 -0.210 
 (0.564) (0.580) (0.189) (0.198) 
Sector: Private 
Grantmaker 
-0.009 -0.045 -0.266 -0.254 
 (0.566) (0.590) (0.207) (0.215) 
Sector: Public 
Foundation 
0.390 0.156 -0.002 0.058 
 (0.661) (0.682) (0.218) (0.224) 
Sector: General 
Fundraising 
-0.029 -0.080 -0.117 -0.127 
 (0.785) (0.810) (0.226) (0.233) 
     
1992 0.320 0.111 0.600* 0.566 
 (0.907) (0.862) (0.357) (0.354) 
1993 0.277 0.000 0.402 0.270 
 (0.897) (0.851) (0.357) (0.355) 
1994 -0.088 -0.351 0.248 0.099 
 (0.898) (0.852) (0.357) (0.355) 
1995 0.187 -0.095 0.383 0.227 
 (0.896) (0.850) (0.357) (0.354) 
1996 -0.058 -0.296 0.383 0.230 
 (0.897) (0.851) (0.357) (0.354) 
1997 -0.002 -0.228 0.464 0.306 
 (0.896) (0.851) (0.356) (0.354) 
1998 0.025 -0.202 0.445 0.300 
 (0.895) (0.849) (0.356) (0.353) 
1999 0.402 0.184 0.402 0.243 
 (0.893) (0.847) (0.356) (0.353) 
2000 0.067 -0.188 0.381 0.234 
 (0.894) (0.849) (0.356) (0.353) 
2001 0.277 0.084 0.296 0.159 
 (0.894) (0.848) (0.356) (0.353) 
2002 0.185 0.038 0.284 0.131 
 (0.895) (0.849) (0.356) (0.353) 
2003 0.222 -0.003 0.293 0.144 
 (0.894) (0.848) (0.355) (0.353) 
2004 0.199 0.030 0.305 0.154 
 (0.894) (0.848) (0.355) (0.352) 
2005 0.229 0.032 0.361 0.212 
 (0.893) (0.847) (0.354) (0.352) 
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2006 0.373 0.186 0.427 0.261 
 (0.892) (0.846) (0.354) (0.352) 
2007 0.023 -0.178 0.419 0.261 
 (0.894) (0.847) (0.355) (0.352) 
2008 0.201 0.029 0.140 -0.000 
 (0.909) (0.864) (0.363) (0.360) 
2009 -0.354 -0.593 -0.026 -0.145 
 (0.997) (0.960) (0.396) (0.393) 
Constant 0.051 0.949 -0.190 0.354 
 (1.048) (1.045) (0.411) (0.412) 
     
Observations 10,212 10,212 28,746 28,746 
log likelihood -4195 -4008 -18849 -18962 
McFadden’s R-squared 0.0743 0.115 0.0337 0.0280 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Base Sector: Other Supporting Public Benefit 
Base Year: 1991 
Robust Errors are Clustered on EIN 
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APPENDIX N: PREDICTORS OF NONPROFIT FINANCIAL RECOVERY 
 FOR SMALL AND YOUNG NONPROFITS, FULL LOGISTIC 
 REGRESSION RESULTS WITH AGE QUADRATIC 
 
Table 125 
Predictors of Nonprofit Financial Recovery for Young and Small Nonprofits, Full 
Logistic Regression Results with Age Quadratic 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Insolvency 
Year 1 
Insolvency 
Year 2 
Disruption 
Year 1 
Disruption 
Year 2 
     
Equity Ratio 1.084*** 1.644*** 0.062*** 0.059*** 
 (0.122) (0.158) (0.006) (0.006) 
Surplus Ratio -0.142** 0.029 0.374*** 0.191*** 
 (0.056) (0.106) (0.027) (0.026) 
Revenue Concentration -0.293** -0.366** -0.588*** -0.595*** 
 (0.142) (0.143) (0.063) (0.064) 
Size -0.022 -0.037 0.052*** 0.029*** 
 (0.018) (0.023) (0.010) (0.009) 
Age -0.142*** -0.116** -0.079*** -0.115*** 
 (0.036) (0.047) (0.015) (0.019) 
Age
2 
0.004 0.002 0.003 0.006** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.002) (0.002) 
     
Sector: Arts -0.429 -0.678 -0.469*** -0.468*** 
 (0.502) (0.521) (0.167) (0.177) 
Sector: Education -0.346 -0.549 -0.183 -0.170 
 (0.504) (0.523) (0.168) (0.177) 
Sector: Environment -0.206 -0.438 -0.184 -0.159 
 (0.514) (0.534) (0.175) (0.184) 
Sector: Health -0.445 -0.569 -0.516*** -0.529*** 
 (0.502) (0.521) (0.168) (0.178) 
Sector: Human Services -0.851* -0.958* -0.715*** -0.724*** 
 (0.497) (0.515) (0.164) (0.174) 
Sector: International -0.360 -0.555 -0.346* -0.321* 
 (0.532) (0.549) (0.181) (0.190) 
Sector: Mutual Benefit -0.437 -0.229 -0.019 -0.088 
 (1.215) (1.231) (0.365) (0.370) 
Sector: Public Benefit -0.060 -0.195 -0.311* -0.302* 
 (0.506) (0.525) (0.169) (0.178) 
Sector: Religious -0.273 -0.492 -0.422** -0.429** 
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 (0.505) (0.524) (0.168) (0.178) 
Sector: Unclassified 0.768 0.926 0.200 0.167 
 (0.900) (0.858) (0.570) (0.592) 
Sector: Supporting 1 
Org. 
0.105 0.046 0.025 0.082 
 (0.518) (0.538) (0.173) (0.182) 
Sector: Sector 
Fundraising 
-0.462 -0.519 -0.250 -0.208 
 (0.564) (0.580) (0.189) (0.198) 
Sector: Private 
Grantmaker 
-0.005 -0.043 -0.268 -0.255 
 (0.566) (0.590) (0.207) (0.215) 
Sector: Public 
Foundation 
0.393 0.158 -0.002 0.058 
 (0.661) (0.682) (0.218) (0.224) 
Sector: General 
Fundraising 
-0.025 -0.078 -0.115 -0.122 
 (0.785) (0.811) (0.226) (0.233) 
     
1992 0.331 0.116 0.608* 0.581 
 (0.915) (0.866) (0.356) (0.354) 
1993 0.285 0.004 0.409 0.282 
 (0.905) (0.855) (0.357) (0.354) 
1994 -0.081 -0.348 0.253 0.108 
 (0.906) (0.856) (0.357) (0.355) 
1995 0.194 -0.092 0.387 0.234 
 (0.903) (0.854) (0.356) (0.354) 
1996 -0.055 -0.295 0.386 0.235 
 (0.905) (0.855) (0.356) (0.354) 
1997 0.004 -0.225 0.468 0.313 
 (0.904) (0.855) (0.356) (0.353) 
1998 0.034 -0.198 0.451 0.312 
 (0.903) (0.853) (0.356) (0.353) 
1999 0.412 0.189 0.409 0.254 
 (0.901) (0.851) (0.355) (0.353) 
2000 0.077 -0.183 0.389 0.248 
 (0.902) (0.853) (0.355) (0.353) 
2001 0.288 0.088 0.304 0.172 
 (0.902) (0.852) (0.356) (0.353) 
2002 0.193 0.042 0.291 0.143 
 (0.903) (0.853) (0.355) (0.353) 
2003 0.230 0.001 0.299 0.155 
 (0.902) (0.852) (0.355) (0.352) 
2004 0.208 0.034 0.311 0.165 
 (0.902) (0.852) (0.354) (0.352) 
2005 0.238 0.037 0.367 0.223 
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 (0.901) (0.851) (0.354) (0.351) 
2006 0.382 0.189 0.433 0.272 
 (0.900) (0.850) (0.354) (0.351) 
2007 0.034 -0.173 0.427 0.275 
 (0.902) (0.851) (0.354) (0.352) 
2008 0.211 0.035 0.148 0.014 
 (0.917) (0.868) (0.363) (0.360) 
2009 -0.348 -0.590 -0.015 -0.128 
 (1.004) (0.964) (0.396) (0.393) 
     
Constant 0.057 0.970 -0.187 0.398 
 (1.054) (1.048) (0.410) (0.412) 
     
Observations 10,212 10,212 28,746 28,746 
log likelihood -4194 -4008 -18848 -18959 
McFadden’s R-squared 0.0743 0.115 0.0338 0.0281 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Base Sector: Other Supporting Public Benefit 
Base Year: 1991 
Robust Errors are Clustered on EIN 
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APPENDIX O: PEARSON CORRELATION MATRICES FOR ASSETS 
 AS SIZE 
 
Table 126 
Pearson Correlations for the Small and Young Solvency Estimation (Assets) 
 Variable Equity Surplus HHI Size Age 
 Solvency .169* .033* -.030* -.218* -.130* 
Solvency
 
Year 1 
 
Equity 1     
Surplus .310* 1    
HHI -.039* -.027* 1   
Size 
(Assets) 
-.445* -.150* .075* 1  
Age -.099* .091* -.028* .221* 1 
Solvency
 
Year 2 
 
Solvency .224* .093* -.033* -.198* -.130* 
Equity 1     
Surplus .262* 1    
HHI -.031* -.013 1   
Size 
(Assets) 
-.491* -.185* .077* 1  
 Age -.140* -.003 -.017 .190* 1 
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Table 127 
 Pearson Correlations for the Small and Young Stability Estimation (Assets) 
 Variable Equity Surplus HHI Size Age 
 Stability .064* .103* -.054* -.184* .092* 
Stability
 
Year 1 
 
Equity 1     
Surplus -.225* 1    
HHI -.007 .031* 1   
Size 
(Assets) 
.117* -.149* .028* 1  
Age -.002 -.129* -.047* .153* 1 
Stability
 
Year 2 
 
Stability .080* .010 -.59* -.224* -.092* 
Equity 1     
Surplus -.395* 1    
HHI .000 .024* 1   
Size 
(Assets)e 
-.062* -.223* .015* 1  
 Age -.024* .012 -.014* .154* 1 
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APPENDIX P: SENSITIVITY LOGISTIC RESULTS FOR ASSETS AS SIZE 
 
Table 128 
 
Predictors of Not-for-Profit Financial Recovery for Young and Small Nonprofits, 
Sensitivity Logistical Regression Results for Measuring Size in Log of Assets 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Insolvency 
Year 1 
Insolvency 
Year 2 
Disruption 
Year 1 
Disruption 
Year 2 
     
Equity Ratio 0.820*** 1.463*** 0.067*** 0.053*** 
 (0.115) (0.158) (0.007) (0.005) 
Surplus Ratio -0.166*** 0.095 0.359*** 0.032 
 (0.060) (0.122) (0.029) (0.025) 
Revenue 
Concentration 
-0.332** -0.313** -0.582*** -0.621*** 
 (0.145) (0.146) (0.064) (0.065) 
Size -0.156*** -0.073*** -0.191*** -0.216*** 
 (0.014) (0.016) (0.008) (0.007) 
Age -0.102*** -0.101*** -0.043*** -0.050*** 
 (0.013) (0.013) (0.006) (0.006) 
Sector: Arts -0.875* -0.912* -0.680*** -0.672*** 
 (0.491) (0.522) (0.172) (0.188) 
Sector: Education -0.644 -0.740 -0.321* -0.287 
 (0.494) (0.525) (0.173) (0.188) 
Sector: Environment -0.558 -0.617 -0.330* -0.289 
 (0.505) (0.535) (0.180) (0.195) 
Sector: Health -0.652 -0.723 -0.542*** -0.508*** 
 (0.491) (0.522) (0.173) (0.188) 
Sector: Human 
Services 
-0.977** -1.081** -0.718*** -0.668*** 
 (0.485) (0.517) (0.169) (0.184) 
Sector: International -0.658 -0.757 -0.445** -0.451** 
 (0.520) (0.552) (0.186) (0.201) 
Sector: Mutual Benefit   -0.040 -0.195 
   (0.376) (0.382) 
Sector: Public Benefit -0.294 -0.361 -0.353** -0.347* 
 (0.495) (0.526) (0.173) (0.189) 
Sector: Religious -0.592 -0.645 -0.644*** -0.649*** 
 (0.494) (0.525) (0.173) (0.189) 
Sector: Unclassified 0.328 1.154 0.009 0.680 
 (0.946) (0.911) (0.791) (0.848) 
Sector: Supporting 1 -0.097 -0.073 0.036 0.067 
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Org. 
 (0.508) (0.540) (0.178) (0.193) 
Sector: Sector 
Fundraising 
-0.717 -0.578 -0.257 -0.247 
 (0.559) (0.583) (0.194) (0.208) 
Sector: Private 
Grantmaker 
-0.181 -0.016 -0.263 -0.287 
 (0.559) (0.590) (0.212) (0.224) 
Sector: Public 
Foundation 
0.022 -0.061 -0.020 -0.035 
 (0.683) (0.692) (0.221) (0.236) 
Sector: General 
Fundraising 
-0.077 -0.119 -0.161 -0.199 
 (0.748) (0.807) (0.230) (0.245) 
1992 0.294 0.050 0.507 0.553 
 (0.868) (0.876) (0.365) (0.403) 
1993 0.194 0.045 0.302 0.266 
 (0.859) (0.864) (0.366) (0.404) 
1994 -0.142 -0.305 0.100 0.077 
 (0.859) (0.865) (0.366) (0.404) 
1995 0.116 -0.065 0.232 0.197 
 (0.857) (0.862) (0.365) (0.403) 
1996 -0.133 -0.287 0.254 0.212 
 (0.859) (0.864) (0.366) (0.403) 
1997 -0.072 -0.176 0.316 0.273 
 (0.857) (0.863) (0.365) (0.403) 
1998 -0.086 -0.197 0.310 0.278 
 (0.857) (0.862) (0.365) (0.403) 
1999 0.274 0.147 0.249 0.217 
 (0.855) (0.860) (0.365) (0.402) 
2000 -0.013 -0.151 0.245 0.237 
 (0.855) (0.861) (0.364) (0.402) 
2001 0.227 0.094 0.157 0.158 
 (0.855) (0.861) (0.365) (0.402) 
2002 0.106 0.062 0.123 0.102 
 (0.856) (0.862) (0.364) (0.402) 
2003 0.125 0.028 0.147 0.098 
 (0.855) (0.861) (0.364) (0.402) 
2004 0.068 0.062 0.157 0.128 
 (0.855) (0.860) (0.364) (0.401) 
2005 0.123 0.011 0.203 0.162 
 (0.854) (0.859) (0.363) (0.401) 
2006 0.208 0.190 0.236 0.193 
 (0.853) (0.859) (0.363) (0.401) 
2007 -0.155 -0.196 0.222 0.173 
 (0.855) (0.860) (0.364) (0.401) 
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2008 0.010 -0.022 -0.103 -0.208 
 (0.872) (0.878) (0.372) (0.410) 
2009 -0.601 -0.620 -0.304 -0.229 
 (0.967) (0.973) (0.407) (0.441) 
     
Constant 1.621 1.324 2.601*** 2.853*** 
 (0.998) (1.022) (0.411) (0.450) 
     
Observations 9,847 9,850 28,122 27,543 
log likelihood -3937 -3795 -18068 -17558 
McFadden’s R-squared 0.0922 0.123 0.0543 0.0607 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Base Sector: Other Supporting Public Benefit 
Base Year: 1991 
Robust Errors are Clustered on EIN 
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APPENDIX Q: CASE STUDY PROTOCOL 
 
 “Determinants of Demise in Small and New Not-for-Profit Organizations” 
Not-for-Profit Interview Protocol 
 
PI: Dennis Young, PhD 
Student PI: Elizabeth A.M. Searing 
(January 8, 2015) 
 
I. Scope of this Instrument 
 
This interview protocol is designed to provide a guide to investigators on the topics of 
interest during the interview.  The exact wording of the questions may change depending 
on the flow of the interview; questions may be entirely removed or added depending on 
what information has emerged already or due to time or the interviewee’s interest 
constraints. 
 
The interview subjects are all managers affiliated with not-for-profits (or nonprofits, here 
used interchangeably) which are in the mental health subsector, were formed after 2000, 
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have made less than 150,000 USD in revenues per year during their lifetime, and are 
located in one of the three target cities in New York state. The "dead" organizations are 
identified through the cessation of filing the mandatory 990 financial form for more than 
two years between their designation of 501(c)3 tax status and 2013. The primary contact 
listed on the most recent filed 990 form is then sent recruitment information via email 
(preferably), letter, or phone call. Following the agreement to participate in the study, a 
comparable "living" organization will be determined in the same geographical area and 
the same recruitment process followed. 
 
Be sure to make note of the surroundings; each interview will take place either over the 
telephone or in-person. The in-person interviews will take place at either the location of 
the not-for-profit organization or a public space agreed upon by the subject. 
 
II. Begin with: 
 
 Brief personal introduction (name, school) 
 State purpose (they may not understand or remember the interview’s purpose), 
such as: 
“My work focuses on how different factors impact the closure or mergers of non-profits 
in New York State.  I am interviewing both currently and formerly operating mental 
health non-profits in Albany, Syracuse, and Buffalo. Questions will cover general 
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operations, goals, and situational factors.  I will combine and analyze all of the data from 
several organizations, then produce a paper which will be made available to you.  
Knowing your story will help guide other nonprofits as they decide how to make the 
world a better place while keeping themselves afloat.   
 Request interviewee to sign IRB informed consent form 
 Request to tape record 
 
Table 129 
Suggested Interview Questions 
Q# Question Notes for the 
Interviewer 
   
 Acquire written consent:  
 Interview Responder Code:  
 Organization Creation and Founding Decisions  
   
 Confirm name, founding date, and closure date (if 
there was one). 
 
1 How did your organization get started?  
2 Were you a part of the founding team?  If not, when 
during the life of the organization were you brought 
in? 
 
3 What are/were the core activities of your 
organization? 
 
4 Was your organization in existence in some form 
before formal incorporation?  For how long? 
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5 At the time of incorporation was your company 
aware of other organizations providing similar 
services to the same population? 
 
6 If so, what set you apart from these organizations?  
7 How did you fund the first year of operation as a 
501(c)3? 
Donations, 
fundraisers/ earned 
revenues,sales of 
goods/program fees 
including medicaid/ 
government grant 
or contract 
excluding medicaid/ 
foundation grant/ 
foundation loan or 
PRI/corporate or 
commercial grant/ 
corporate or 
commercial loan or 
PRI/ privately 
funded by 
founder/privately 
funded by non-
founder/ parent or 
affiliate 
organization 
 Mission and Goals  
   
8 What was your organization’s mission?  
9 Did you help create that mission?  
10 How was/is Organization going to achieve the 
mission? 
 
11 What were your short term and long term goals when 
you started? 
 
12 Has that changed any over time, either in terms of the 
mission or the means of achievement? 
 
13 Is there anything you wish you had done differently 
in terms of your mission when you first started 
working with Organization? 
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 Commitment Theory  
   
14 Let’s talk about the people who worked with you.  
How many were there? 
 
15 Did that number grow or shrink over time?  
16 How did people who contributed to the organization 
learn about you? 
 
17 How did people who volunteered for your 
organization learn about you? 
 
18 Did you experience donor fatigue?  With the board?  
With non-board contributors? 
 
19 How did you keep donors engaged?  
20 Did you experience volunteer fatigue?  
21 How did you keep volunteers engaged?  
 Conflict Theory  
   
22 Did the founding team stay through the life of the 
organization/until now? 
 
23 What do you think is the strongest positive to that?  
The strongest negative? 
 
24 How did Organization handle disagreements between 
people at the organization? 
 
25 Was there ever disagreement over mission?  Over 
how to achieve the mission? 
 
26 What else were disagreements about?  
27 Did Organization get better or worse at handling 
these disagreements over time? 
 
28 Were there ever disagreement between donors and 
people who worked at Organization?  What were 
those about?  How were they resolved (or were 
they)? 
 
29 Were there ever disagreement between clients and 
people who worked at Organization?  What were 
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those about?  How were they resolved (or were 
they)? 
 
Human Resources Theory 
 
   
30 How many paid employees did your organization 
have at different times? 
FT End of first 
year/Currently; PT 
End of first 
year/Currently 
31 Were you able to offer benefits such as health 
insurance? 
 
32 How many unpaid individuals provided time to your 
organization, such as volunteers or unpaid interns? 
 
33 Where did you work before you worked at 
Organization?  How did they woo you away, or what 
brought about the founding of Organization? 
 
34 Describe what you did at Organization.  
35 Did your responsibilities stay the same during your 
time at Organization? 
 
36 Did they get easier for you to do?  
37 Did anyone ever get training outside of Organization 
on topics that would help you do your job? 
 
38 What management areas have posed significant 
challenges in your first years of operation? 
Start-up/Mission 
Development/Finan
cial 
Accounting/Legal 
support/Program 
Evaluation,Impact 
assessment/Human 
Resources/Corpora
te strategy; 
Insufficient/OK/Ade
quate/Hard to say 
39 If it cost something, who paid?  
40 How do you think your organization paid in 
comparison to other nonprofits doing similar jobs? 
 
41 Where would you have been working if it was not for  
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your position at Organization? 
 Mission Theory  
   
42 How would clients find out about your services?  
43 What would clients say the best thing about your 
organization was? 
 
44 What would your clients say was the part of your 
organization or what you did that could use the most 
improvement? 
 
45 Do you agree with their assessment?  
46 Did this change over time?  
47 How do you feel you could have improved service 
delivery, if you think you could have? 
 
48 If the community you are located in does not contain 
your clients, what do you think the community 
supports your mission?  Why do you say that? 
 
49 Did the community support get stronger or weaker 
over time? 
 
 Network Theory  
   
50 Describe the network of organizations that helped 
you deliver services. 
 
51 Did you have formal partnerships with any 
organization?  Working partnerships or referral 
networks? 
 
52 Did these partners change over time?  
53 Did you provide the same or different services as 
these partners? 
 
54 Do you wish you had more or less organizational 
partners?  Why? 
 
55 Were you part of an incubator or accelerator 
program? 
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56 Are you a member of any professional associations?  
57 Do you ever meet with other nonprofit managers, 
employees, or volunteers to discuss business-related 
activities? 
 
58 Do you ever meet with other nonprofit managers, 
employees, or volunteers for social occasions? 
 
59 Did organizations that delivered similar services 
appear or disappear during this time period?  How do 
you feel that affected Organization? 
 
60 How did/would the closure of your organization 
affect other organizations in your network? 
 
 Niche Theory  
61 What types of resources have been important in 
enabling your company to pursue its mission? 
Self-funding/ 
institutional funders 
or 
clients/community/o
rg 
partnerships/contac
ts from founding 
team and 
management 
62 Do you think that funding would be easier to achieve 
with less organizations? 
 
63 Are there too many nonprofits in the nonprofit 
sector?  Too few?  What about in mental health? 
 
64 Describe your relationship with government, if you 
have one. 
 
65 Is there anything that changed on a city level that 
impacted your delivery of services? 
 
66 Is there anything that happened on a state or national 
level that impacted your delivery of services? 
 
67 Would you consider City a good place to be a young 
nonprofit?  Why? 
 
68 How could City be more supportive of young 
nonprofits? 
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 (*When Applicable*) Organizational Closure  
69 When did Organization formally stop operating?  
70 When did it actually stop operating?  Was it a 
gradual process? 
 
71 Why do you believe Organization closed its doors?  
72 How long in advance did you know that closure was 
imminent? 
 
73 What do you think could have been done to prevent 
Organization from closing? 
 
74 Is there something you wish you had known earlier?  
 
 
III. End with: 
 Is it permissible to contact you for follow-up information?  All information will 
continue to remain confidential, regardless of response. 
 Make sure any names for potential interviewees are clearly understood and as 
much contact information is provided.  
 Follow up on any offers of information the r’s may have made during the 
interview 
 Ask for recommendations of any entrepreneurs they know which we should also 
talk to. 
 Exchange business cards 
 Profuse and sincere thanks! 
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APPENDIX R: PICTURES OF INTERVIEW TOOL 
 
 
 
Figure 44.  Interview Tool, Page 1 
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Figure 45.  Interview Tool, Page 2 
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APPENDIX S: OPEN CODING SCHEME (WITH HIGHLIGHTS SHOWING 
RELATIONSHIP TO SECONDARY CODING SCHEME) 
 
Table 130 
Open Coding Scheme 
 
Code Meaning Freq 
 FOUND Founding 2 
 Foundt time of 1 
 Foundw who 1 
 Foundy why 2 
 GOVT Government 15 
 Δ Large change 3 
 MISS Mission 11 
 IMPL Implementation 1 
 FUND Funding 11 
 CONFL Conflict 18 
 BOARD Board 9 
 NYC NYC 2 
 CITY City of NP 1 
 CONTACT Characteristic of interviewee 1 
 RELA Relationship 1 
 OUTL Personal outlook 5 
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EMP Employee or staff-related 4 
 
LIAB 
Relating to liab of newness or 
smallness 2 
 NET Network 4 
 NP Nonprofits in general, the sector 3 
 END Org closure 1 
 
  
98 
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APPENDIX T: SECONDARY CODING SCHEME 
 
Table 131 
Secondary Coding Scheme 
Freq. in 
Open Code 
Color Code Description 
19  INTERNAL 
Internal Characteristic (Including 
Board and Human Resources) 
18 
 
CONFL Conflict (Internal or External) 
15  GOVT Related to the Government 
13 
 
MISSION Related to Mission 
11 
 
FUND Financial Resources 
6 
 
NET Network-related 
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APPENDIX U: THE ROLE OF MISSION IN NFP OPERATIONAL STATUS 
Tables 132 - 139: Word Tables for Mission 
 
The  **  denotes the interviewee’s response to the direct question regarding the NFP’s 
mission. 
 
Table 132 
Mission and NFP #201 
#201 Alive  
 
 
** *The purpose is to ensure that different areas of New 
York state received equitable funding for mental health. 
 
 
 *Success is completing a certain number of projects per 
year that are focused on their main objectives 
 
 
 *Prevent the pullback of funding from rural areas as 
managed care is implemented 
 
 
 *Be a funding outlet for counties with mental health 
projects they are unable to pursue for political or 
manpower reasons.  These could be considered “one off” 
projects, but they are common. 
 Main Target Professionals; Government 
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Table 133 
Mission and NFP #302 
#302 Resurrection  
 
 
** * Purpose is to provide mutual support to group members 
in overcoming their addiction 
 
 
 * Incorporated because similar sibling organizations in 
New York State have faced individual member liability 
 
 
 * NPF maintains minimal formal responsibility and 
financial obligation so as not to incur additional 
obligations or enable addictions for the members 
 Main Target Own Members 
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Table 134 
Mission and NFP #339 
#339 Reincarnation  
  * ED was a part of his/her govt job 
  * Board are county representatives 
 
 
** * Purpose was to educate and organize policymakers in 
the depts. of health and mental health regarding specific 
New York regulations 
 
 
 * Upstate counties united against NYC, but not exactly 
the same interests 
 
 
 * Policy change is going to make small “mom and pop” 
NFPs pool together or merge; administratively 
inefficient, but more “responsive to consumer demand 
changes, not just institutional changes” 
 Main Target Government 
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Table 135 
Mission and NFP #361 
#361 Alive  
 
 
 *Founded due to a disagreement regarding a regulation 
while working for the govt or govt funding, which 
caused the founding team to go their own way. 
  *“The fight for rights never ends” 
  *Many initiatives are on a project level. 
 
 
 *Shift in attitude toward legislative education and 
advocacy occurred following a suggestion by a social 
friend. 
 
 
** *Purpose is to encourage full and accessible information 
regarding mental health education and options. 
 Main Target Government; Society 
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Table 136 
Mission and NFP #661 
#661 Alive  
 
 
** *Encourage effective programs through targeted grants 
and support.  
 
 
 *Provide a neutral clearinghouse of information 
regarding mental health education options 
 
 
 *Belief in the mission is essential for those in the 
organization – those people bring in resources 
 
 
 *Originally ambiguity about the organizational mission, 
but this cleared 
 Main Target Professionals; Society 
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Table 137 
Mission and NFP #732 
#732 Zombie  
 
 
** * Purpose was to educate and organize policymakers in 
the depts. of health and mental health regarding specific 
New York regulations 
  * Also helped limit access to certain resources 
 
 
 * Other organizations with the same targeted regulation 
were not incorporated as NPFs.  This NPF lost the 
exemption, but still technically exists. 
 Main Target Government 
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Table 138 
Mission and NFP #932 
#932 Alive  
 
 
 * Inspired by the death of a family member; founded by 
two family members and two friends 
 
 
** * The NPF exists to inform the population of the dangers 
of addiction and suicide, which includes overt trust in 
prescribers and the harms of stigma 
 
 
 * NPF also exists to increase prescriber awareness, which 
has significant roadblocks due to corporate and political 
interests 
 
 
 * Mission started with addiction, but has expanded to 
include the causes of addiction  
 
 
 * Though there have been legislative victories, it’s 
“tough calling it a success when kids are still dying.” 
 
 
 * “Education is the answer to the whole situation.” Laws, 
people, understanding, compassion – all are necessary to 
address. 
 Main Target Government; Society 
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Table 139 
Mission and NFP #991 
#991 Dead  
 
 
** *To support the needs of certain professionals in New 
York state, which consists of a heterogeneous group of 
individuals with different backgrounds and education 
levels 
 
 
 * Mission contains both advocacy and education, but the 
former pulls too many resources from the latter 
 
 
 * Difficult getting enthusiasm or funding for training the 
trainers 
  * Scope was expanded to include veterans 
 Main Target Professionals; Government 
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APPENDIX V: THE ROLE OF INTERNAL CHARACTERISTICS IN NFP 
 OPERATIONAL STATUS 
Tables 140 - 147: Word Tables for Internal Characteristics 
Table 140 
Internal Characteristics and NFP #201 
#201 Alive  
 
 
Personal * Started as government group that could chase grants 
* Would give up chairmanship to anyone interested, but 
has been around since the beginning 
* All do what’s necessary – phones, writes grants, etc. 
 
 
Staff * None full time, but some interns or project-specific 
consultants 
 
 
Board Size * 62 founders, but only 7 on the board 
* Doesn’t want to increase the number because 
consensus will be more difficult 
 
 
Board 
Composition 
* Mix based on needs: 3 conference members and 4 at-
large; some industry, 1 NYC 
* “Growing pains” due to mix of directors involved 
 
 
Client * State agencies are unable to pursue certain projects or 
funding, so they come to the NFP 
 
 
Changes * Board reorg 5-6 years ago after existential question was 
answered in the positive 
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Table 141 
Internal Characteristics and NFP #302 
#302 Resurrection  
 
 
Personal * Does jobs when needed: PR for this Area, Treasurer for 
another Area, plus Treasurer and PR for Region 
* Service recipients “owe” society 
* Persistent and asked for help when needed about tax 
forms 
 
 
Staff * Staff at Area level has organizational resources 
* No staff paid until higher levels in worldwide 
organization 
* Previous Treasurer did not know about regulatory 
requirements and status was lost for several years 
 
 
Board Size  
 
 
Board 
Composition 
* Very hierarchical structure outside of this NFP 
* Lack of participation 
 
 
Client * They are their own clients 
 
 
Changes * 120 similar groups in the area with talk of splitting 
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Table 142 
 Internal Characteristics and NFP #339 
#339 Reincarnation  
 
 
Personal *Life in professional govt 
* Serves on other county and elected boards 
* Started in hospital administration 
* Not much social interaction w work associates 
anymore 
 
 
Staff *In kind secretary, but only s/he was paid 
* Had attorney, but made errors 
 
 
Board Size *20, which was too large to manage consensus 
 
 
Board 
Composition 
* In first NPF, all govt.  Then changed to be more 
balanced. 
 
 
Client * Second and third NPFs included in board 
* Wanted to choose their own representation without 
meddling 
 
 
Changes * In later NFPs, same board size but diff composition 
* Low turnover bc “people not used to genuine efforts to 
collaborate” 
*”Voting with their feet” for disagreements 
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Table 143 
Internal Characteristics and NFP #361 
#361 Alive  
 
 
Personal * Him/her and founders worked for state agencies 
* Currently works for govt funding, with some of the 
same issues 
* Would found again, only with different expectations 
* On other NFP boards and meets for business 
* “Everyone in the field knows everyone else.” 
* Great idea from person at a casual party 
 
 
Staff  
 
 
Board Size * 5.  Of original 3, one has moved on and one has died. 
 
 
Board 
Composition 
* All but 1 board member has a “psychiatric history.” 
* One member still works for govt, which causes issues 
 
 
Client * Overlap since most board members have psychiatric 
histories. 
 
 
Changes * NFP is part time and works on very select projects 
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Table 144 
Internal Characteristics and NFP #661 
#661 Alive  
 
 
Personal * Almost left during formative years, but “committed to 
the cause” 
* Extensive contacts from current job, including social 
time 
* Working extensively with Agency 
* :Leveraging relationships to build this out.” 
 
 
Staff * Replaced only dedicated staff with professional 
management agency 
 
 
Board Size * 15, mostly the same that they started with 
 
 
Board 
Composition 
* Originally composed of breakaway group from parent 
NFP 
* Personal networks gain funders and supporters 
 
 
Client * Use of internet to find applicants is important 
 
 
Changes * Very reliant on certain donors and personal networks 
that may be waning 
* Hoping for total board turnover in coming years, 
including selves 
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Table 145 
Internal Characteristics and NFP #732 
#732 Zombie  
 
 
Personal * Background as leadership in large NFP 
* Started as low-level NFP leadership decades ago 
* Still meets with other leaders for business and personal 
 
 
Staff * Occasionally had consultants 
* Wanted someone full time that had a stronger 
relationship  than the one they had with county hospitals 
 
 
Board Size * 6, which has dwindled to 2 
 
 
Board 
Composition 
* All 6 leaders of other large NFPs 
* Contentious 
* Pieces of boards were shared between member 
agencies 
* One potential member excluded over donor concerns 
 
 
Client * People wanted access to the organizations and 
resources that were achieved through board member ties 
 
 
Changes * Outside pressures formed alliances, but new leadership 
at the agencies has decreased commitment 
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Table 146 
Internal Characteristics and NFP #932 
#932 Alive  
 
 
Personal * Tragedy to family member inspired NFP 
* Confrontational style; “chutzpah” 
* Doesn’t expect to entirely succeed  
 
 
Staff * Husband is not in outside workforce, wife is 
 
 
 
Board Size * Was 7, now 11 members 
 
 
Board 
Composition 
* Started by husband/wife and two friends of victim; 
latter gone 
* Have needed skills on board (finance, insurance, etc.) 
* New members bring the new ideas 
 
 
Client * Helping a crowd that may not want to self-identify or 
that donors may be uneasy donating to 
* Enjoys working with the kids most; also helping 
parents 
 
 
Changes * Personal nature of the mission spurs burnout 
* People that stay are the ones touched personally 
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Table 147 
Internal Characteristics and NFP #991 
#991 Dead  
 
 
Personal * Originally in govt and recommended for the job 
* “Brought advocacy and state know-how, but very little 
experience or knowledge in running a nonprofit” 
* Learned since then bc she has served as a board chair 
* His/her govt contacts helped sustain the NFP 
 
 
Staff * Between 3-5 people, some benefits 
* Some training by NFP 
 
 
Board Size  
 
 
Board 
Composition 
* Shared with competing organizations; problematic 
* Board fund drive insufficient 
* 1/3 of board academics with different priorities and 
engagement 
 
 
Client  
 
 
Changes * Board stayed constant 
* Previous ED also had conflicts w Board 
* No trust between anyone 
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APPENDIX W: THE ROLE OF CONFLICT IN NFP OPERATIONAL STATUS 
Tables 148 - 155: Word Tables for Conflict 
 
Table 148 
Conflict and NFP #201 
#201 Alive  
 Self * None evident 
 Within NFP * Board reorg 5 years ago and existence reaffirmed 
* Consensus decisions, but people with disagreements 
simply “sat out and came back” (including the person for 
a year) 
 Between NFPs * “Get bigger or get eaten.” 
 With State Govt * Helps local govt v the state: “In govt, no savings goes 
unpunished.” 
* Helps local orgs vs new state reqs 
* Fights the concentrations of power 
 With Other * Local govts use them for special projects 
 With NYC *”Black hole” for state money that needs 
counterbalancing 
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Table 149 
Conflict and NFP #302 
#302 Resurrection  
 Self * Some – service recipients like self “owe” society 
 Within NFP * Consensus means slow and difficult 
* Disagreement via absence 
* Requirements for volunteer positions 
 Between NFPs * Others like them incorporating for liability reasons 
* Higher orgs dependent on voluntary labor and 
contributions from group of autonomous NFPs 
 With State Govt * None evident 
 With Other  
 With NYC  
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Table 150 
Conflict and NFP #339 
#339 Reincarnation  
 Self * None – part of official job was the NFP 
 Within NFP * Consensus; would sometimes have “2-3 tortuous 
hours” of board meeting, but wanted consensus rather 
than compromise 
* Since in this NFP individuals had membership based 
on occupation, disagreement resulted in absence.  Most 
pronounced in smaller counties. 
* Considers longevity of board bc “people not used to 
genuine collaboration – there is no ‘stick’” 
 Between NFPs * United by common interest against NYC getting too 
much funding or attention 
* Policy changes will force mergers and/or growth 
 With State Govt * “Very volatile” 
* Power can be concentrated in small areas 
* Stakeholder groups want limited state involvement 
 With Other  
 With NYC * NFPs in NYC and their issues would be 
“disproportionately favored” 
* Unifying factor amongst non-NYC NFPs 
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Table 151 
Conflict and NFP #361 
#361 Alive  
 Self * Tension between job reqs and personal beliefs 
originally 
 Within NFP * None evident, though person is only remaining active 
member 
 Between NFPs * None evident 
 With State Govt * Founded over opposition 
* Opposition on a project basis; “fight for rights never 
ends” 
 With Other  
 With NYC  
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Table 152 
Conflict and NFP #661 
#661 Alive  
 Self * None evident 
 Within NFP * Wants more involvement, but involves outside 
consultant and expects agreement 
* Forming advisory council, but wants more board 
engagement 
* Wants national scope, but not alienate core donors 
* Founded over disagreement in leadership 
 Between NFPs * Founded because no “honest broker” of mental health 
information 
 With State Govt * Key is facilitating risk-taking programs by risk-averse 
institutions 
 With Other  
 With NYC  
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Table 153 
Conflict and NFP #732 
#732 Zombie  
 Self * None evident 
 Within NFP * High – members are all execs in other NFPs 
* “Always conflict”, “friendliness, but obvious they were 
competitors” 
* Power imbalance via social, then shifted via funding 
* Only two members left 
 Between NFPs * Others like them not always incorporate 
* Animosity from those excluded 
 With State Govt * Have to be reactionary to “20 year cycles” 
 With Other  
 With NYC  
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Table 154 
Conflict and NFP #932 
#932 Alive  
 Self * Tremendous self-blame 
 Within NFP * Disagreements regarding direction – others want 
caution 
* Burn-out 
 Between NFPs  
 With State Govt * Opposition on a project basis 
 With Other * Versus business (generally) for commoditizing people 
and patients; “no one will help you if you take on X” 
* Versus a specific business for their role in the problem, 
which won money and concessions 
* Versus other levels of government on a project basis, 
such as the mayor or national Congressional hearings 
* “The fear of every politician is negative press.” Based 
on track record, this extends to corporations. 
 With NYC  
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Table 155 
Conflict and NFP #991 
#991 Dead  
 Self * Could not establish trust because of within/between 
conflicts 
 Within NFP * Because of board overlap, within and between were the 
same conflict 
* No trust because of divisions over occupation, outside 
affiliation, and location 
 Between NFPs * Overlaps with Within NFP and With NYC 
 With State Govt  
 With Other  
 With NYC * Location of competitive power base; “downstate bias,” 
especially if your scope is state-wide 
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APPENDIX X: THE ROLE OF NETWORKS IN NFP OPERATIONAL STATUS 
Tables 156 - 163: Word Tables for Networks 
 
Table 156 
Networks and NFP #201 
#201 Alive  
 Source ED Professional; ED Personal; Board 
 Funders  
 
 
Local Govt. 
(Own) 
County (+) 
 
 
Local Govt. 
(Neighbor) 
County (+) 
 NYC Competition for resources, but on Board (+ and -) 
 State/Nat. Govt Agencies (+); Legislature (+ and -) 
 Clients  
 Corporations  
 Other NFPs Parent NFP (+); Other NFPs (+) 
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Table 157 
Networks and NFP #302 
#302 Resurrection  
 Source ED Professional 
 Funders  
 
 
Local Govt. 
(Own) 
 
 
 
Local Govt. 
(Neighbor) 
 
 NYC  
 State/Nat. Govt  
 Clients  
 Corporations  
 Other NFPs Parent and Sibling NFPs (+) 
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Table 158 
Networks and NFP #339 
#339 Reincarnation  
 Source ED Professional; Board: Providers; Peers; Families;  
 Funders  
 Local Govt. 
(Own) 
County (+) 
 Local Govt. 
(Neighbor) 
County (+) 
 NYC Competing NFPs (-); competing quasi-publics (-) 
 State/Nat. Govt Exec Agencies (+ and -) 
 Clients Stakeholder groups: providers, peers, and families (+) 
 Corporations Subcontractor (+) 
 Other NFPs Local similar missions (+, but not ally); Subsequent 
NFPs (+); smaller peer NFPs (+) 
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Table 159 
Networks and NFP #361 
#361 Alive  
 Source ED Professional; ED Personal; Board 
 Funders  
 Local Govt. 
(Own) 
 
 Local Govt. 
(Neighbor) 
 
 NYC  
 State/Nat. Govt Agencies (+ and -) 
 Clients Service Recipients (+) 
 Corporations  
 Other NFPs Contracts (+); Other NFP Boards (+) 
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Table 160 
Networks and NFP #661 
#661 Alive  
 
 
Source ED Professional; ED Personal; Board 
 
 
Funders Local Celebrities (+ and -), “a great asset if you know 
how to appreciate them the right way” 
 
 
Local Govt. 
(Own) 
 
 
 
Local Govt. 
(Neighbor) 
 
 NYC  
 State/Nat. Govt  
 Clients Funding Opportunities through the Internet (+) 
 Corporations Management Assoc. (+) 
 Other NFPs Parent NFP (+ and -); 
Other NFPs in Same Sector (+ and -) 
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Table 161 
Networks and NFP #732 
#732 Zombie  
 Source ED Professional; ED Personal; Board 
 Funders  
 Local Govt. 
(Own) 
 
 Local Govt. 
(Neighbor) 
 
 NYC  
 State/Nat. Govt Legislature (+) 
 Clients  
 Corporations Professional Contacts (+) 
 Other NFPs Other NFPs (+ and -) 
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Table 162 
Networks and NFP #932 
#932 Alive  
 
 
Source ED Personal; ED Professional; Board 
“Picked up through activities and existing contacts.” 
 Funders  
 
 
Local Govt. 
(Own) 
Own school (-), Mayor (-) 
“Community most important in supporting each other.” 
 
 
Local Govt. 
(Neighbor) 
Other Schools (+ and -) 
 NYC Particular Politician (-) 
 State/Nat. Govt National Drug Czar (+) 
 Clients Parents (+) 
 Corporations Insurance (+ and -); Referrals (+) 
 Other NFPs Referrals (+) 
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Table 163 
Networks and NFP #991 
#991 Dead  
 Source ED Professional; Board 
 Funders  
 
 
Local Govt. 
(Own) 
Roundtables on veterans affairs (+); 
Own legislators (- because state scope) 
 
 
Local Govt. 
(Neighbor) 
 
 NYC Other NFPs (-) 
 
 
State/Nat. Govt Governor’s administration (+); 
Current legislators (+ and -); Agencies (+ and -) 
 Clients Training recipients (+); 
potential clients after roundtables (+) 
 Corporations  
 Other NFPs Contracts (+); Competition for training (-); Competition 
for money and board attention (-) 
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APPENDIX Y: THE ROLE OF FINANCIAL RESOURCES IN NFP OPERATIONAL 
STATUS 
Tables 164 - 171: Word Tables for Financial Resources 
 
Table 164 
Financial Resources and NFP #201 
#201 Alive  
 Revenues * Original funding from parent govt-affiliated NFP 
* They receive both “state funding and contracts,” 
though it is unsure whether the contracts are state-
sourced 
* Some counties tried to give in-kind or lease staff rather 
than give money, but this was frowned upon 
* Money dried up during the Great Recession, which 
caused an existential re-evaluation. 
 Expenses * No full time employees, though they have hired 
consultants and interns 
 
 
Small/Young  * “Get big or get eaten – you have to be big enough to 
negotiate with a managed care company.” 
 
 
Govt. Money * They often receive end-of-fiscal leftovers for projects 
from counties since “in govt., no savings goes 
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unpunished.”  These are referred to once as “one-off,” 
but they occur more than once. 
* “They help agencies anxious to spend.” 
* Since DoH controls the Medicaid dollars, they are the 
ones in charge compared to the others. 
* Following shifting govt priorities has taught all NFP 
how to chase the money 
 Corp. Money  
 Donations * NFP created bc govt group could not chase grants 
* Currently receive some foundation grants, which are 
considered by the interviewee to be most important 
* Tough getting the first grant bc “nothing builds success 
like success.” 
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Table 165 
Financial Resources and NFP #302 
#302 Resurrection  
 Revenues * Sustained only by voluntary contributions from 
members 
 Expenses * Rent for the meeting space – should have 2-3 months 
stockpiled.  Should not stockpile more bc it creates a bad 
incentive for the individuals responsible for the money 
* Optional amount to Area, where most of the 
administrative support is located (phone line, print 
materials, etc.) 
* Optional amount to Region, which pays ~$1800 every 
other year to send an alternate delegate to the 
international meeting 
* Only the international headquarters has paid staff (and 
the contact emphasizes well-paid staff) 
* They encourage volunteers at the regional level to ask 
for reimbursement so that the true costs of running the 
organization are known. 
 
 
Small/Young * Have to be careful with their size and mission so that 
they do not encourage bad decisions by making a 
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volunteer leader either (1) flush with cash or (2) put 
under hardship trying to fulfill their duties 
* New groups like them are forming more for liability 
protection than because they feel like standalone NFPs 
 Govt Money  
 Corp. Money  
 Donations * Difficult for multiple layers of organization to subsist 
on optional donations 
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Table 166 
Financial Resources and NFP #339 
#339 Reincarnation  
 Revenues * Voluntary contributions from counties 
* Larger counties often paid more than smaller 
 Expenses * Part of ED’s paying govt job 
* Secretarial support given in kind 
* Travel for ED 
* Paid a for-profit corp. for research analysis 
* Attorney made a mistake when dissolving the first 
version NP, caused a delay and expense 
 Small/Young  * Administratively inefficient 
* More responsive to consumer change 
* Mergers might help, or at least pooling back office 
support 
* Peer support orgs especially will probably benefit from 
merging bc of the regulations 
* Policies will force even those NFP who would have 
preferred to stay small to remain small 
 Govt Money * 3 major groups: OMH, OASAS, and DOH.  DOH has 
Medicaid, though, so they “call the shots” 
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* Probably will force agency consolidations elsewhere 
soon 
 Corp. Money  
 Donations  
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Table 167 
Financial Resources and NFP #361 
#361 Alive  
 Revenues * Funded on a project basis: two foundation grants 
supported one particular project 
* Board members conduct trainings 
* Formal subcontracting relationships with one particular 
large NFP 
* They don’t compete for the same dollars other NFPs do 
bc they are not service delivery 
 Expenses * Underestimated the funding required to fund salaries 
* Contact works about 20 days/year on NFP activities 
 Small/Young * Refers to the NFP as “kindof alive,” even though it is 
alive by study standards 
 Govt Money * Govt money “ties your options”.  For example, even at 
current job, contact has to use wording that they do not 
agree with. 
* Finance officer still works for the govt and 
occasionally gets pressure about her involvement with 
the NFP 
 Corp. Money  
 Donations “Foundation grant is the easiest way ever to get money.” 
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Table 168 
Financial Resources and NFP #661 
#661 Alive  
 
 
Revenues * ED has been in role since the really successful 
fundraiser 
* A windfall fundraiser really expanded horizons; this 
event is still utilized, but there is concern about overly 
relying on the same set of donors 
 
 
Expenses * Interns or consultants for specific projects 
* Given about $30K in grants per year for 4-5 years 
* Trying to “operate, grant out , and build an 
endowment”, which is difficult bc they are all competing. 
* “The point of an org like theirs is to know the need and 
spread the money.” 
* Replaced retiring staff member with professional 
management company. 
 
 
Small/Young  * “In order to grow, you have to be credible, but 
credibility goes to those who have grown.  It’s a chicken 
and the egg problem.” 
* They found an exemplar that has grown the way they 
want to grow. 
 Govt Money  
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 Corp. Money  
 Donations * Mission people in the NFP are the ones who reach out 
to donors. 
* Their city is good not only bc of proximity to 
government, but also to notable figures. 
* Leverage existing board members or contacts into new 
members and donors. 
* People can be “great assets if you know how to 
appreciate them the right way.” 
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Table 169 
Financial Resources and NFP #732 
#732 Zombie  
 Revenues * The six member organizations had monthly dues 
* Np still technically exists bc (1) it has monetary value, 
(2) it’s connections have value, and (3) there are only 
two members remaining. 
 Expenses * No salaries or benefits 
* Occasionally brought in consultants and wanted to 
have someone with mental health experience and the 
hospitals 
 Small/Young * Internal power structures are tense, important, and 
heavily influenced by resource access 
 Govt Money  
 Corp. Money  
 Donations * A potential member was excluded bc they received 
donations from a source that an existing member 
objected to; this caused serious tension 
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Table 170 
Financial Resources and NFP #932 
#932 Alive  
 
 
Revenues * Confronted a commercial org regarding their role in his 
family tragedy; they contributed significant funding 
toward a website, hotline, and impact surveys 
* He and his wife spent almost all their money on the 
NFP 
* Billboards donated 
* Just got biggest donation, but it came with stipulations 
* Biggest mgmt. challenge: drumming up funds for an 
addiction people won’t talk about 
 Expenses * 5K calendars 
 Small/Young   
 
 
Govt Money * They don’t like govt. money – it has rules and looks 
like an endorsement 
* Govt money and corp. money are too close 
 Corp. Money * Big Pharma should pay for addiction warnings 
* Oxycodone verdict and fine was inadequate 
 Donations  
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Table 171 
Financial Resources and NFP #991 
#991 Dead  
 Revenues * Original funding from OASAS 
* Consulting contract with ATTC 
* Originally supplemented w legislative earmarks, but 
those stopped in 2010 – “death knell” 
* Needed “deeper pockets and more visibility” 
* Tried a board fund drive and grants, wasn’t enough 
* No fees for popular programs bc they’re grant funded 
* 3 Problems happened at once 
      1. Financial crisis 
      2. Earmarks were discontinued 
      3. General political instability 
 Expenses * Operating costs a problem, especially when OASAS 
cut the amount allowable to overhead.  Grants weren’t 
enough to run the program 
* Had some mgmt. training at first 
* Neither white knight org would take them bc they were 
60K in debt 
* Salaries were cut, etc. prior to closure 
 Small/Young  
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 Govt Money  
 Corp. Money  
 Donations  
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APPENDIX Z: THE ROLE OF GOVERNMENT IN NFP OPERATIONAL STATUS 
Tables 172 - 176: Word Tables for Government 
 
Table 172 
Government and Financial Resources 
Financial 
Resources 
NFP 
#201 #302 #339 #361 #661 #732 #932 #991 
Provided 
Employment Pre-
NFP 
X  X X    X 
Provides Current 
Employment  
?  X      
Provides/d Direct 
Funding to NFP 
(voluntary) 
X  X     X 
Provides/d Direct 
Funding to NFP 
(mandatory) 
        
Provides/d 
Contracts to NFP 
X     X  X 
Provides Contracts    X X   X 
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to Current 
Employment 
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Table 173 
Government and Mission (Regulation) 
Mission 
(Regulation) 
NFP 
#201 #302 #339 #361 #661 #732 #932 #991 
Govt Figures 
Targets of 
Education/ 
Advocacy 
X 
(not 
only) 
 X 
(only) 
X 
(not 
only) 
 X (not 
only) 
X (not 
only) 
 
Mission Targets 
Specific Govt 
Regulation 
  X X   X  
Specific Govt 
Regulation 
Inspired 
Formation 
  X X  X   
Lack of Specific 
Govt Regulation 
Inspired 
Formation 
      X  
Does Targeted 
Regulation 
Currently Exist? 
  No Yes  No No  
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Failure of 
Regulation 
Attributed to 
Member of Govt? 
  No    Yes  
Did Members 
Form Another 
NFP? 
  Yes   No  No 
Was NFP 
Successful? 
  Yes   Somewhat Somewhat  
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Table 174 
Government and Mission (Financial) 
Mission (Financial) 
NFP 
#201 #302 #339 #361 #661 #732 #932 #991 
Attempts to Influence 
NY State Funds 
X  X   X X X 
Being Located Close 
to Legislators is 
Important 
   X X   X 
Attempts to Influence 
National Funds 
      X  
Considers NYC a 
Funding/Attention 
Adversary 
X  X     X 
Considers (Other) 
Local Govts in 
Upstate Adversaries 
  X    X X 
Considers (Other) 
Local Govts in 
Upstate Colleagues 
X  X X    X 
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Table 175 
Government and Governance 
 
Governance 
NFP 
#201 #302 #339 #361 #661 #732 #932 #991 
Govt Figures 
Members as 
Function of Govt 
X  X 
(only) 
    X 
(not 
only) 
Govt Figures 
Members as 
Personal Individuals 
   X X    
Consensus Voting  X X   X   
Disagreements cause 
member absence 
X X X   X   
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Table 176 
Government and the Regulatory Environment 
Regulatory 
Environment 
NFP 
#201 #302 #339 #361 #661 #732 #932 #991 
Concerned 
about Power 
Concentration 
in Agencies 
X  X   X   
Concerned 
about Power 
Concentration 
in Governor 
X  X      
Concerned 
about Number 
of NFP 
Regulations 
X X X     X 
Concerned 
about Number 
of Mental 
Health 
Regulations 
X  X   X  X 
   
397 
 
Agency of 
Primary 
Concern 
Dept 
of 
Health 
 Dept. 
of 
Health 
Ofc. of 
Mental 
Health 
  Varies Indiv. 
Legislation 
Concerned 
about Influence 
of Money on 
Govt 
 X     X  
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